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ABSTRACT
REFUTATION AND JUSTIFICATION IN
MOORE »S DEFENSE OF COMMON SENSE
(April 1976)
William D. Anderson, B.A., University of Omaha
M.A.
,
University of Nebraska
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Herbert Heidelberger
My purpose is to consider two important aspects of
G.E, Moore's defense of Common Sense; His refutations
of various philosophical views and his justification of
Common Sense beliefs. 1 first examine two theories of
Moore's refutations and attempt to establish Moore's own
conception of his refutations over these two theories.
Both theories claim that Moore is not defending a
set of empirical truths which we commonly believe are true.
Norman Malcolm maintains that Moore's refutations are
successful if and only if these consist in pointing out
that certain sentences have a correct use in everyday
speech. His claim is that Moore's defense of Common Sense
is properly construed as a defense of ordinary language.
Malcolm's theory, I argue, is not established by the
premises he uses to support it. Furthermore, the argument
which he thinks Moore must employ to refute his opponents
is unsound. In the course of my discussion, I pull together
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arguments Moore offers to justify his own conception of his
refutations -- a conception according to which his refuta-
tions are of empirical views. I find that Moore's concep-
tion withstands Malcolm's objections to it.
Morris Lazerowitz's theory consists of two separate
arguments and an interpretation which these arguments jointly
are supposed to justify. Lazerowitz's interpretation of Moore's
defense of Common Sense represents Moore as resisting aca-
demic alterations in ordinary language; alterations which
Moore's opponents introduce under the impression that they
are stating important theories about the nature of things.
The first of Lazerowitz's arguments allegedly shows
that Moore's opponents are not advancing empirical views.
The second supposedly shows that Moore is not attacking
a priori claims in his refutations. I reject this second
argument when I criticize his view of logical necessity;
I reject the first after replying to Lazerowitz's claim
that the appearance/reality distinction cannot protect
an anti-Common Sense philosopher from Moore's charge that
he knows facts which render his view false.
In appealing to Common Sense propositions to refute
his opponents, Moore often says that he knows that such
propositions are true even though he cannot prove that they
are true. Some have claimed that Moore wishes to count
Common Sense beliefs as self- justified propositions. Two
Vsuch interpreters are E.D, Klemke and V.C, Chappell, They
take Moore to be suggesting that Common Sense propositions
are the ultimate propositions to which one appeals to jus-
tify claims to knowledge. Although Chappell's interpreta-
tion is more plausible than Klemke* s, each attributes to
Moore a view I believe he would want to reject.
After criticizing each of these interpretations, I
present an alternative account of Moore's appeal to Common
Sense beliefs in his arguments against scepticism, 1 sug-
gest that when Moore's arguments are viewed in terms of his
approach to criteria of knowledge, we arrive at a more rea-
sonable interpretation of his appeal. In my interpretation
I make use of a distinction Roderick Chisholm has made between
two different approaches to justification, I argue that Moore
can reasonably be construed as saying that the beliefs of
Common Sense are completely justified but not sel f- justified
,
These beliefs are ones which our criteria of knowing should
recognize as instances of knowledge, but such criteria can
tell us how to justify these beliefs in terms of more basic
propositions
,
vi
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INTRODUCTION
Vlll
G.E. Moore sets down in his "A Defense of Common
Sense"! a number of propositions which he claims he knows to
be true. He claims to know, for example, (1) that he has a
living human body
5 ( 2 ) that his body was born at a certain
time in the past and has existed continuously ever sincej
(3) that his body has been in contact with or at various dis-
tances from other things forming his environment; ( 4 ) that
the earth has existed for many years before he was born;
(5) that he is a person who has had many different kinds of
experiences such as perceiving various things around him
(the bookcase in front of him, for instance), Moore also
claims to know that many other persons have frequently known
corresponding propositions about themselves. 2 There may be,
says Moore, many propositions which can be called "Common
Sense beliefs" and which are both false and "deserve to be
mentioned with the contempt with which some philosophers
speak of 'Common Sense beliefs,' But to speak with con-
tempt of those 'Common Sense beliefs' which I have mentioned
is quite certainly the height of absurdity. "3
Moore was convinced, however, that many philosophers
did hold "in contempt" propositions like those he claims he
and others know to be true. He was concerned to defend our
^George Edward Moore, "A Defense of Common Sense,"
Philosophical Papers (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959),
pp . 32-59
,
^Ibid., pp. 33-35. ^Ibid., p, 45.
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belief that such propositions are true against the attacks of
philosophers whose views, he claims, are certainly incompati-
ble with them. Since *1 have a body* implies there are
material things, any philosopher who declares that there are
no material things is holding a view inconsistent, says Moore,
with a belief of Common Sense which we all know to be true.
Since 'My body has been in contact with or at various dis-
tances from other things' implies that space is real, any
philosopher who maintains that space is not real is likewise
holding a view incompatible with a belief of Common Sense
which we all know to be true. It is a sufficient refutation
of such views according to Moore, to simply point out that
we do know that these Common Sense beliefs are true propo-
sitions, Any philosophical theory from which it follows
that these beliefs are false is itself false. When Moore
says that we all know that these Common Sense propositions
are true, he means to include those philosophers who seem-
ingly hold views incompatible with these propositions,^
In this dissertation I am concerned with two important
features of Moore's defense of Common Sense: His refutations
of various philosophical views and his justification of Com-
mon Sense beliefs. Part 1 of the dissertation is given
over to a critical discussion of two theories of Moore'
s
refutations. In the literature on Moore's defense of Com-
^Ibid., p. 41.
Xmon Sense, I have not run across any satisfactory attempt to
show that these two theories are unsuccessful. The arguments
provided by the author of each theory have, for the most part,
gone unexamined. In Part I, my primary purpose is to defend
Moore's own conception of his refutations against these argu-
ments.
The two theories which I discuss both claim that Moore
cannot be doing what he appears to be doing in his attempts
to refute his opponents' philosophical views. Though each
theory tries to argue for the notion that Moore's opponents'
views are not empirical, they differ in important respects.
Norman Malcolm, whose theory of Moore's defense of Common
Sense is discussed and criticized in chapter I, takes Moore's
opponents to be stating what they believe are a priori truths.
He argues that if Moore's defense of Common Sense is to pro-
vide a refutation of his opponent's view, then Moore cannot
be construed as replying to his opponent with what seems to
be a simple, empirical truth. Malcolm puts forward a theory
of Moore's defense of Common Sense which implies that Moore
is defending ordinary language against attacks upon it and
not a set of empirical truths which we commonly believe to be
true. I try to show that Malcolm is not successful in estab-
lishing this theory, and that he does not provide good reasons
for supposing that Moore's own conception of his refutations
is mistaken. Moore took himself to be disestablishing philo-
sophical theories with empirical truths of Common Sense.
XI
Morris Lazerowitz's theory of Moore's defense of Com-
mon Sense is discussed in chapter II. Lazerowitz cannot
accept Moore's claim that philosophers have actually held
views inconsistent with what they knew to be true. They can-
not reasonably be said to have held views which, if incon-
sistent with empirical facts of the sort Moore appears to
bring against them, are so obviously inconsistent with such
facts. Lazerowitz contends that philosophers know such facts
and yet do not give up their views. The only reasonable
conclusion to draw, he believes, is that Moore's opponents'
views are not inconsistent with empirical facts of the sort
with which they do seem to be inconsistent. Lazerowitz offers
an argument to show that not only are Moore's opponents' views
not inconsistent with emprircal facts, they are not incom-
patible with facts which would refute non-empirical propo-
sitions. He holds a theory about logically necessary propo-
sitions which implies that if Moore's opponents' utterances
actually expressed necessary truths, then they would convey
information about the actual use of terminology. On the
supposition, however, that Moore's opponents are using lan-
guage to express necessary truths, their utterances
convey
misinformation about actual usage. Since Moore's
opponents
know ordinary usage and would, therefore, see
that their
views are refuted by facts of usage, it becomes
unreason-
able to hold that they actually believe their
utterances to
be expressions for necessary truths
- as language is now used.
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Lazerowltz gives up the idea that Moore* s opponents'
views have refutations of any kind. He presents an interpre-
tation of these views which implies that Moore's opponents
are presenting concealed, academic alterations of ordinary
language: concealed because these are presented in the form
of speech in which we ordinarily make truth-value claims, and
academic because they are not intended for practical adoption.
The philosopher, says Lazerowitz, is retailoring ordinary
usage under the false impression that he is announcing a theory
about phenomena, Moore's refutations are construed by
Lazerowitz as attempts to resist such non-practical changes
in ordinary language. To be sure, says Lazaerowitz, Moore
would not agree that this is what his refutations amount to;
Moore himself was, like his opponent, under the impression
that the disputes in which he was engaged centered on the
truth-value of a theory about things.
In chapter III I give my assessment of Lazerowitz'
s
theory of Moore's defense of Common Sense. I attempt to
show that two arguments involved in his theory are not good
arguments. One of these arguments depends on his theory
about logical necessity, a theory I critically discuss and
find to imply a contradictory claim. I try to explain how
it is that without the truth of his theory about necessity,
we do not arrive at his interpretation of Moore's refutations.
Finally, I attempt to establish that the other of his argu-
ments is unsovind and that, therefore, he has not provided a
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sufficient reason for supposing that Moore's opponents' views
are not empirical assertions.
Part II of the dissertation is concerned with the ques-
tion as to whether Moore regarded the beliefs of Common Sense
as self- justified beliefs. Would Moore claim that his refu-
tations of various philosophical views are successful because
in appealing to a Common Sense belief he is appealing to a
belief which neither has nor requires a justification in terms
of further propositions? After presenting one of Moore's typi-
cal arguments against scepticism 1 examine, in chapter IV,
two interpretations of Moore's appeal to Common Sense premises
in philosophical arguments of this sort. Each interpretation
attributes to Moore the view that Common Sense beliefs are
sel f- jus tif ied beliefs, E.D, Klemke claims that Moore regarded
the beliefs of Common Sense as self-evident truths. On the
basis of this understanding of Moore, Klemke makes a critical
assessment of Moore's appeal to Common Sense. He finds Moore's
appeal unsatisfactory. But his criticism, 1 argue, derives
from a misunderstanding, 1 attempt to show that he has misin-
terpreted Moore and that he is mistaken in saying that Moore
appealed to a supposed criterion of self-evidence to justify
acceptance of Common Sense beliefs.
What appears to be a more sympathetic interpretation
of Moore's appeal to Common Sense in his arguments against
scepticism is given by V.C. Chappell, I find that we must
distinguish two points in Chappell's interpretation in order
xiv
to determine whether Moore would subscribe to this interpre-
tation, Once these two points are distinguished, I turn to
an examination of passages in Moore's writings which Chappell
beleives support his interpretation, 1 develop Moore's notion
of immediate knowledge and conclude that Chappell has incor-
rectly identified the claim that Common Sense propositions
are known immediately with the claim that they are self-
justified, Moore's notion of immediate knowledge is compati-
ble, I argue, with the idea that there are propositions which
can be said to justify Common Sense beliefs.
It is my contention that once we follow Chisholm in dis-
tinguishing two different approaches to what he calls the
"problem of the criterion," we find an interpretation of
Moore's appeal to Common Sense which seems the most reasona-
ble to accept. It is in chapter V where I present my own
interpretation of Moore's appeal to Common Sense beliefs,
I claim that given Moore's position with respect to the pro-
blem of criteria of knowledge, he is not claiming that the
beliefs of Common Sense are self-justified , I interpret
Moore as suggesting that these beliefs are those which the
criteria of knowledge should countenance as completely justi-
fied but not as self-justified , What is involved in selec-
ting Common Sense beliefs as those which an adequate set of
criteria will countenance is explained,
Moore seems to have been in favor of a foundationalist
view of justification in which Common Sense beliefs are not
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basic. But, as I attempt to show, he was uncertain about
how these more basic propositions — on his view, propositions
about sense-data -- might justify propositions about the
external world. Nevertheless, I conclude chapter V with what
1 believe is a plausible suggestion. This is that Moore's
concerns both as a Common Sense philosopher and as a sense-
datum foundationalis t are complemented by an attempt to
formulate, as Chisholm has done, epistemic principles which
tell us how to justify propositions about the external world
on the basis of certain subjective propositions,
I should briefly mention three conventions I employ
in the dissertation, I follow Moore's practice of using
capital "C" and capital "S" in "Common Sense belief" or
"Common Sense proposition," Some authors referred to in the
dissertation follow this practice but some do not. Thus, if
one finds in the text no such capital letters, it is because
the author in question does not follow this convention, I
also follow Moore's practice of mentioning propositions by
the use of single quotation marks, unless I use the locution
"The proposition that," Finally, I frequently abbreviate
reference to Moore's general practice of defending Common
Sense, by putting just the word "defense" within quotation
marks
,
1CHAPTER I
MOORE *S DEFENSE OF COMMON SENSE AS
A DEFENSE OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE:
MALCOLM'S THEORY
Introduction
In his most recent paper on Moore's philosophical
method, Norman Malcolm makes the following statements:
... if Moore's so-called 'defense of common sense'
has any cogency, then it is not really about common
sense or common beliefs , for neither of these things is
relevant to the philosophical issues in which Moore is
involved, I take the philosophers with whom he is
engaged to be asserting that the notion of seeing a
body (or of having absolutely certain knowledge of an
empirical truth, and so on) contains a logical absur-
dity. The actual efficacy of Moore's reply, his mis-
named 'defense of common sense,' consists in reminding
us that there is a proper use for sentences like ' I see
the broom under the bed' or 'It is known for certain
that he drowned in the lake.'l
The claim that Moore's "defense" consists in pointing out
(reminding us) that certain sentences have a proper or cor-
rect use (in ordinary language) is thought by many of Moore's
commentators to involve a basic misunderstanding of his
position. It is said that Malcolm has here identified Moore's
"appeal to common sense" with his (Moore's) "appeal to ordi-
nary language," and that this is a mistake because for Moore
^Norman Malcolm, "George Edward Moore," Knowledge and
Certainty: Essays and Lectures (Englewood Cliffs,
Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. Ibl. This paper is reprinted in
Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowitz, eds,, G.E, Moore: Essays
in Retrospect (London: George Allen 6c Unwin, 1969), pp , 34-
52
.
Subsequent references to this paper are from Malcolm's
Knowledge and Certainty.
2these two appeals are entirely different. This charge was
first made by Alan R, White2 but has been made since by both
E.D. Klemke^ and Ralph S. Pomeroy,^ Coupled with this charge
is the assertion that in Moore's philosophical practice "the
appeal to ordinary language is subsidiary to the appeal to
common sense. The best expression of what is intended by
this assertion is given by White when he says:
Moore's recourse to ordinary language ... is mainly
intended to discover what a philosopher's view comes to
when put into the language we all understand, namely,
ordinary language, and to indicate what in fact are the
beliefs of common sense by referring to what we all
ordinarily say. Having established what is the philo-
sophical view and what Qi^ the common sense view and
that the two conflict, he can then use the appeal to
the latter to refute the former.^
But when Malcolm is accused of mistakenly identifying
two different appeals in Moore's works, he replies that his
interpretation of Moore's "defense" is misunderstood.
In my own writings on Moore I have not devoted any
particular attention to his practice of setting out
the implications of a philosophical position in terms
of concrete examples expressed in ordinary language:
e.g. of drawing from the philosophical proposition 'All
^Alan R. ^'/hite, G.E. Moore: A Critical Exposition
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell^ l95S), esp. pp. 5-7
.
^E.D. Klemke, The Epistemology of G.E. Moore (Evanston,
111.: Northwestern University Press, 1^69), pp. 5T-39.
'^Ralph S. Pomeroy, "Moore as an Ordinary Language
Philosopher: A Centenary Tribute," Metaphilosophy 5 (1974):
92.
^Klemke, Epistemology p. 35, See also I'/hite,
G.E. Moore
, p. 7.
^White, G.E. Moore
, p. 7.
3that we know of material objects is the orderly succes-
sion of our own sensations* the alleged consequence
that a person riding in a train cannot know, at the
time, that the train has wheels, Moore was uncommonly
skillful at this, 1 should have thought that the
merit of this 'appeal to ordinary language,' if White
wants to call it that, was beyond dispute and I agree
that it is an entirely different thing from Moore's
defense of Common Sense. When I conceived of Moore's
defense of Common Sense as a defense of ordinary lan-
guage 1 did not mean by the latter the above practice,
\>/hat I did mean can be understood only in terms of the
theory that I formed about his defense of Common Sense,
. .
,
[[andj which still seems to me to be sound, ^
The theory about Moore's defense of Common Sense
which Malcolm is referring to here is the subject of this
chapter. After explaining what this theory is I answer the
following two questions; (1) l>Jhat does Malcolm mean when he
says that Moore's defense of Common Sense is a defense of
ordinary language? (2) When conceived as a defense of ordinary
language, what is the difference between Moore's defense of
Common Sense and Moore's practice of setting out, in terms
of ordinary language, the concrete implications of a philo-
sophical position? Another way of stating (2) is; l^at is
the difference between what White and others call "Moore's
appeal to ordinary language" and what Malcolm regards as
Moore's defense of Common Sense? Once these questions are
answered I then try to establish, in order, each of the
following points; (1) that the premises supporting Malcolm's
theory of Moore's defense of Common Sense do not entail this
theory; (2) that on Malcolm's theory or interpretation, Moore
^Morman Malcolm, "Critical Notice" on A,R, White's
G,E, Moore
,
Mind 69 (1960); 95-96,
4does not succeed in refuting his opponents; (3) that Malcolm
has not shown Moore* s own conception of his refutations to
be a mistaken one.
I, Malcolm's Theory of Moore's
Defense of Common Sense
To understand Malcolm's theory according to which
Moore's "defense" consists in pointing out that certain sen-
tences have a proper or correct use in ordinary language, we
must observe what he has to say with respect to the philo-
sophical views Moore hopes to refute. Recall first that one
of Malcolm's claims is that "if Moore's so-called 'defense of
common sense' has any cogency, then it is not really about
common sense or common beliefs , for neither of these two
things is relevant to the philosophical issues in which Moore
is involved."® As Malcolm sees, for example, the philosophi-
cal issue between Moore and his opponent who claims that we
do not see physical bodies such as chairs and doors, it is
not one to be resolved in the way in which Moore thought it
could be, namely, by recourse to what "we certainly all do,
in ordinary life, constantly believe
. . .
."^ Moore, says
Malcolm, had the "mistaken idea that when he is dealing with
a proposition put forward by a philosophical skeptic he is
^Malcolm, "George Edward Moore," p. 181.
^George Edward Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy
(London: George Allen & UnwirTj^ p. l82.
5dealing with an empirical proposition. " 10 "in order to
find out what kind of thesis a philosopher [^Moore's opponent^]
IS maintaining, we have to consider the kind of support he
offers for it."H An examination of a typical argument for
the view that we do not see physical bodies shows, says
Malcolm, that what is being maintained is a non-empirical
thesis. 12
After a detailed but well documented presentation of
H.A. Prichard* s argument for the view that we do not see
bodies,!^ Malcolm writes:
The argument may be briefly recapitulated as follows:
Suppose there are two 'states,* or 'states of mind, *25
A and B. They are states of either seeing or seeming to
see a man in front of us; when state A occurs there
actually is a man in front of us*; state B is an illusion
produced by a mirror. States A and B have the same
intrinsic character — that is, if we considered state
B * in itself we could not say that it was not a state of
seeing* a man in front of us. 26 state A, therefore,
vdiich is ordinarily called 'seeing a man in front of us*
is not actually seeing a man in front of us, any more
than is the admittedly illusory state B,
The reasoning is undoubtedly obscure; but at the
same time it is extremely persuasive, and it is extremely
difficult to put one's finger on any serious error in it.^^
This argument, Malcolm adds, "is one of a number of attractive
arguments that Prichard and others have used to prove, to the
satisfaction of many philosophers, that we do not see bodies.
lOMalcolm, "George Edward Moore," p. 180.
^^Ibid., p, 181, Malcolm's footnote.
^^Ibid., p. 180. ^^Ibid,, pp. 175-176,
^^Ibid., pp. 176-177. Malcolm's footnote references
are to H.A. Prichard, Knowledge and Perception (New York:
Oxford University Pres^^j l950), pp. 49-54.
6and that what we really see are ‘sense-data* or • sensations .••• 15
If we look at this argument it becomes evident, says
Malcolm, that "Prichard's reasoning,
. . . clearly implies
that his thesis is non-empirical , " 16 Malcolm continues:
^ believe,
. . . that Prichard's real pointcould have been that visual illusions do occur in pointoff^. Suppose that they should cease to occur fi gthere are no more mirrors or reflecting surfaces): '
Prichard be willing to admit then that we seebodies? Obviously not. The 'state' that we call 'seeing
a body would not have changed its 'intrinsic character'
and could not do so. Visual illusions would be logicallypossible, and this would be enough to prove that we do
not see bodies.
In other words,
Prichard is holding that if we could see bodies then
visual illusions could not occur. The actual occurence
of illusions is not necessary for his position. The
logical possibility of illusions suffices. The logical
possibility of visual illusions is an a priori truth.
^en Prichard's view is drawn out in the only direction
it can go, it turns out to be the claim that it is an
a priori truth that we cannot see bodies.
On Malcolm's view, since "his [^Prichard ' s^] denial that
we see bodies is really the claim that it is logically impos-
sible to see bodies, Moore is not dealing with an empirical
proposition or thesis when he attempts to refute a position
such as the one Prichard holds. Consequently, if Moore is
to refute Prichard's position, his refutation cannot, says
Malcolm, consist of pointing out to Prichard that we do in
l^ibid., p. 177.
l^Ibid., p. 178.
^^Ibid., p. 181. Malcolm's footnote.
l^Ibid.
,
p. 182.
7fact see physical bodies. When Moore says, for example, "1
have often perceived both my own body and other things which
formed part of its environment
, ,
.
^i'20 cannot be reply-
ing to an opponent such as Prichard if we interpret his reply
as stating an obvious empirical truth. Prichard was not
denying the simple empirical truth that we see physical bodies.
\-</hy should we not say that what Prichard was blind to
was the fact that we do see bodies? Because, as I tried
to show, his denial that we see bodies is really the claim
that it is logically impossible to see bodies. Moore's
assertion that we do see the moon and pennies and doors
can be taken as a reply to Prichard only if it is under-
stood as the assertion that there is no logical absurdity
in the notion of seeing a body. But is it a 'common
sense view' or a 'common belief that it is logically
possible to see bodies? No, It is the kind of observation
that only a philosopher makes or understands . 21
Malcolm wishes, then, to claim two things. First,
that Prichard's position is non-empirical
,
as is (supposedly)
implied by the line of reasoning he offers for his position.
Second, that for Moore to refute Prichard's position, he cannot
reply to Prichard with an empirical statement; he must reply
with the non-empirical statement that it is logically possible
to see physical bodies. Claiming these two things, Malcolm
then argues that Prichard's position is refuted by the fact
that sentences asserting the perception of physical bodies
(perceptual sentences) have a correct use. He writes;
Prichard is holding that there is a conceptual absurdity
in saying such a thing as 'I see a raccoon in your com
20Moore, "A Defense of Common Sense," p. 33.
2lMalcolm, "George Edward Moore," p, 182.
8patch,' or in making any affirmative statement expressed
by a sentence whose main verb is some form of the verb
'see' used in a visual sense and taking for its object
the name of a body.
If those sentences embodied some conceptual absurdity
then they would not have a correct use. They could never
express true statements. But those sentences do have a
correct use. 22
In replying to Prichard, therefore, it "is both unnecessary
and misleading for Moore to assert that he has often seen the
moon, "23 that is, to make, as he thought he did, an empirically
true perceptual statement. "What is necessary and suf ficient , "24
says Malcolm,
and also puts the view he is attacking in its true light,
is to point out that the sentence ' I see the moon' has a
correct use. It is surprising that anyone should think
it has not: but philosophical reasoning has a peculiar
power to blind one to the obvious. 25
What Malcolm means in saying that Moore is defending
ordinary language
.
Malcolm's theory of Moore's defense of
Common Sense states that this defense consists in pointing
out that certain sentences have a correct use in ordinary lan-
guage. In terms of Prichard's view (position) that it is
logically impossible to see physical bodies, Moore's "defense"
consists in pointing out that sentences like "I see the moon"
have a correct use (in ordinary language). The basis for this
theory, as it applies to Prichard's view, is Malcolm's claim
that recourse to the fact that these perceptual sentences have
a correct use is both necessary and sufficient for refuting
2422ibid,, pp. 178-179.
25ibid.
23xbid., p. 180. Ibid.
9Prichard* s position. Malcolm is saying that Moore does not
have available the alternative of refuting Prichard's position
by recourse to (non-linguistic ) empirical fact; that is, Moore
cannot refute Prichard's position by pointing out the empirical
fact that he does see the moon. Prichard, on Malcolm's view,
is not denying the empirical fact that we see such things when
he says that it is logically impossible to see physical
bodies. Consequently, Malcolm holds that if Moore's "defense"
is to be a refutation of the philosophical positions he
opposes, then it has to be understood as a defense of ordinary
language. It has to be understood, in other words, as the
assertion that certain ordinary sentences have a correct use.
Only the true proposition that a certain sentence has a cor-
rect use, Malcolm is suggesting, will refute the claim that
what this sentence asserts is a logical impossibility.
The difference between what White ( and others ) call
Moore'
s
" appeal to ordinary language " and Malcolm' s conception
Moore's "defense . " What Malcolm means, then, in charac-
terizing Moore's defense of Common Sense as a defense of
ordinary language is this. Moore is successful in refuting
his opponents* views if and only if he points out that certain
sentences have a correct use in ordinary language. What
White and others are referring to, however, when they speak
of Moore's own "appeal to ordinary language" is something
entirely different from this thesis of Malcolm's. They are
referring, as Malcolm puts it, to Moore's own practice of
10
setting out in terms of concrete examples the implications
of various philosophical positions, Moore expressed these
implications in ordinary, everyday language. In the course
Of examining one theory as to our knowledge of material
objects, Moore asks us to consider whether this theory
expresses what we ordinarily believe when, for example, we
are traveling in a train. He concludes his discussion of
this theory by saying;
So long as it is merely presented in vague phrases such
as: All that we know of material objects is the orderly
succession of our own sensations; it does, in fact, sound
very plausible. But, so soon as you realize what it means
in particular instances like that of the train -- how it
means that you cannot possibly know that your carriage is
even probably, running on wheels, or coupled to other
*
carriages -- it seems to me to lose all its plausibility , 26
In stating his opponents' views in terms of concrete
examples expressed in everyday language, Moore attempts to
bring out in sharp relief the difference between what these
views imply in specific cases and "what we
, , , believe in
ordinary life;
. . , He says that he is providing his
opponents* views with "translations into the concrete," In
connection with F.H. Bradley's assertion that Time is unreal,
Moore asks;
What would most people mean by this proposition? I do not
think there is much difficulty in discovering what sort
of thing they would mean by it ... , if you try to
translate the proposition into the concrete, and to ask
26Moore, Some Main Problems
, p, 135 .
27ibid.
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what it implies, there is, 1 think, very little doubt as
o the sort of things it implies. The moment you try todo this, and think what it really comes to, you at oncebegin thinking of a number of different kinds of proposi-tions, all of which plainly must be untrue, if Time is
unreal. If Time is unreal, then plainly nothing everhappens before or after anything else; nothing is ever
simultaneous with anything else; it is never true that
anything is past; never true that anything will happen inthe future- never true that anything is happening now;
and so on.^° t-r- o ,
If these kinds of propositions are all untrue, Moore would
hold, then a whole class of more specific Common Sense propo-
sitions must be false — for example, propositions such as
'My body was born at a certain time in the past, and has
existed continuously ever since. '29 xhat is, all those prop-
ositions we ordinarily express by sentences with tensed verbs
must be false.
To decide whether a philosophical theory stated in
abstract terms goes against the beliefs of Common Sense, Moore
first attempts to discover what it means upon "translation in
the concrete." These "translations," Moore thought, allow
us to see whether what the philosopher is saying when he expresses
his view is something which we ordinarily believe (or know)
to be true. It is this feature of Moore's philosophical
practice which some philosophers, such as VJhite and Klemke,
have called Moore's "appeal to ordinary language."
28Qeorge Edward Moore, Philosophical Studies
Routledge 6c Kegan Paul, 1922) pp , 209-216.
29cf. Moore, "A Defense of Common Sense," p.
(London
:
39.
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Th^ relation between Moore* s " translations " and
Malcolm's conception of Moore's "defense ." In his "Critical
Notice" on White's book G,E. Moore: A Critical Exposition
.
Malcolm says that Moore's practice of setting out the impli-
cations of a philosophical position (that is, his practice
of "translating" such positions "into the concrete") "is an
entirely different thing from Moore's defense of Common Sense. "30
He goes on to say that "when I conceived of Moore's defense
of Common Sense as a defense of ordinary language I did not
mean by the latter the above practice. "31 We have seen what
the difference is between this practice of Moore's and what
Malcolm means when he claims that Moore is defending ordinary
language. However, in saying that Moore's practice of "trans-
lating into the concrete" his opponents* views is an entirely
different thing from Moore's defense of Common Sense, Malcolm
may be overstating his case. These two things are clearly
di-ffsrent aspects of Moore's philosophical method but they
are also related. What is more, 1 think Moore's "transla-
tions" play a role in Malcolm's theory of Moore's defense of
Common Sense.
In attempting to refute the views of his opponents,
Moore generally assumes
.
as a typical first step of his refu-
tations, a "translation into the concrete" of their views.
^^Malcolm, "Critical Notice," pp. 95-96.
31lbid.
,
p. 96.
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It is to the (alleged) truth of such propositions as 'I now
see a finger' to which Moore actually appeals in attempting
to refute a view such as Prichard's and not the (alleged)
truth of the more general proposition 'We (do) see physical
things. '32 Moore would grant, of course, that if he does
see a finger then it follows that he sees a physical body;
but he was concerned, as Malcolm himself notes, with giving
examples of true perceptual propositions in refutation of
such a view as Prichard ' s . 33
Three basic steps are involved in Moore's refutations
of what he himself takes to be his opponents' positions,
even though Moore does not explicitly state each one.3'^
Taking Prichard's position to be the empirical proposition
that we do not see physical bodies, Moore first draws from
this position the concrete implication that we do not see
such things as fingers and doors. His next step is to argue
that since, for example, he does perceive his own finger and
that door, the statement implied by Prichard's position,
the statement, namely, that we do not see such things, is
false. His final step is to infer that Prichard's view is
itself false, since only a false statement can entail a
false statement. 35 Giving a view a "translation into the
32cf. Moore, Philosophical Studies , p. 226-227.
33Malcolm, "George Edward Moore," p. 180.
3^See, however, pages 21-26 below where a more
detailed discussion of Moore's own conception of his refu-
tations is presented.
35cf. V.C. Chappell, "Malcolm on Moore," Mind 70
(1961): 420 I 421 !
14
concrete” (the first of the three steps mentioned above)
plays an important part in Moore's defense of Common Sense,
as he himself conceived it. He imagined that he was defend-
ing the Common Sense belief that we do see such things as
fingers and doors against the attacks of philosophers who
are sceptical of our perception of physical bodies.
But it seems to me that these "translations into the
concrete" also play an important part in Malcolm's conception
of Moore's "defense." Malcolm's view is that it is both
necessary and sufficient in refuting Prichard's position
that Moore point out that sentences like "I see the moon," "1
see the door," have a correct use. He takes Prichard's posi-
tion to be the non-empirical proposition that it is logically
impossible to see physical bodies. This proposition, says
Malcolm, is refuted only by pointing out that ordinary per-
ceptual sentences have a correct use. Malcolm's reasoning seems
to be that if it were logically impossible to see physical
bodies, then sentences which we ordinarily use to assert the
perception of physical bodies, for example, "1 see the door",
would have to express logically impossible propositions.
But since these sentences have a correct use, they do not
express logically impossible propositions. Hence, Prichard
is mistaken in claiming that it is logically impossible to
see physical bodies. Malcolm is suggesting that Moore can
refute Prichard's position only by pointing out that those
sentences which Moore thinks express the (empirical) concrete
15
implications of Prichard's view have a correct use. Malcolm
would not agree with Moore in saying that these "translations
into the concrete" bring to our attention empirical conse-
quences of Prichard's view. He would say rather that they
bring to our attention the ordinary sentences which must
lack a correct use if Prichard were right in saying that it
is logically impossible to see physical bodies.
In conclusion, Moore represents his "translations into
the concrete" as being the means by which we ascertain the
concrete, empirical consequences of a philosophical position.
Malcolm does not think that they can actually have this
particular function. He does not accept Moore's notion that
these "translations" are being applied to empirical views.
These "translations," Malcolm would say, show us only what
ordinary sentences Prichard takes to express logically impos-
sible propositions and, accordingly, what he supposes to be
sentences of ordinary language which have no correct use.
Although Malcolm's conception of Moore's "translations" is
quite different from Moore's own, they do have a definite
place in his theory of Moore's defense of Common Sense.
II. The Premises of Malcolm's Theory
Malcolm's theory of Moore's "defense," the theory that
this defense consists in pointing out that certain sentences
have a correct use in ordinary language (subsequently referred
to as (MT)), is based on the following claim:
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(IFF) Moore refutes his opponents' views if and only if
he points out that certain sentences have a correct use
(in ordinary language).
With respect to refuting Prichard's view Malcolm writes:
"What is necessary and sufficient, and also puts the view he
Qloor^ is attacking in its true light, is to point out that
the sentence 'I see the moon' has a correct use. "36 (IFF)
is Malcolm's reason for holding (MT). Malcolm maintains that,
not only are Moore's opponents' views refuted by pointing out
that certain sentences have a correct use, this is the only
way such views are refuted. Consequently, if Moore ever does
refute his opponents' views, then his so-called "defense of
Common Sense" has to be understood as the assertion that cer-
tain sentences have a correct use in ordinary language.
Because Malcolm takes Moore in each case to be pointing out
the fact that various sentences have a correct use, it will
follow that on (MT), Moore always does refute his opponents'
views. I think it is an interesting question as to whether
a theory of Moore's "defense" should assume that he does in
each case succeed in his defense (or in his refutations of
opposing views), but we will leave this question aside.
What we now seek are the premises used to support (IFF) and
ultimately (MT).
The following passage contains Malcolm's argument to
^^Malcolm, "George Edward Moore," p. 180.
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refute Prichard's position:
Prichard is holding that there is a conceptual absurdity
such a thing as ' I see a raccoon in your cornpatch, or in making a^ affirmative statement expressedby a sentence whose main verb is some form of the verb
see, used in a visual sense and taking for its objectthe name of a body,
sentences embodied some conceptual absurditythen they would not have a correct use. They could neverexpress true statements. But those sentences do have acorrect use.j/
Malcolm would allow the replacement of "a sentence embodying
a conceptual absurdity" with "a sentence which expresses a
logically impossible proposition. "38 Given this replacement,
we can represent this argument, hereafter referred to as (MA),
in the following way:
(1) Perceptual sentences (sentences like "I see
the door before me") have a correct use, that
is, they can be used to express true proposi-
tions,
(2) If these sentences expressed logically impos-
sible propositions then they would not have a
correct use -- they could never express true
propositions.
Therefore, (C), Perceptual sentences do not express logically
impossible propositions.
Now (C) does not, to be exact, express the negation of
Prichard's view as Malcolm interprets it. Prichard's view,
according to Malcolm, is the claim that it is logically
3837ibid., pp. 178-179. Ibid., p. 182.
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impossible to see physical bodies; it is the assertion that
the proposition 'We see physical bodies' is logically impos-
sible. Nevertheless, we can assume, 1 think, that Prichard
would grant Malcolm the following two things: (a) If per-
ceptual sentences, for example, "I see that door," do not
express logically impossible propositions, then the sentence
"We see physical bodies" does not express a logical impos-
sibility; (b) If the sentence "We see physical bodies" does
not express a logical impossibility, then the proposition
that we see physical bodies is not logically impossible.
Assuming that Prichard would grant Malcolm (a) and (b), which
I think he would, then we can go immediately from (C) to:
(C) It is not logically impossible to see physical bodies.
(C) expresses the negation of Prichard's view, on Malcolm's
interpretation of what Prichard is claiming. Let us call (C)
the "primary" conclusion of (MA) and (C) the "secondary"
conclusion of (MA).
Malcolm has not established (MT) with (|^). Notice
that the soundness of (MA) does not establish the truth of
(IFF), when (IFF) is put in terms of Prichard's view. If
the premises of (MA) are true (since (MA) is valid), we can
say that a sufficient condition for refuting Prichard's view
is to point out that perceptual sentences have a correct use.
In other words, if the premises of (MA) are true then we can
establish the "secondary" conclusion of (MA). And, in general,
we can conclude that Moore refutes his opponents' views ^
19
he points out that certain sentences have a correct use in
ordinary language. But the soundness of (MA) will not yield
the consequence that a necessary condition for Moore to
refute Prichard’s view is that he point out that perceptual
sentences have a correct use. (MA), if sound, does not
warrant saying that Moore refutes Prichard’s view only if
he points out that perceptual sentences have a correct use.
Accordingly, even if (a) (MA) is sound and (b) Moore uses
(MA) as his argument against Prichard’s view, we do not
arrive at (MT) as applied to Prichard’s view. (MT) requires
that (MA) be the only argument Moore can use to refute
Prichard’s view. The premises of (MA), or their modification
to fit views other than Prichard’s, are, however, the only
premises which Malcolm claims Moore appeals to in refuting
his opponents. Hence, Malcolm has not established that if
Moore appeals to premises like those of (MA), we must accept
(MT).
Can Moore refute Prichard ’ s view with (1;;^)? But if
Moore appeals to the premises of (MA) to refute Prichard’s
view, does he actually succeed in refuting Prichard’s view?
That is, does (MA) supply Moore with a way of refuting
Prichard’s claim that it is logically impossible to see phy-
sical bodies? I believe not. To show that (MA) is unsound,
consider premise (1). It seems that Prichard could accept
this premise unless it is qualified. He could maintain that
perceptual sentences do have a correct use, that is, can be
20
used to express true propositions, provided that those sen-
tences expressed propositions other than those they do now,
as a matter of contingent fact, express. If to say that
Such sentences have a "correct use" means nothing more than
"they can be used to express true propositions," Prichard
could accept premise (1) and successfully argue against prem-
ise (2) on the grounds that, from the fact that a sentence
expresses a logically impossible proposition, it does not
follow that it could never express a true proposition. For
it is only a contingent fact that a sentence expresses a
logically impossible proposition. Consequently, Prichard
could argue, from the fact that perceptual sentences now
express logically impossible propositions it does not follow
that such sentences could never express true propositions.
To hold that such sentences could never express true propo-
sitions would be to imply that such sentences could not
express any propositions other than those they do now express.
And Prichard could certainly say that his view does not com-
mit him to holding this.
But when qualified, Malcolm's premise (2) reads: If
perceptual sentences expressed logically impossible propo-
sitions they could never express true propositions, provided
they express the same propositions they now express. This
qualified version of premise (2) is, 1 believe, true but also
unobjectionable to Prichard, On this qualified version of
premise (2), premise (1) merely begs the question against
21
Prichard. It simply asserts what Prichard would deny.
In his "A Reply to My Critics," Moore claims that the
philosophers whom he attacks would say that they know certain
ordinary sentences are often used, yet are not aware that
such sentences describe what could be the case. 39 Such philo-
sophers would hold, says Moore, "that, on the contrary,
, . .
[^hese sentences asser^ that something is the case, which
could not possibly be the case."^0 Following this suggestion
of Moore* s, Prichard (and others) could argue that "correct
use" need not be equated, in the way Malcolm does, with "can
be used to make true statements." Sentences which express
logically impossible propositions have a correct use; their
correct use, as language is presently employed, is restricted
to expressing false propositions. Were language to change,
such that these sentences would no longer express the propo-
sitions they do now, they might express true propositions.
But to reserve "correct use" for just those sentences which
do now express true or possibly true propositions, Prichard
could argue, is purely arbitrary.
I do not find that (MA) affords Moore a way of refuting
Prichard's view. It seems to me that Malcolm has not shown
39Qeorge Edward Moore, "A Reply to My Critics," in The
Philosophy of G.E. Moore . The Library of Living Philosophers,
vol. 4, 3d ed., edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (La Salle, 111.:
Open Court, 1968), p. 673.
40 Ibid.
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that even a sufficient condition for refuting Prichard's view
is to point to the fact that perceptual sentences have a cor-
rect use. Unless premise (1) is qualified, pointing to the
fact that a perceptual sentence has a correct use will not
be pointing to anything with which Prichard disagrees, and
without this qualification, premise (2) seems false. But
when the necessary qualification is made, however, premise
(2) is replaced by a true statement but then (the qualified)
premise (1) does nothing more than assert what Prichard
would clearly deny.
Ill, Whether Moore is Refuting
Empirical Views: Moore's Own
Conception of His Refutations
Is Moore, as Malcolm alleges, mistaken in supposing
that the views he attacks are empirical? To deal adequately
with this issue, we need to consider what is involved in
Moore's assessment of the views he attacks. Malcolm has not
shown that (MA) provides Moore with a means of refuting a
view such as Prichard's, nor that it is the only argument
available to Moore if he hopes to refute his opponents* views.
Let us turn, then, to an examination of Moore's own concep-
tion of his refutations,
Moore thinks that a philosopher like Prichard who says
that we do not see physical bodies ^ denying the empirical
fact that we see such things as fingers and doors. But
Moore, unlike Malcolm, does not see that it is a mistake to
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suppose that Prichard is denying this. Prichard, Moore would
say, IS making bo^ an empirical and a non-empirical claim
when he argues that we do not see physical bodies. The
non-empirical claim, namely, that it is logically impossible
to see physical bodies, is Prichard's reason or ground for
maintaining that we do not see physical bodies. But when he
maintains that we do not see physical bodies, Prichard is
making an empirical, not a non-empirical claim. Addressing
himself to the philosophical view that there are no external
objects Moore says:
Of course, his [the philosopher'^ reason, his statement
that 'There are external objects' is self-contradictory
t
^
an empirical statement. But he is, of course
wrong in thinking that 'There are external objects' is
self-contradictory, and if so, 'There are external objects
may really be an empirical statement. It seems to me
that m}^ statement, that there are, certainly is empirical.
Why should it not be the case that from his false non-
empirical statement that 'There are external objects' is
self-contradictory, the philosopher invalidly infers the
empirical statement 'There are no external objects?' This
seems to me to be what has actually happened; and that,
therefore, philosophers who say 'There are no external
objects' are making a false empirical statement, though
they are also making a false non-empirical one, namely,
that 'There are external objects' is self-contradictory
Now Moore does not hold, I believe, that the inference
from (1), 'There are external objects' is self-contradictory,
to (2), There are no external objects, is invalid, in the
sense of holding that (2) does not follow from (1). The infer
ence from (1) to (2) merely has the form
— p
H
p
which
is an elementary, valid schema of modal logic. ^2 i believe
^Ubid.
, p. 672.
42ii<^m stands for logical possibility, for negation,
and " " for entailment.
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that what Moore meant was: Since the proposition that
-There
are external objects' is self-contradictory (or logically
impossible) is false, the philosopher has not established
the truth of what he maintains, namely, that there are no
external objects. In other words, the philosopher in ques-
produced a valid but unsound argument,
If we turn to a passage from Moore's Lectures on
Philosophy, it becomes evident that Moore wishes to reject
an inference like the one from (1) to (2) on the grounds
that its premise is false and not because its conclusion
does not follow from its premise. Here Moore's use of
"invalid" corresponds to that of "unsound"; where an argu-
ment is said to be "unsound" if either at least one of its
premises is false or the conclusion does not follow from the
premises. The passage reads as follows;
Now the argument; 'This desk has shape' is true it
is not self-contradictory
is just as good an argument as
'This desk has shape' is sel f-contradictory -*• it is
false
,
<l^at I can't understand is how anybody can think
their argument a better one.>
We can argue; The premisses offered as shewing that
'This desk has shape' is self-contradictory, either can -
not be true or cannot shew it, because 'This desk has
shape' pis tru^
.
People don't see this, I think: If you know that this
^^It might be objected, here, that the real mistake
Prichard makes is to suppose that he can infer an empirical
statement from a non-empirical one. But consider; From (1)
'It is logically impossible that I am writing a paper on
Moore,' I can validly deduce (2) 'I am not writing a paper
on Moore.' But (2) is empirical (and false) and (1) is non-
empirical (and false). The inference from (1) to (2) is
merely unsound.
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ihlt follows that the argument used tos ew that it is self-contradictory must be invalid --
^ther the premisses are false, or thi^ don't shew it
^is really is a conclusive proof, provided you know thattne desk has shape,
Moore, of course, believed that on many occassions he
knew to be true such propositions as 'This desk has shape'
and, hence, knew to be false a claim professing it to be self-
contradictory for a thing to have shape or extension. But
the issue between Moore and Malcolm here is not whether Moore
knew such propositions to be true. The issue is whether Moore
is correct in deducing the falsity of a proposition which
both he and Malcolm agree is non-empirical
,
in this case, the
proposition that 'This desk has shape* is self-contradictory,
from a true empirical proposition — the empirically true propo-
sition that this desk has shape, Moore's belief that he can
make this simple deduction is his reason for claiming that
his opponent has unsoundly inferred a false empirical propo-
sition from a false non-empirical one. He is willing to
grant that part of what his opponent is doing is advancing a
non-empirical claim. But Moore wishes to say that this non-
empirical claim, which constitutes the reason for what his
opponent is maintaining, can be shown to be false by deducing
its falsity from an empirical fact. Consider the following
important passage from Moore's Commonplace Book ;
^^eorge Edward Moore, Lectures on Philosophy , ed. Casimir
Lewy (London; George Allen L Unwin Ltd
. ,
1966), pp, 45-46.
The brackets around "is true" are Moore's own.'
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philosopher says (a) 'There's a hand' isLf-contradictory
, /, (b) There are no hands.
»
(h) is empirical; though, if(a) were true, (b) would be a tautology, since, if p-Isa contradiction,^
p is a tautology .... ^But 'That there are hands' can be established by
empirical evidence; anything which can be establishedby empirical evidence, can't be sel f-contradictory . ^5
To return to the particular dispute between Moore and
Prichard. If it can be established by empirical evidence
that we see such things as fingers and doors, then it cannot
be logically impossible, claims Moore, to see physical bodies.
TTius, Moore wishes to contend that since it is an empirical
fact that he has often perceived such things as his own fingers,
the (empirical) proposition that we do not see physical bodies
must be false. But then so must be the non-empirical claim
which Prichard offers as his reason for claiming that we do
not see physical bodies: the claim, namely, that it is logi-
cally impossible to see physical bodies. Moore's reasoning
here is straightforward and very simple. It is as follows:
(1) The proposition that I see a door is true
(as established, for example, by the empirical
evidence of sight)
Therefore, It is false that we do not see physical bodies.
(2) If it is false that we do not see physical
bodies then it is logically possible to see
physical bodies.
ed
.
P-
^^George Edward Moore, Commonplace Book, 1919-1953
,
Casimir Lewy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1562)
,
202
.
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Therefore, it is logically possible to see physical bodies.
Let us refer to this argument as (MO).
If (MO) is cogent then two important things seem to
result. First, Malcolm is wrong in saying that "Moore's
assertion that we do not see the moon and pennies and doors
can be taken as a reply to Prichard only if it is understood
as the assertion that there is no logical absurdity in the
notion of seeing a body."^^ Moore's reply to what Prichard
is maintaining will be the empirical proposition that he sees
a door. On Moore's understanding of (MO), Prichard is main-
taining the empirical proposition that we do not see physical
bodies. Second, since Moore's reply to what Prichard is
maintaining will itself imply the non-empirical
,
modal state-
ment 'It is logically possible to see physical bodies,' Prichard's
reason for saying that we do not see physical bodies, his
reason, namely, that it is logically impossible to see physi-
cal bodies, will itself be refuted by the empirical fact that
Moore sees a door. In short, what Prichard is maintaining,
as well as what constitutes his reason for what he maintains,
is refuted by one and the same empirical factj the fact that
Moore sees a door.
IV. \4hether Moore is Refuting
Empirical Views: Malcolm's
Objections to (MO) and Replies
Malcolm would not accept (MO) as a cogent argument.
^^Malcolm, "George Edward Moore," p. 182.
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Recall Malcolm's assertion that Prichard is not blind to the
fact that we do see physical bodies. This can be taken to
mean that Prichard is not saying that it is a matter of
experience that we do not see physical bodies.
When a philosopher maintains that we do not know material
object propositions to be true (Hume) or that we do not
see material things (Prichard), he must be holding that
the notions of knowing a material object proposition to
be true and of seeing a material thing are really self-
contradictor}^. He certainly cannot be maintaining that
it is a matter of experience that people do not know
or see such things.
If Prichard is not saying that it is a matter of experience
that people do not see physical bodies, then, Malcolm would
claim, Moore is mistaken in thinking that appeal to the evi-
dence of sense-experience can refute what Prichard is denying
when he says that we do not see physical bodies.
Is this a serious objection to (MO)? I do not believe
that it is. Prichard does not hold that it is a matter of
experience that we do not see physical bodies. But from this
it would be wrong to infer that he is not really denying the
truth of a proposition which can be refuted by appeal to
experience. Prichard does not think that he is making an
empirical statement when he says that we do not see physical
bodies. For he provides as his reason for saying this the
proposition that it is logically impossible to see physical
bodies. Clearly Prichard imagines himself to be stating a
^7 Ibid.
^^Malcolm, "Critical Notice," p. 97.
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necessary truth when he maintains that we do not see phy-
sical bodies. He would not accept any empirical evidence as
counting against what he asserts because he believes that the
truth of (1), »No one sees physical bodies,* soundly follows
from the truth of (2), 'It is logically impossible to see
physical bodies.' And, of course, (2) were true then (1)
would be necessarily true and not capable of refutation by
sense-experience. But since (2) is not true, Moore's belief
that 'We do not see physical bodies' denies what can be es-
tablished by appeal to experience, is perfectly consistent
with saying that Prichard does not take it to be a matter of
experience that we do not see physical bodies. Hence, Malcolm's
objection to (MO) does not show that (MO) is an unsuccessful
means of refuting Prichard's view.
Malcolm would not accept that his objection to (MO)
has been adequately answered. He would not allow that Prichard
is making an empirical statement when he says that we do not
see physical bodies. He would point out that "in order to
find out what kind of thesis a philosopher is maintaining, we
have to consider the kind of support he offers for it. "^9
And, he would continue, "Prichard's reasoning, for example,
clearly implies that his thesis is non-empirical
.
"50
Malcolm takes Prichard's thesis to be the claim that
^^Malcolm, "George Edward Moore," p, 180. Malcolm's
footnote
,
50ibid.
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it is Logically impossible to see physical bodies,
,
his Q*richard * s]^ denial that we see bodies is really the claim
that it is logically impossible to see bodies, But surely
Prichard's reasoning, his argument to show that it is logi-
cally impossible to see physical bodies, does not imply that
•It is logically impossible to see physical bodies' is non-
empirical, Prichard's argument has nothing to do with deter-
mining whether this proposition is empirical or non-empirical
,
The same thing holds if we take Prichard's thesis to be the
proposition that we do not see physical bodies, \*rtiether this
is an empirical proposition cannot be inferred from Prichard's
argument
,
From a consideration of Prichard's reasoning we can,
1 believe, infer that what he holds is that it is logically
impossible to see physical bodies, and not that it is a
matter of experience that we do not see physical bodies,
But this is quite different from saying that his reasoning
implies that his thesis is non-empirical. To find out whether
Prichard believes that the claim 'We do not see physical
bodies' is an a priori or empirical truth, we have to consi-
51lbid,
,
p, 182,
1 think Malcolm is correct in saying that the actual
occurence of visual illusions is not necessary for Prichard's
position ( Knowledge and Certainty , p, 178), Prichard's
reasoning seems to be that one could be said to see physical
bodies only if visual illusions were logically impossible.
He would claim that only if visual illusions were logically
impossible would the state of seeing a physical body differ
in its "intrinsic character" from the state of only seeming
to see a physical body -- a difference reouired, on his viev^,
if we can be said to see physical bodies (See Prichard, Know
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der the kind of support he offers for saying that we do not
see physical bodies. An examination of the argument which
Prichard provides for his assertion that we do not see phy-
sical bodies, shows that he thinks he is stating an a priori
truth when he claims that we do not see physical bodies; it
shows that his reason for saying that we do not see physical
bodies is non-empirical
. And certainly Moore would no doubt
agree to this. For as we have seen, he allows that Prichard
is making a non-empirical claim in arguing that we do not
see physical bodies. But he wants to insist that Prichard
is also making an empirical claim. Although an examination
of Prichard’s argument reveals that his reason for saying
that we do not see physical bodies is non-empirical, it does
not show that the proposition he maintains when he asserts
that we do not see physical bodies is non-empirical.
Malcolm seems to have the idea that, if a philosopher
does not offer as his reason for saying that we do not see
physical bodies a statement prefaced with the words "It is a
matter of experience that
. .
.," then what the philosopher
says is not the straightforward empirical assertion that we
do not see physical bodies. But this seems to me to be a
mistake. Again, what a philosopher offers as his reason for
ledge and Perception
, p. 50). But since the logical possi-
bility of visual illusions is a necessary truth, Prichard,
it seems to me, wants to conclude that the proposition 'We
do not see physical bodies' is itself a necessary truth.
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what he maintains shows at most what kind of thesis or view
iagfijnes himself to be maintaining. It does not show
what kind of thesis,
_a priori or empirical, he is actually
holding when he says, for example, that we do not see phy-
sical bodies.
In one place Malcolm asserts with respect to a view
Moore attacks: "If the philosopher's statement were an empir
ical statement, we can see how absurdly unreasonable it would
be of him to make it
,
,h 53 g^t here again, failing
to clearly distinguish between the reason for what a philo-
sopher maintains and what he actually maintains will only
bring about its seeming "absurdly unreasonable" to suppose
Prichard, for example, to be making an empirical statement.
It would at best be "absurdly unreasonable" for Prichard to
offer as his reason for claiming that we do not see physical
bodies the statement "It is a matter of experience that we
do not see physical bodies." That is, it might be "absurdly
unreasonable" for Prichard to believe that he is making an
empirical statement when he says that we do not see physical
bodies, but I do not see that it is "absurdly unreasonable"
to suppose that Prichard made a false empirical statement
while believing he had an argument which established his
statement as an a priori truth. Certainly Malcolm has not
shown this to be so,
^^Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," The Philo -
sophy of G.E. Moore
, p. 352.
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Malcolm has not shown that, in addition to making the
non-empirical claim 'It is logically impossible to see phy-
sical bodies,' Prichard is not also making an empirical claim
in saying that we do not see physical bodies. Hence, Malcolm
is not justified in charging Moore with having the "mistaken
idea that when he is dealing with a proposition put forward
by a philosophical skeptic he is dealing with an empirical
proposition,"^^ I do not see, then, that he has any serious
objections to (MO),
V, A Closing Comment
In his early paper "Moore and Ordinary Language,"
Malcolm characterizes the philosophical statements which Moore
opposes as "disguised linguistic statements
. This char-
acterization is never elaborated by Malcolm but is highly sug-
gestive. It suggests that, in some sense, a philosophical
statement of the sort Moore opposes has linguistic content
but is expressed in a mode of speech which "disguises" its
content. If this characterization of a philosophical state-
ment of the sort Moore attacks could be successfully devel-
oped, then possibly the notion that such statements are
refuted by recourse to non-linguistic matters of fact could
be shown to be mistaken. If it could be demonstrated, in
other words, that Prichard is making a statement which has
only the "verbal appearance" of making a claim about what we
^^Malcolm, "George Edward Moore," p. 180,
^^Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," p. 354.
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do not see when he says we do not see physical bodies, then
possibly his statement is not one to be upset by irecourse to
(non-linguistic) empirical fact.
One gets the impression that Malcolm must still have
the idea in his latest paper on Moore that Moore's opponents'
statements are "disguised linguistic statements," For he
never openly attempts to explain why he thinks reference to
(non-linguistic) empirical fact cannot upset, for example,
Prichard's claim that it is logically impossible to see phy-
sical bodies. He never explains why he believes the supposed
logical impossibility of seeing physical bodies cannot, as
an alternative to being refuted by pointing out that percep-
tual sentences have a correct use, be refuted by recourse
to the fact that one sees the moon, l\Tiy is a philosopher
who claims that it is logically impossible to see physical
bodies not saying something which can be refuted in the straight-
forward, simple manner in which Moore thought it could be?
What is wrong with Moore's notion that "anything which can
be established by empirical evidence can't be self-contra-
dictory j_logically impossible
[
"?^6 gj-e never given an
answer to these questions by Malcolm. Yet he believes it
to be necessary in refuting Prichard's view to point to the
S7fact that perceptual sentences have a correct use,-^'
Malcolm even says that doing so "puts the view he PMoore | is
^^Moore, Commonplace Book , p, 202.
^^Malcolm, "George iidward Moore," p. 180,
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attacking in its true Light,
. . .
...58 ^nd that it is
"misleading for Moore to assert that he has often seen the
moon. This certainly creates the impression that Malcolm
regards Prichard's view as being in some "disguised" way
only a mistaken claim about the use of perceptual sentences.
When we turn in the next chapter to an examination of
the interpretation of Moore's defense of Common Sense advanced
by Morris Lazerowitz, we will find an attempt to develop the
idea that the anti-Common Sense views which Moore attacks are
linguistic in substance and, hence, have only the "verbal
appearance" of being claims which go against what most of us
take to be true propositions in everyday life. Lazerowitz
argues that if a view like Prichard's were really the claim
that it is logically impossible to see physical bodies,
recourse to matters of non-linguistic fact would not be rele-
vant in upsetting this claim. This claim is, on his view,
simply an ontological way of claiming that the expression
"sees a physical body" has no descriptive use in everyday
language, 60 ^s we shall see, Lazerowitz finds this to be a
reason for giving up the idea that Prichard, for example, is
really making the claim he seems to be making, A paradox is
found by Lazerowitz to be associated with either the notion
58ibid. 59ibid.
^^Lazerowitz does not maintain, however, that the two
claims in question are equivalent. The relationship between
these two claims is examined in our discussion of Lazerowitz'
s
view.
that Moore's opponents' views are empirical claims or the
notion that they are attempts to state a priori truths.
Hence, he rejects what would seem to be two standard inter
pretations of Moore's defense of Common Sense in favor of
third, which has the consequence that neither Moore's oppo
nents' views nor Moore's replies are truth-value claims.
CHAPTER II
MOORE'S PARADOX: LAZEROWITZ'S THEORY OF
MOORE'S DEFENSE OF COMMON SENSE
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I. What is Moore's Paradox?
Moore claims that such philosophical views as 'Time
is unreal,' 'Space is unreal,' 'Material objects do not
exist,* have consequences which are inconsistent with propo-
sitions we know to be true, where "we" includes the philoso-
phers who hold the views in question. A philosopher who
holds the view that time is unreal knows, says Moore, that
he was born at a certain time in the past; a philosopher who
holds that space is unreal knows that he has been in contact
with or at various distances from other things; a philosopher
who says that material objects do not exist knows that he
has a body.
In connection with such philosophical views, Lazerowitz
believes that "Moore has formulated what is one of the most
important paradoxes in philosophy,"! This paradox, stated
in Moore's own words, is that
philosophers
. . .
have been able to hold sincerely, as
part of their philosophical creed, propositions incon-
sistent with what they themselves knew to be true; and
, .
^Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore's Paradox," reprinted in
his The Structure of Metaphysics
,
with a Foreward by John
Wisdom (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), p. 3.
This paper was previously published in The Philosophy of
G , E, Moore , pp, 371-393, Subsequent references to this
paper are from The Structure of Metaphysics
.
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this has really frequently happened,
2
Lazerowitz finds this to be an
-astonishing paradox. -3 As
he observes the matter, we need an explanation as to what
"makes it possible for philosophers to hold
. .
.
[view^ in
the face of plain matter of fact, with which, as seems to be
the case, the views are inconsistent."^ In the course of
his paper, "Moore's Paradox," Lazerowitz makes evident that
he does not subscribe to the idea that there is an inconsis-
tency between these views and facts of the sort Moore appears
to refer to in his refutations. In fact, Lazerowitz argues
against this seeming inconsistency. What he hopes to show
is "how his Q^oore's^] paradox together with his refutations
throw light on the nature of the views, so that it can be
seen that those views have no refutations , "3
Lazerowitz points out that Moore's opponents' views,
if inconsistent with facts of the sort Moore refers to in
his refutations, are so "obviously inconsistent with them;
nothing, for example, could be more obvious than the incon-
sistency, if there is one, between a fact of the form 'I
have a body' and the view that there are no material bodies."^
In spite of such facts being well known by them, however,
Moore's opponents continue to hold their views. "That is,
2Moore, "A Defense of Common Sense," p, 41,
3Lazerowitz, "Moore's Paradox," p, 4,
^Ibid, ^Ibid., p. 6, ^Ibid., p, 5,
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such facts does not make them give up their views;
Since there is no question, says Lazerowitz, that
they hold their views sincerely as well as know facts which
SO obviously seem to render their views false,
... it i
dox
. . .
as part of
they knew
tions
' are
they knew
conclusion
refutation
s,
.
. . a correct paraphrase of Moore's nara-to say that philosophers have held 'sincerely
propositions whichfalse
. And if his Q^oore ' s~~l 'refuta-
retutations, then philosophers have held viewsto be false. This is impossible, and the only
, . . . IS that his 'refutations' are not
s of their views,
°
In response to Lazerowitz, Moore says that he does not
see that it is impossible to suppose that philosophers have
held sincerely views which they knew to be false. He maintains
that Lazerowitz does not give a reason for claiming that this
is impossible and, therefore, has not shown that his, Moore's,
"refutations" are not refutations . 9 Lazerowitz contends, how-
ever, that he does not mean that it is logically impossible
to suppose that philosophers have held views which they knew
to be false. What he wants to hold is that it is very unlikely
or highly improbable that they have held views which they
knew to be false. 10 More recently he has had this to say;
G.E. Moore has remarked on the strange thing that philo-
sophers have been able to hold, in all seriousness, propo-
sitions which, if they are what on the surface they appear
to be, flagrantly contradict what is known to be true by
everyone, including the philosophers themselves. In
^Ibid. ^xbid., p. 9.
^Moore, "A Reply to My Critics," p. 675.
lOfiased on a discussion with him concerning this very
point.
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another place he has remarked that certaintheories could be held rmi « u philosophical
sophic moment.. I? le out theJ t!. he called -a philo-
creatl;nr''as\rwou[d™“"'' soLtWng maglcaft^'®’
the choice either of acre presented with
ihii^i' the mindrorphflosopL?s"or°;f
Thus, since there is no evidence whatsoever to suppose that
a philosopher suffers such a .'mental split, -12 Lazerowitt
contends that it is unlikely that Moore's opponents are stat-
ing views which are inconsistent with facts of the sort Moore
appears to refer to in his refutations.
II. Argument (NR)
Lazerowitz has an argument, however, which he thinks
shows that Moore's opponents' views are not inconsistent with
plain matters of fact. His argument to show this is part of
a much longer argument the conclusion of which is that
York
:
Morris Lazerowitz, Studies in Metaphilosonhv
The Humanities Pres s ,“T^'64)
, pp. 518-215'.
(New
12An example of what Lazerowitz seems to mean by a
mental split" is given in the case of a disparing parent
unable to cope with the death of a son. This person may,tor example, acknowledge with remorseful behavior that the
son has been killed in war but, nevertheless, claim in all
seriousness and with assurance against those who try to
make him (her) confront reality, that someday the son will
return home. The point is, as I understand it, that explana-
tions of typical cases which permit "a false belief to lie
side by side with the knowledge that the belief is false"
would be inappropriately applied to the behavior of a philo-
sopher, which Moore's "paradox" forces on us.
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Moore's opponents' views have no refutations of any kind,
and that, consequently, Moore's refutations are to be inter-
preted as having a different purpose from what is ordinarily
supposed; they are not, according to Lazerowitz, aimed at
upsetting a truth-value claim. My strategy will be to develop
this more inclusive argument, subsequently referred to as
(NR), before attempting to make any lengthy criticism of it.
Since one of the premises of (NR) requires an extended dis-
cussion to appreciate its full meaning, I have divided my
presentation of (NR) into two chapters. The remainder of
this chapter is primarily concerned with acheiving an overall
understanding of (NR). In the next chapter I offer my
assessment of (MR).
III. The Constituents of (NR):
(EM), (AP), and (REV)
(NR) consists of two component arguments and a sub-
sequent interpretation of Moore's opponents' views as well as
of Moore's refutations of such views. I shall refer to these
two arguments and the interpretation, respectively, as (EM),
(AP), and (REV). (EM) is an argument to show that Moore's
opponents* views are not empirical, and that if looked upon
as demonstrations in which empirical facts are brought
against these views, Moore's "refutations" are not refutations.
(AP) is an argument to show that Moore's opponents' views
are not a priori true propositions and that if we take his
opponents as trying to state a priori truths, a variant of
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Moore's original paradox results — a paradox which again
makes it unlikely that Moore refutes his opponents' claims.
(REV) says, in effect, that Moore's opponents, though seem-
ingly expressing views in opposition to Common Sense, are
presenting concealed, academic revisions of ordinary lan-
guage. Moore's refutations are here understood as attempts
to resist such revisions. Given this general breakdown of
(NR), let us begin our exposition of it with the subsidiary
argument (EM).
Argument (m)
.
(EM) has two premises:
(EMl) Recourse to actual matters of fact known by the
philosopher (that is, Moore's opponent) does not
result in his view being given up.^3
(EM2 ) . .no imaginable or describable facts ... do
so either."!^
Speaking of Bradley's view that time is unreal, if taken to
mean that there are no temporal facts, Lazerowitz writes:
He (Brad le:^ cannot describe anything, over and above
the phenomena he rejects as being temporal, which he
would say was the real thing, really temporal. Unlike
the bored seeker for excitement who complains that
nothing happens, he cannot say what it would be like for
anything to happen. Nothing in actual experience, in
recollection, in present experience, or in fulfilled
expectation, is acceptable as disestablishing his view,
and neither is anything which could be described,
regardless of whether it exists or not. Unlike 'Centaurs
13Lazerowitz
,
14 Ibid.
"Moore's Paradox," p. 11.
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are unreal,' 'There are no temporal facts' is such
falsify^it^fs'^^^^^
picture to ourselves would
Consequently, "the philosopher who asserts 'Time is unreal'
is not using it to express a proposition which could imagine-
ably be false, i.e., an empirical proposition . " 16 ^nd so,
"if Moore's refutations are looked on as demonstrations in
which empirical facts are brought to bear against the views,
. . .
his 'refutations' are not re futations . " 1 7 Let us
call the conclusion that Moore's opponents are not asserting
empirical propositions (EM^), and let us call the conclusion
that if Moore's "refutations" are attempts to bring empiri-
cal facts against these views they are not refutations,
(EM^'). (EM), then, consists of two premises, (EMj) and
(EM2 >, and two conclusions, (EM^) and (EM^').
"Once it becomes clear that in holding
, . , their
Ibid,, pp. 11-12. Moore says that, when expressed
"in the way in which it would be expressed in ordinary life,"
"Time is unreal" means the same as "There are no temporal
facts," See Philosophical Studies
, p. 211.
l^Ibid., p, 12. Throughout most of his writings,
Lazerowitz uses "could imaginably be false" or "could conceiv-
ably be false" to mean could possibly be false
, in the sense
of logical possibility. Moreover, he frequently uses " a priori
proposition" and "empirical proposition" interchangeably with
the respective terms "necessary proposition" and "contingent
proposition." For a recent criticism of such interchangeabi-
lity, see Saul A. Kripke
,
"Naming and Necessity," in Donald
Davidson and Gilbert Harman, eds.. Semantics of Natural Lan-
guage (Dordrecht: D, Reidel
,
1972), esp.pp. 560-^63. ftow-
ever, for the purposes of exposition, I shall make free use
of this supposed interchangeability myself.
l^Ibid.
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views, Moore's oponentj] are not asserting empirical propo-
sitions, the natural thing is to think that they are assert-
ing necessary ones." 18 since a philosopher who claims that
there are no temporal facts "cannot say what it would be
like for anything to happen, "19 one may suppose, says
Lazerowitz, that he is using the words "There are no temporal
facts" to express a proposition which cannot possibly be
false. Lazerowitz wants to show that, on the supposition
that Moore's opponents are stating necessary truths, two
follow; One, that the disputes between Moore and his
opponents have to be interpreted as disputes over points of
actual linguistic usage. Second, that if this is what the
disputes come to, then we are confronted with a version of
Moore's paradox; a paradox which suggests that Moore's op-
ponents have been interpreted wrongly when understood as
trying to state necessary truths.
Argument (^) . We have given the name (AP) to
Lazerowitz' s argument to show both that Moore's opponents
are not stating a priori truths and that they are wrongly
interpreted as trying to state a priori truths. And we will
regard (AP) as a kind of reductio ad absurdum argument. I
say "a kind of" because the conclusion of (AP) is not intended
by Lazerowitz to be a "reduction to absurdity" of the supposi-
tion that Moore's opponents are stating necessary truths.
1918ibid. Ibid
.
The conclusion of (AP) is suppose to be a statement with a
high degree of probability given what this supposition
itself implies. The following is our rendition of (AP):
(APj) Suppose Moore's opponents' views are nec-
essarily true propositions.
(AP2) The information conveyed by sentences
expressing necessarily true propositions
is about the actual use of terminology . 20
(AP3) But when regarded as expressions for nec-
essarily true propositions, the sentences
stating Moore's opponents' views convey
nii^in formation about the actual use of
terminology — expressions in everyday Ian
guage.21
(AP4) Moore's opponents know, however, facts
about the actual use of terminology which
they seem plainly to deny, when their
utterances are taken to express necessary
truths . 22
Therefore, (AP^), Moore's opponents are not trying to state
what they believe to be necessary truths
(as language is presently employed).
It is evident that (AP) requires discussion before
20 lbid., p. 14
. pp. 16 - 18 .
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we can be said to know Utether it is a good argument. Before
an attempt is made, however, to critically examine what 1
think is its crucial premise, namely, (AP2), let us acquire
an understanding of what Lazerowtiz has in mind by (AP),
After achieving an understanding of what Lazerowitz hopes to
show with (AP), we will consider his theory of logical nec-
essity. It is this theory which elucidates the claim made
by (AP2). We will set out his view of necessity and then
show how he applies this view to his interpretation of the
philosophical dispute between Moore and the conventionalist
philosopher who says that necessary propositions are really
verbal. Here we will see in detail what (REV) asserts. The
presentation of (REV) will be followed by an assessment of
(AP2) and, consequently, (AP). Finally, we will return to
an assessment of (EM). These assessments are in chapter III.
(AP2) asserts that what we know and all that we know
in understanding a sentence which expresses a necessarily
true proposition is a fact about the use of expressions.^^
It asserts, for example, that what we know and all that we
know in understanding the sentence "A camel is an animal"
is that "animal" applies, as a matter of usage, to whatever
"camel" applies to, and that "camel but not an animal" has
no descriptive use. Consequently, (AP3) means this. On
the assumption that the sentence "There are no temporal facts,"
23see pp. 50-57 below for a detailed treatment of (AP2).
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for example, expressed a necessary truth, what we would know
in understanding it (and all that we would know) would be
that "temporal fact" describes nothing actual or logically
possible. But that "temporal fact" has no descriptive use —
as language is presently employed -- is a false proposition.
Thus, what we would know to be true (and all that we would
know to be true) in understanding the sentence "There are
no temporal facts" on the assumption that it expressed a
necessary truth, turns out to be a false claim about the use
of the expression "temporal fact" -- the claim, namely, that
it has no descriptive use.
(AP4) says, with respect to our example, that Moore's
opponent (Bradley) knows that "temporal fact" has a des-
criptive use. He knows that this expression, which applies
to whatever expressions using tensed verbs -- for example,
"was bom in the past" -- apply to, describes what is both
actual and possible.
What Lazerowitz wants to establish with (^) . We can
now see, I believe, what Lazerowitz hopes to show with (AP).
Assume, as does Lazerowitz, that (AP2) true. Then all
that, say, Bradley would know in understanding the sentence
"There are no temporal facts," if it expressed a necessary
truth, would be that "temporal fact" has no descriptive use.
Thus, if Bradley actually believed that his utterance, "There
are no temporal facts," expressed a necessary truth, then
in
stating his view he would be informing us only of his belief
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that the expression "temporal fact" has no use to describe
anything actual or possible. In attempting to show this
belief mistaken, Moore has to be construed as pointing out
that "temporal fact" — or any other expression which has an
application only if "temporal fact" has an application, for
example, "was bom in the past" - is an expression with a
descriptive use. The dispute between Bradley and Moore
becomes a disagreement as to whether temporal terminology
has a descriptive use in everyday language.
However, to suppose, says Lazerowitz, that Bradley
actually believed himself to be stating a necessary truth
by the words "There are no temporal facts" leads us to a linguis-
tic parallel to Moore's paradox. This new version of Moore's
paradox is that
philosophers '
. . .
have been able to hold sincerely, aspart of their philosophical creed, views according to
which expressions of various sorts, which they know are
used in ordinary discourse to describe real or imaginary
states of affairs, have no [descriptive use or sense.
But this, according to Lazerowitz, is unacceptable.
Since philosophers understand the language and know how
to use it, and since Moore's demonstrations only call
attention to what they already know, they must see that
his refutations do establish the falsity of views accord-
ing to which great p^rts language in everyday use make no
sense [descriptivelyj
.
The fact that they see this and
do not give up their views would be entirely unintelligi-
ble if facts of the sort he adduces were incompatible
with their views.
^^Lazerowitz, "Moore's Paradox," p. 15.
2^Ibid., p. 18.
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Therefore, claims Lazerowitz, it is highly unlikely that
Moore's opponents actually believe themselves to be stating
necessary truths with their philosophical utterances. And
if the views Moore attacks are neither empirical, as (sup-
posedly) shown by (EM), nor a priori
, as (supposedly) shown
by (AP), then they have, says Lazerowitz, no refutations. 26
Since Lazerowitz rejects the idea that Moore's op-
ponents actually believe their utterances to express nec-
essary truths, he would not accept Moore* s account of what
his opponents are doing. Moore, recall, claims that a philo-
sopher who says, for example, that there are no temporal facts
is making both a non-empirical and an empirical assertion.
The non-empirical assertion is that it is logically impossible
for there to be temporal facts. According to Moore, such
a philosopher is making a false non-empirical assertion in
saying that it is logically impossible for there to be tem-
poral facts, since the proposition that there are no temporal
facts is (empirically) false. But Lazerowitz would not agree
2^Ibid. It has been argued that it is possible for
a statement to have a truth-value and be neither empirical
nor a priori
.
See J.W.N. Watkins, "Word Magic and The
Trivialization of Philosophy," Ratio 7 (1965); 214. Watkins
holds that a "pure existential statement," like * There exists
a metal which does not expand when heated,' could theoreti-
cally be shown to be true but is unfalsifiable in an "infi-
nite space-time region.'* Lazerowitz* s reply to Watkins is in
Lazerowitz, "Moore's Ontological Program," Ratio 14 (1972):
56-58. I shall not take up the issue whether there can be a
proposition which is neither empirical nor a priori
.
My
criticism of (NR) will be aimed at (EM) and (AP). 1 try to
show that these two component arguments are unsound.
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with the notion that Moore's opponent is making a false non-
empirical statement, that is, an a priori false statement.
To suppose, Lazerowitz would contend, that Moore's opponent
is making an a priori false statement in claiming that it
is logically impossible for there to be temporal facts is to
attribute to him the belief that the sentence '’There are no
temporal facts" states, as language is presently employed, a
necessary truth. But this is to attribute to him the belief
that "temporal fact" has no descriptive use — a belief which,
if we attribute it to him, leads to the unacceptable linguis-
tic parallel to Moore's paradox. Thus, if it is unacceptable
to suppose that Bradley actually believes the words "There
are no temporal facts" express a necessary truth, then it is
equally unacceptable to suppose that ^ is making an a priori
false statement in claiming it to be logically impossible for
there to be temporal facts.
IV. Lazerowitz on Logical Necessity:
The Support for Premise (AP2)
The elucidation of the claim that sentences expressing
necessarily true propositions convey only verbal information
-- (AP2) has played an important role in most of Lazerowitz'
s
writings. In nearly everything he has written one finds some
discussion of this claim. His paper "Moore's Paradox," how-
ever, presents only a brief and somewhat sketchy treatment
of the view in question. This seems to indicate that, in this
very early paper, Lazerowitz had not yet fully developed
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various alternative ways of supporting his position and
defending it against the charge that it is really nothing more
than a standard conventionalist view of logical necessity.
So in turning to his later writings on this topic, we will
be providing the kind of support Lazerowitz would currently
offer for this crucial premise as it occurs in the overall
argument (NF) given in "Moore's Paradox."
One of the most elaborate and thorough treatments of
(AP 2 ) appears in Studies in Metaphilosophy (1964). Our
attempt to reconstruct what is involved in this claim will
proceed along the lines of the discussion of it in this work.
However, in order to avoid certain complications which are
linked with the choice of example-sentences in the relevant
pages of this work, complications of a kind which are removed
from our purpose, we will select for our discussion sentences
which Lazerowitz uses as examples in a later but very similar
treatment of the claim in question. 27 \^q need to add one
9 7
“^'The complications involved with the sentences chosen
in Metaphilosophy center around having to distinguish and ex-
plain the relationship between verbal propositions expressed
by sentences of the form " ' (S_ ' means'":^" and their non-
verbal correlates, and those of the form " ' 64 ' applies to
whatever applies to" and their non-verbal counterparts,
where <SX and are words or expressions. On Lazerowitz'
s
view, propositions expressed by the latter form of sentence
are the more general of verbal correlates of necessarily
true propositions. By "more general" he means that a propo-
sition expressed by a sentence of the form " ' (QL ' means "
will entail but not necessarily be entailed by a proposition
expressed by a sentence of the form " ' ' applies to what-
ever applies to," The relationship between what is
expressed by sentences of the latter form and sentences
I
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sentence absent in this later treatment of the relevant
claim, 28 go as to have analogues to those sentences of interest
Studies in Metaphilosophy . The following sentences,
then, are for our consideration:
(1) A camel is a herbivore
(2) A camel is an animal
(3) The word "animal" applies, as a matter of usage, to
whatever "camel" applies to
(4) The expression "camel but not an animal" has no des-
criptive use in the (English) language,
Lazerowitz supports (AP 2 ) » As is evident, sentence
(1) expresses a true non-verbal, empirical proposition while
sentence (2) expresses an a priori true proposition. 29
Lazerowitz hopes to establish (AP 2 ) by pointing out certain
relations which he believes obtain among sentences (l)-(4).
We now turn to these supposed relations.
expressing necessarily true propositions will suffice for
our purpose.
The example- sentences we will use are taken from Morris
Lazerowitz, "Necessity and Language," in Alice Ambrose and
Morris Lazerowitz, eds., Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy
and Language (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), p, 249.
28sentence (4) above,
2 9 The terms "empirical" and " a priori " are generally
used to indicate how the truth-value of a proposition is
knovm
,
whereas "contingent" and "necessary" are used to indi-
cate the manner in which a proposition possesses its truth-
value. Unless it becomes important, we will not concern
ourselves with whether or not we are using, in a certain con-
text, the proper member of each pair of terms ( a priori ,
necessary), (empirical, contingent).
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S entences (2) ar^ (3). Lazerowitz claims that under-
standing sentence (3) implies knowing the meaning of the
words it uses but does not imply knowing that what it says
IS true. That is, understanding (3) does not imply knowing
the meaning of the words it mentions
. Knowing in addition
that what (3) says is true is to know a fact about usage.
However, understanding sentence (2) implies knowing the
meaning of all the words occuring in it; it "implies knowing
that what Q(3)3] . . . says is true, and furthermore this
is all that is known in understanding [^(2)3[ ^ . . .
For, "understanding [;(2)2| . . ., which implies both knowing
the use of Q' camel
.
. .
and also that Q' animal ... is
used to apply to whatever Q' camel
.
. . applies to, does
not imply knowing anything in addition to this."^^ Accord-
^tig to Lazerowitz, the reason why understanding sentence (2)
is ec]uivalent to knowing a fact about verbal usage, "^2 namely,
the fact we know in knowing that what sentence (3) says is
true
,
^^Lazerowitz, Metaphilosophy
, p. 47. Lazerowitz'
s
footnote should be quoted. "To avoid unnecessary misunder-
standing, it should be noticed that understanding a sentence
which expresses a self-contradictory proposition, e.g., the
sentence, "Some siblings have no parents in common," implies
knowing that the proposition it expresses is self-contradictory.
And this implies knowing, and knowing nothing more than, that
the sentence, 'Usage does not dictate the application of
"have parents in common" to whatever "siblings" applies to,'
expresses a false verbal proposition."
^^Ibid., pp. 50-51.
OO
'^Lazerowitz, "Necessity and Language," p. 250.
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is best brought out in the following way; The fact that
the sentence 'A camel is an animal* expresses a necessary0- a necessarily true proposition is equivalent to
the fact that the sentence 'The word "animal" applies as
a matter of usage, to whatever "camel" applies to* expresses
a true verbal proposition ." 33
Sentences (1), (2), and (3). Since we are withholding
until the next chapter our criticism of the claim which
Lazerowitz is here attempting to support -- namely, (AP 2 ) --
let us next look into the alleged relationships among sen-
tences (2), (3), and (1), where (1) is a sentence expressing
a non-verbal, empirical proposition.
Lazerowitz contends that sentence (2)
shares with sentence 1
. . .
the feature of mention-
ing no expressions, in which respect it is different
from Qsentence (3)j . . ., but it conveys only verbal
information, the verbal information that [1(3)3 states
. . . .
It has its mode of speech in common withC(l)3
. . .
and its purport in common with C(3)3
. . .
In attempting to bring out in still sharper relief the like-
nesses and unlikenesses among sentences (1), (2), and (3),
he further adds:
To put it somewhat metaphorically, the verbal content
of C(3)3 ... is explicit and visible, while the verbal
content of 0(2)^ ... is hidden; it is made invisible
by the mode of speech in which the sentence is formulated.
(1) has factual content, 0(3)3 . . . has verbal content,
and |0(2)3 . . . has hidden verbal content. 0(2)3 . . .
is a grammatical hybrid which is sired by (1) and 0(3)3
. . .
and differs markedly from both.^^
^^Ibid.
3‘^Lazerowitz
,
Metaphilosophy p. 49.
35Lazerowitz
,
"Necessity and Language," p. 250.
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To sum up this discussion with respect to sentences
(1), (2), and (3), while at the same time introducing a
distinction he draws, "understanding
... is equiva-
lent to knowing a fact about verbal usage, although this fact
is not expressed by the sentence. "36 is, however,
natural to think that if what we know in understanding
the sentence Q'A camel is an animal'J
,
. .
.
,
is a fact
about verbal usage, then the sentence expresses thatfact. But this does not follow. We have to distinguishbetween what we know in understanding a sentence for an
3
—
ptior i proposition and what the sentence expresses
what it says
.
37 —
^
»
"A camel is an animal" does not express the verbal fact that
the word "animal" applies, as a matter of usage, to whatever
"camel" applies to, although "it is this fact [^and only this
fact^ that we know in understanding the sentence. "38 in con-
clusion, then, sentence (2) "shares its form of speech with
(1), the ontological idiom in which words are not mentioned
and are usually used to refer to things. Its content, how-
ever, what might be called its invisible subject matter, is
shared x^ith Q(3)^ . . . .»'39
Sentences (2), (3), and (4). Finally, we have left
the relations among sentences (2), (3), and (4). And the
relations which, according to Lazerowitz, hold among them
can be expressed in this way:
36ibid.
^^Lazerowitz
,
The Structure of Metaphysics
, p. 270.
38ibid.
39Lazerowitz
,
"Necessity and Language," p. 250.
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. . , the proposition expressed by Q(3Q . , , implies
the proposition expressed by C(4)3] , . . .or that know-
that what Q(3)J . . . says is true implies knowing
that what L(^)Z1 • • . says is true. Thus, understanding
|_(2)] . . . implies knowing that sentence C(^)ZI • • •
makes a true verbal claim. 40
Why Lazerowitz maintains these entailments is best
explained by his belief that
another and equivalent way of writing Q2Q . . . is the
sentence [I(2')J . . ., ' It is impossible for anything to
be Qa camel but not an animal] .... * And it can be
seen that the fact that this sentence declares something
to be a priori impossible implies that the sentence,
"The expression [j camel but not an animal *Ij. . , has no
descriptive use in the English language," expresses a
true proposition about a combination of words.
Continuing, he writes:
The descriptive part of Q(2*) — the phrase *camel but
not an animal *J-- . . ., quite plainly lacks descriptive
use; for if, like the descriptive phrases, ‘crystal which
does not have six edges' and 'winged horse with silver
hoofs,' it referred to an actual or hypothetical object,
it would constitute a theoretical falsification of a
proposition which has no theoretical falsification. ^3
Supposedly, then, the reason vdiy the proposition expres-
sed by (3) implies the proposition expressed by (4) is that it
will be a matter of usage , as opposed to a matter of non-linguistic
^^Lazerowitz
,
Metaphilosophy , p. 51.
^^That these are intended as entailments and not
material implications is based on a discussion in which he
maintained this.
^^Lazerowitz, Metaphilosophy , p. 51. We should briefly
mention that "It is impossible for anything to be a camel but
not an animal" is not, it would seem, an equivalent way of
writing the sentence "A camel is an animal." The former
sentence is equivalent to "It is a necessary truth that a
camel is an animal." To discuss Lazerowitz' s reason
holding an equivalence between (2) and (2') would require
an examination of his view beyond the scope of this chapter.
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fact, that "animal" applies to whatever "camel" applies to
only if the expression "camel but not an animal" has been
assigned no descriptive use in the English language, that is,
no use to describe an actual or hypothetical object. And the
reason why understanding sentence (2) implies knowing that
sentence (4) makes a true verbal claim is that what we know
in understanding sentence (2) is precisely , on Lazerowitz's
view, that it is a matter of usage that "animal" applies to
whatever "camel" applies to. If the expression "camel but
not an animal" had a use to describe an actual or hypothetical
object, then sentence (2) would not express a proposition
"true in all possible worlds;" sentence (2) would not express
a necessarily true proposition, and what we would know in
understanding it would not be that, as a matter of usage,
"animal" applies to whatever "camel" applies to.
So, with respect to sentences (2), (3), and (4) we
have it that
understanding [1(2)11 . . . implies knowing that what [1(3)11
. , .
and [](4)3 , , , says is true; and without going
into the refinements of differences and similarities
between [1(3)3 , . . and [1(4)3 , . . . this is all that
is to be known in understanding H(2)3» • • • There is
nothing in addition that we learn in getting to know
that the proposition we apprehend in understanding [1(2)3
. . ,
is a priori true.'^^
V. Moore and the Conventionalist:
An Example of Interpretation (REV)
Given these supposed relationships among sentences
44 Ibid
. ,
p , 52
.
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(1) - (4), Lazerowitz believes we have an insight into the
conventionalist theory about the nature of necessary propo-
sitions. This theory, he maintains, is "one of a large
family of theories, and to get an inside look into it is to
get an inside look into the other members of the family, "45
For the theory which claims that necessary propositions are
really verbal or about the use of expressions in a language
is, like the other theories which Moore opposes, a "gerry-
mandered piece of terminology, which because it is presented
in the ontological form of speech
. . .
create an illusion
. . .
that a theory about things is being advanced "46 and,
thus, "conceals what is being done with language, "47
On Lazerowitz’ s view, the philosophical claim made by
the sentence "Necessary propositions are really verbal" is
"not put forward as a generalization which issues from an
examination of instances. Instead, it is put forward as a
statement to which there can in principle be no exceptions,"^®
However, to suppose that what is put forward by the words
"Necessary propositions are really verbal" is restatable as
an entailment claim, namely, ’ being a necessary proposition
entails being about the use of expressions .’ would also,
claims Lazerowitz, be a mistake, 49 por on the assumption
that the sentence in question made an assertion restatable
45Lazerowitz
,
"Necessity and Language," p, 254.
^^®Ibid., p. 246. ^^Ibid. ^®Ibid., p. 238.
49 Ibid.
,
pp. 238-239.
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as an entailment claim, it would
-convey,- although it would
not express, what is openly stated by the sentence
-'about
the use of expressions' applies, as a matter of usage, to
whatever 'necessary proposition' applies to." The convention-
alist knows, however, that the phrase
-about the use of expres
sions- does not, in point of usage, apply to whatever
-nec-
essary proposition- applies to. His view is not subject to
linguistic correction, says Lazerowitz, because he is making
the word verbal- apply to whatever
-necessary proposition"
applies to. That is, the conventionalist is altering the
actual use of
-verbal,- and not because he has a mistaken
idea about its actual use.^^ The philosophical sentence
"Necessary propositions are really verbal- introduces in the
ontological mode of speech
-a stretched use of 'verbal,' a
use which artificially covers necessary propositions, and
is not using the word 'verbal' in the normal way to make a
false statement about them.-^l Elaborating on this idea
^^This way of putting his point is demonstrated in con-
nection with the philosophical sentence
-Everything remains
unchanged- when he writes: "... if 'Everything remains un-
changed' denotes an a priori truth, it does so by virtue of
the fact that ' remains unchanged ' correctly applies, as a
matter of usage, to whatever 'material thing' applies to.
There is, of course, no such fact about English usage.
Consequently, if the phrase 'remains unchanged' is made to
apply to whatever the word 'material thing' applies to, the
use of 'remains unchanged' has been altered and no longer has
its ordinary use .- A little further down he adds: Tne
metaphysical sentence uses the words 'remains unchanged' in
a new way, and not because the metaphysician has a mistaken
idea about its actual use in common speech. For if his usage
were just a mistake, he would be open to correction, and he
is not- ( The Structure of Metaphysics
, p. 63.).
^^Lazerowitz
,
-Necessity and Language," p. 255.
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Lazerowitz writes:
By means of this stretched use he the conventionalistbrings nearer to us a similarity, while keeping at a
tizerSL? ^ philosopher he drama-zes what he does by presenting it in the guise of atheory to which, it must be said in his defense, he
Instead of saying a camel is an
^imal IS like the word ’animal* appliei~ to whatever
is unlike it in ribi: mentioning
words, and that it is unlike a camel is a herbivore in
not being about camels, he says 'The proposition a camel
^-an animal is really verbal.' When a philosopher usesthe word really' he appears to be reporting a discovery
whereas, as Wittgenstein remarked, 'what he wants is a
is presented in
*
,
-
^ wlUOi J_
^
Wil«
new notation,
A
new use of 'verbal
a way which creates the impression that the^true nature
of necessary propositions is being revealed. 52
^^The Blue Book
, p, 57.
The conventionalist, if Lazerowitz is correct, is
not making a false statement about necessary propositions.
In introducing a stretched use of "verbal," the convention-
alist presents, in a concealed way, a retailored use of an
expression. He can thus hold his view while knowing objec-
tions which, if his view were a truth-value claim about nec-
essary propositions, would be conclusive in refuting it.
One objection, for example, is that since a proposition about
the use of expressions is, if true, only contingently true,
to hold that a necessary proposition is about the use of
expressions is to imply that a necessary proposition could
have a truth-value other than the one it has by logical nec-
essity. Thus,
52 Ibid
, , p . 251
.
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=^’"^s£ies himself thathe has refuted the conventionalist theory, the conven-tionalist can survive refutation after refutation andremain satisfied that, all the same, his theory is notincorrect. Both the philosopher who holds the conven-lonalist theory and the philosopher who rejects it
namifv
fallacy which pervades all philosophy:
rh
notion that the dispute centres on
^ed1str?rtT®^'"®f‘’^
® theory rather than on the academicr istricting of a term.
In relating his discussion of the conventionalist
theory to things Moore has said against this view, and which
Moore v;ould regard as points which refute it, Lazerowitz
calls attention to a passage from Moore's paper "Wittgenstein's
Lectures in 1930-33." Here Moore is discussing Wittgenstein's
claim "that, e.g., '3+3=6* 'treats only of the symbol ism. ' "54
Moore goes on to remark that
he Qv/ittgensteir^ did indeed actually assert
. . .
that
the proposition 'red is a primary colour' was a proposi-
53 Ibid., p. 225. Lazerowitz's paper "Language and Nec-
essity" is, in part, an attempt to elaborate on and argue for
some iconoclastic ideas of Wittgenstein as they relate to the
notion of necessity and the nature of philosophy. Some of
these ideas come from unpublished notes taken by A. Ambrose
and M. Masterman in the intervals between dictation of The
Blue Book
. In these notes Wittgenstein writes; "The fallacy
we want to avoid is this; when we reject some form of sym-
bolism, we're inclined to look at it as though we'd rejected
a proposition as false. It is wrong to compare the rejection
of a unit of measure as though it were the rejection of the
proposition, 'The chair is 3' instead of 2' high.' This con-
fusion pervades all philosophy. It's the same confusion that
considers a philosophical problem as though such a problem
concerned a fact of the world instead of a matter of expres-
sion." Quote is taken from Morris Lazerowitz, "Wittgenstein;
The Nature of Philosophy," Philosophy and Illusion (London;
George Allen & Unwin, 1968), p"]^ 66.
^^Moore, Philosophical Papers
, p. 290.
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tion about the word 'red'
;
and, if he had seriously held
this, he might have held similarly that the proposition
. . .
’343=6' was merely a proposition
. , about the
particular expressions ' 343 ' and '6'.^^
But, Moore continues;
he cannot have held seriously either of these two views,
because the same proposition which is expressed by the
*
words 'red is a primary colour' can be expressed in
French or German by words which say nothing about the
English word 'red'; and similarly the s ame proposition
. . .
which is expressed by '343=6' was undoubtedly
expressed in Attic Greek and in Latin by words which
say nothing about the Arabic numerals '3' and
Moore adds to this by noting that Wittgenstein seemed to be
aware of the above sort of objection but never apparently
regarded it as evidence against his view; he never tried,
says Moore, to defend his seemingly conventionalist-type
statements against such an objection,
Lazerowitz holds that Moore, like the conventionalist
philosopher with whom he disputes, is of the mistaken opin-
ion that the issue between them concerns the truth-value of
a theory about necessary propositions. He claims that Moore's
objection against saying that the proposition '343=6' is
about the expression "343" and "6" -- the objection, namely,
that the same proposition which is expressed by the sentence
" 343= 6 " is expressible in other languages by words which say
nothing about the Arabic numerals "3" and "6" -- has a verbal
point. Moore is
calling attention to a grammatical similarity between
sentences which express necessary propositions and those
55lbid., p. 291. 57j;bi^d.
63
which make factual claims about the world, while push-background the likeness between sentenceswhich express necessary propositions and those whichexpress propositions about usage. 58
Although this is what his objection amounts to, Lazerowitz
would hold, Moore imagines himself to be upsetting a truth-
value claim rather than bringing forward grammatical points
in favor of resisting a stretched use of the phrase "about
the use of expressions," or a stretched use of the word
"verbal .
"
To see more clearly what Lazerowitz is charging Moore
with here, consider the following six sentences, three of
which come from our discussion of Lazerowitz' s theory of nec-
essity, These are the six sentences;
(1) A camel is a herbivore
(2) Ein Kamel ist ein P f lansenfresser
(3) A camel is an animal
(4) Ein Kamel ist ein Tier
(5) The word "animal" applies, as a matter of usage, to
whatever "camel" applies to
(6) The word "Tier" applies, as a matter of usage, to
whatever "Kamel" applies to^^
The view of necessity which Lazerowitz holds is con-
sistent with the fact that, since (3) and (4) above express
^^Lazerowitz
,
"Necessity and Language," p, 254.
^^This list of sentences is given on page 236 of "Nec-
essity and Language."
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the same proposition, neither sentence says anything about
the words which occur in it. That is, (3) and (4) do not
^pr^ respectively what (5) and (6) express. On his view,
not only is it correct to say that sentences (1) and (2)
have the same meaning, 60 it is also correct to say that sen-
tences (3) and (4) mean the same but incorrect to say that
(5) and (6) mean the same. 61 Sentence (1) and (2), he claims,
say the same thing about the same subject. This feature
of the pair of sentences gives us one condition for the
correct application of the phrase 'mean the same.' Sen-
tences (5) and (6) do not satisfy this condition; they
say similar things about their subjects, but their sub-jects are different, which makes it incorrect to apply
the phrase 'mean the same' to them. By contrast, (3) and
(4) have no subjects; but it is correct English, never-
theless, to say that they mean the same. They have the
same meaning, although they make no declaration about
anything. 62
To maintain that sentences (3) and (4) have no sub-
jects does not imply, however, that they "say nothing or
that they are literally meaningless. To put the matter
briefly, understanding them comes down to knowing facts about
the use of terminology, although terminology is not the sub-
ject of these assertions . "63 Recounting a point Lazerowitz
60por purposes of our discussion, it is unimportant
that we identify, as does Lazerowitz, 'have the same mean-
ing' with 'express the same proposition.' However, for a cri-
ticism of the view that a proposition is correctly described
as the meaning of an indicative sentence, see Richard
Cartwright, "Propositions," Analytic Philosophy
,
ed. Ronald
Butler (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), pp. 81-103.
fi 1”
^Lazerowitz
,
"Necessity and Language," p. 252.
62ibid. 63xbid., p. 253.
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writes
:
^ossbreeS^wlth " grammatical^ ^ speak, in the correlated
,
^ ^he same language, and the other infact-claiming sentences. (3) and (4)
incorrect " feature'that makes
t-ho
to apply the term 'mean the same,' or 'havehe same meaning,' to the sentences, despit4 their not
bnth^
^ anything, 7 3^^ a person who understandso sentences will know facts of usage in differentlanguages, while a person who understands only one of
Thus, what can be concluded is that
pie phrase 'mean the same' is used to refer to one fea-ture when applied to sentences in the hybrid idiom andIS used to refer to a further feature when applied tofact-claiming sentences. But by artificially equating
mean the same' with 'say the same thing about the same
under the rule that a literally meaningfulindicative sentence must be about something -- a philo-
sopher creates the illusion that (3) and (4) have
G? s'-^bject, and in fact the same sub jec t I
When Moore, then, points out that such sentences as
(3), "A camel is an animal," and (4), "Ein Kamel ist ein Tier,"
express the same proposition and, thus, that neither can
express the same proposition as (5), "The word 'animal' applies,
as a matter of usage, to whatever 'camel' applies to," and
(6), "The word 'Tier' applies, as a matter of usage, to what-
6^1bid. Lazerowitz's footnote reads: "It should be
noted that 'mean the same' does not apply to all sentences
which translate into each other, for example, to equivalent
non-sensical sentences in different languages. A person
who insists that sentences which translate into each other
must mean the same is stretching the expression 'sentences
which mean the same' so as to give it the same range of
application that 'sentences which translate into each other'
has
.
"
65ibid.
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ever 'KameL* applies to," respectively, he highlights, accord
ing to Lazerowitz, a point of actual usage. His reply to the
conventionalist brings to our attention that "express the
same proposition" correctly applies to the pair of sentences
(3) and (4). Moore's reply, accordingly, brings out a like-
ness between the pair of sentences (3) and (4) and the pair
of sentences (1), "A camel is a herbivore," and (2), "Ein
Kamel ist ein Pflanzenfresser"
;
but it pushes into the back-
ground an important difference concealed by this point of
actual usage. His reply pushes into the background the fact
that in understanding sentences (3) and (4), a person will
know different verbal facts. Under the false impression,
however, that he is correcting a mistaken theory about the
nature of necessary propositions, Moore does not view his
"refutation" or "objection" to conventionalism as an attempt
to highlight a point of usage -- at the expense of muting a
distinction -- in order to resist an "ontologically presented
. . .
revision of grammar.
Moore always had the idea that he was refuting an
important theory about the nature of various phenomena in
attacking his opponents' views. But according to Lazerowitz,
66 Ibid.
,
p. 263.
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though he had this idea, his refutations are in each case
"designed to oppose an idle innovation in a language which
works well enough [that is, ordinary language! ."67
67Lazerowitz, Metaphilosophy
, p. 213.
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CHAPTER III
AN EVALUATION OF
LAZEROWITZ'S THEORY:
ARGUMENTS (AP) AND (EM)
I. (AP2) as the Crucial
Premise of (AP)
Premise (AP2) asserts that the information conveyed
by a sentence expressing a necessarily true proposition is
about the actual use of terminology . 1 (AP2) is, it seems to
me, the crucial premise of (AP). Without (AP2) Lazerowitz
cannot establish three important claims required to justify
acceptance of interpretation (REV). The first claim he can-
not establish is this: In believing that his utterance
expresses a necessary truth -- as language is now employed
-- Moore's opponent has a belief only about a certain ver-
bal proposition. For example, the truth of (AP2) is suppose
to imply that if Bradley actually believed that the sentence
"There are no temporal facts" expressed a necessary truth,
then his belief would be equivalent to a belief that the
proposition '"Temporal fact" has no descriptive use* is true.
(AP2) is suppose to mean: What one knows and all that one
knows in understanding a sentence which expresses a neces-
sary truth is that a certain verbal proposition states a fact
of usage. If we assume that Bradley would claim to under-
stand the sentence which he uses to express his view, then
^See p.45 , chapter II.
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(AP2) seems to imply that Bradley has a belief only about
a (false) verbal proposition when he believes that his
sentence expresses a necessary truth.
The second claim Lazerowitz cannot establish without
(AP2), if I am right, has an important consequence for Moore'
refutations. If (AP2) is false, then Moore's opponent can
be said to have a belief about a non-verbal proposition whict
Moore takes his opponent's utterance to express, when his
opponent claims to be asserting a necessary truth. For
example, Moore takes Bradley to have the belief that the non-
verbal proposition 'There are no temporal facts' is a neces-
sary truth. Lazerowitz, as we have seen, distinguishes
between the non-verbal proposition which a sentence asserting
a necessary truth expresses and the verbal proposition we
know to be true in understanding this sentence. In holding
(AP2), however, he implies that if "There are no temporal
facts" expressed a necessary truth, what one would know
in understanding it is a verbal proposition which
now happens to be false -- the proposition that "temporal
fact" has no descriptive use. Hence, given Lazerowitz*
s
view of necessity, Moore is not attempting to refute a sup-
posed non-verbal proposition which Bradley believes that the
sentence "There are no temporal facts" expresses, when the
latter takes his utterance to express a necessary truth.
Lazerowitz says that Moore is to be construed as refuting a
mistaken verbal claim on the hypothesis that Bradley believes
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that the sentence "There are no temporal facts" expresses a
necessary truth. It would seem, then, that if (AP 2 ) is false,
then Moore can refute Bradley's belief that the non-verbal
proposition expressed by the sentence "There are no tem-
poral facts" is necessarily true by showing that this propo-
sition is, in fact, false — false because Moore knows, for
example, that he was born at a certain time in the past.
A final claim that Lazerowitz will not be able to
establish if (AP 2 ) is false bears on his interpretation of
Moore's dispute with the conventionalist. If the likenesses
and unlikenesses Lazerowitz finds among sentences expressing
empirical, a priori
,
and verbal propositions do not all
obtain, then he is not justified in his interpretation of
what both the conventionalist and Moore are doing with lan-
guage. Lazerowitz' s claim that the conventionalist stretches
the use of "verbal" in order to bring nearer to us a simi-
larity between sentences expressing necessary propositions and
those expressing verbal propositions implies that the simi-
larity in question exists. This similarity, according to
Lazerowitz, is that each conveys the same information though
in different modes of speech. This will not be true if
(AP 2 ) is false. Furthermore, if (AP 2 ) is false, Moore can-
not be said to be pushing into the background a likeness
between such sentences in his reply to the conventionalist .
2
2see p. 66
,
chapter II.
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II. A Critique of Lazerowitz's View
of Logical Necessity;
Rejection of (AP 2 )
According to Lazerowitz, the concept (U), under-
expresses a necessarily true propo -
is logically equivalent to (and hence, entails) the
concept (K), knowing that the sentence expresses a neces -
sarijj^t^^ proposition. 3 por he claims that understanding
the sentence (2), "A camel is an animal,'* entails and is
entailed by knowing that what sentence (3), "The word
'animal' applies, as a matter of usage, to whatever 'camel'
applies to," says is true. And, given his alleged equiva-
lence betv/een the proposition (S), that the sentence "A
ca_mel is an animal" expresses a necessarily true proposition
,
and the proposition (S'), that the sentence "The word 'animal'
§PPlj-^s, as a matter of usage, to whatever 'camel' applies to"
expresses a true verbal proposition
. Lazerowitz hopes to con-
clude that, understanding sentence (2) entails and is en-
tailed by knowing that (2) expresses a necessarily true
proposition. Finally, he hopes to conclude that (U) is
equivalent to (K). Put in argument form, we have;
O
-’Similarly, 'understanding a sentence which expresses
a necessarily false proposition* implies, on his view, 'know-
ing that the sentence expresses a necessarily false propo-
sition.' See his footnote on pp. 47-48 in Metaphilosophy
where he explicitly says this.
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(Are;urnent N)
(1) Understanding (2) entails and is entailed by
knowing that what (3) says is true.
(?) (S'), The proposition that what (3) says is
true is equivalent to (S), the proposition
that (2) expresses a necessary truth.
Therefore, (c). Understanding (2) entails and is entailed by
knowing that (2) expresses a necessary truth
Therefore, (C), (U) is equivalent to (K).
Is Argument N a goo(j argument? To begin with, its
more general conclusion (C) seems to be false. For if (u)
entailed (K) it would follow that, in commencing a proof of
a mathematical proposition the truth-value of which is
unknourn to us, we would not be understanding the sentence
expressing this proposition -- in the sense of grasping the
proposition which this sentence expresses. Not until the
proof itself was completed, which we v^ould ordinarily say
brings us to the knowledge that the proposition \<;e already
apprehend is either (necessarily) true or false, would we
understand the sentence in the sense of grasping the propo-
sition expressed. And this is, indeed, paradoxical. For
what is it that we would be setting out to prove if not the
proposition we apprehend and which the sentence expresses?
In her paper ''Believing Necessary Propositions"
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elsewhere,^ Alice Ambrose has tried to meet the above
objection. Her claim, that to understand a sentence express-
ing a necessary proposition implies knowing the truth-value
of the proposition in question, has been recently criticized,
however. 5 Nevertheless, the support which 1 believe she
intends to offer for this claim and, in particular, the line
of reasoning she seems to employ in order to meet the above
objection has not been criticized. And it seems to me that
the argument she would offer to meet the above objection
makes explicit use of Argument N, the soundness of which we
will shortly challenge.
From a number of assertions made in her more elaborate
paper, 6 we can put together what seems clearly to be her
attempt to meet the objection that it is paradoxical
,
if not
just false, to maintain: a person commencing a proof of a
mathematical proposition the truth-value of which is unknown
to him does not understand the sentence expressing it -- in
the sense of grasping the proposition expressed -- until he
Alice Ambrose, "Believing Necessary Propositions,"
(1974): 286-290. See also "Proof and the Theorem
Proved" in her Essays in Analysis (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1966), p^Ti 13 - 2 5 , and "Ma thematical Generality" in
Ludwi g Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language
.
^See Donald McQueen, "Necessity and Probability: A
Reply to Professors Ambrose and Lazerowitz Mind 83 (1974):
291-295.
^Ambrose, "Mathematical Generality," esp. pp. 303-318.
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learns of the proposition's truth-value at the end of the
proof. Her reasoning is essentially as follows.
In speculating about whether the proposition expressed
by a sentence of, say, the form "All f's are g's" is neces-
sarily true, we are actually speculating about whether the
sentence "All f's are g's" expresses a necessary truth.
This is because, if the sentence in question does express a
necessary truth, then a person understands that sentence if
and only if (where 'if and only if means mutual entailment)
he knows that what the sentence "The expression »g' applies,
as a matter of usage, to whatever 'f applies to" says is true
So, if a person does not know that this latter sentence states
a verbal fact, he cannot speculate about whether the propo -
sition expressed by "All f's are g's" is a necessary truth
-- unless, of course, he knows that this proposition is a
necessary truth independently of his understanding of the
English sentence expressing it. For although the verbal fact
is not what the sentence "All f's are g's" expresses, if
this sentence expresses a necessary truth, a person will not
know what the sentence does express, what it says, unless he
knows the verbal fact that "g" applies, as a matter of usage,
to whatever "f" applies to. Hence, since
The proposition that what the sentence "'g' applies, as
a matter of usage, to whatever 'f applies to" says is
true
is equivalent (logically) to
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The proposition that what the sentence mau fs are
8*s“ says is necessarily true,
•speculating about whether the Ergposition that all fs are
S-s is necessarily true-
, convenient, though misleading
locution"? for talk of a speculation about whether the
"All fs are g-s" expresses a necessary truth. In
View of the equivalence above, such a locution amounts to
talk of speculating about whether a certain verbal proposition
a fact of usagG,®
Ambrose's reasoning here could be put somewhat differ-
ently. On her view, a person will not know that the sen-
tence 'g' applies, as a mat ter of usage
,
to whatever 'f
applies to" expresses a true proposition unless he knows
that the phrase "f but not g" has no descriptive use. Con-
sequently, she holds that prior to finding out that "f but
not g" has no descriptive use, one "does not know what the
proposition is which is expressed by
. .
,
(j'All fs are
8's"J
,
. .
.h 9
__ where "All f s are g's" expresses a nec-
essary truth. Since termination of the proof brings about
the knowledge that the phrase "f but not g" has no descrip-
tive use, "to know the truth-value of what is expressed by a
sentence terminating the statement of proof is to know what
^Ambrose, "Believing Necessary Propositions," p. 289.
Q
Cf. "Mathematical Generality," pp. 317-318.
^Ambrose, "Proof and the Theorem Proved," p, 19.
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is eKp.essed,..10
„ence again, to talk about a conjectute at
the commencement of a ptoof as to whether the proposition
all f s are g's is (necessarily) true, is a "conven-
ient substitute" 11 for talk about a conjecture as to whether
a certain verbal proposition states a fact of usage - m
this case, the verbal proposition
-The expression "f but not
8" has no descriptive use.' Such a conjecture does not imply
understanding the sentence "All fs are g's" in the sense of
knowing what it expresses. For the verbal fact which we get
to know when we do understand the sentence, and about which
we conjecture until the proof terminates, is not what the
sentence expresses.
Has Ambrose satisfactorily met the objection we raised
on page 72 concerning the conclusion of Argument N, namely,
the conclusion that (U) entails and is entailed by (K)7 To
see that she has not requires seeing what is wrong with Argu-
ment N itself, upon which her line of reasoning to meet this
objection depends. And in returning to Argument N now, let
US first consider premise (1),
According to Lazerowitz , 1 2 premise (1) means: what we
know and all that we know in understanding the sentence (2),
lOlbid., p. 19.
^
^Ambrose, "Believing Necessary Propositions," p. 290.
1 p
^^And Ambrose, since it is Lazerowitz »s theory of
logical necessity she refers to and employs in her argument
we constructed to meet the above objection concerning what
we know at the outset of a proof.
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"A camel is an animal,., is that what sentence (3), ..The
word
.animal, applies, as a matter of usage, to whatever
•camel, applies to,., says is true. 13 ^ow an immediate objec-
Cion to premise (1) might be the following: If „hat we know
in understanding sentence (2) is precisely what we know in
knowing that what sentence (3) says is true, then the propo-
sition expressed by (2) musty De the same proposition as that
whxch we know, when we know that what sentence (3) says is
true; that is, the proposition expressed by (2) must be one
stating a verbal fact. It is here, however, that Lazerowitz
would maintain:
'^hat we know in understanding the sentence 'Blue is a color ,•
. . is a
fact^ sentence expresses thatnot follow. We have to distinguishbetween what we know in understanding a sentence for an
^hS^says!l4^^'~°'' sentence presses,
But why, exactly, do we have to make such a distinc-
tion? What argument can be given in its favor? The reason he
provides for its introduction consists of (a) his belief
that premise (1) is true, and (b) his acknowledgement that
sentence (2) does not express the same proposition as that
which we know in knowing that what sentence (3) says is
true. But I think there is at least one good reason for
believing that premise (1) is false. This is that if premise
(1) were true, then in understanding sentence (2), a sentence
l^See Lazerowitz, Me taphilosophy
. p. 47.
^^^Lazerowitz, The Structure of Metaphysics
, p. 270.
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which expresses a necessarily true proposition, we do not
get to know the proposition it expresses, what it says. 15
But knowing the proposition expressed, in the sense of
apprehending it, would seem to be a necessary, if not suf-
ficient, condition for fully understanding the sentence in
question.
It needs to be pointed out that, in her argument to
meet the objection we raised against the conclusion of Argu-
ment N, Ambrose recognizes that in understanding a sentence
which expresses a necessary proposition we get to apprehend
the proposition it expresses. Her claim, that a person
cannot speculate about whether the proposition expressed by
the sentence "All f*s are g*s" is necessarily true unless
he knows to be true the verbal proposition expressed by "*g»
applies, as a matter of usage, to whatever *f* applies to,"
implies that when the proof is completed, the person gets
to know what is expressed by the sentence "All f*s are
gis."16 Her argument is intended to show that only at the
end of the proof, when we are made aware of the verbal fact
that "g" applies, as a matter of usage, to whatever "f"
^^A similar problem confronts Lazerowitz*s account of
sentences expressing necessarily false propositions. He
claims that in understanding such sentences we know only that
a certain correlative sentence expresses a false verbal propo-
sition, See his footnote on pp, 47-48 in Metaphilosophy .
16Ambrose, "Proof and Theorem Proved," p, 19,
79
applies to, can we be truly said to know what the sentence
"All f's are g's" says. But her holding the generalized
version of premise (1), Argument N — the generalization,
namely, that what we know and all we know in understanding
a sentence which expresses a necessarily true proposition is
a fact of usage
— prevents her from successfully showing
what she intends to show. For if this generalized version
of premise (1) is true, neither at the outset nor at the end
of a proof do we get to know what a sentence expressing a
necessarily true proposition says
.
Thus, for the success of her argument that we do not
understand — in the sense of apprehending what it says a
sentence expressing a necessary propositionl7 until the
demonstration terminates, Ambrose makes use of a condition
for understanding a sentence which, by her holding a general-
ized version of premise (1), is ruled out. This condition
is that to understand a sentence is to know what it says,
to apprehend the proposition it expresses.
Now Lazerowitz himself wishes to hold each of the
following statements:
(a) Understanding a sentence which expresses a neces-
sarily true proposition, for example, "A camel is
an animal,*' implies knowing and knowing only a ver-
bal fact -- in this case the verbal fact that the
^^More exactly, a sentence expressing a necessary
proposition which requires a demonstration to know its truth-
value.
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word
..animal., applies, as a matter of usage, to
whatever
..camel., applies to.
(b) A sentence expressing a necessarily true proposi-
tion does not express what we know in understanding
it.
(c) Understanding a sentence which expresses a neces-
sarily true proposition
..is all that is required in
order to know that what it says is true m18
> • • •
(d) "There is nothing in addition Qto the verbal fact
that » animal* applies, as a matter of usage, to
whatever » camel* applies that we learn in get-
ting to know that the proposition we apprehend in
understanding,
. .
.
Qma camel is an animal'*] is
a priori true, "19
But it seems to me that if (a) and (b) are both true, then
(c) and (d) are both false. For given (b), since the sen-
tence "A camel is an animal" does not express what we know
in understanding it, we do not get to know that what it
says is true in understanding it and, thus, (c) is false in
l^Lazerowitz, Metaphilosophv
. p. 50. See also The
^ructure of Metaphysics, d. 7/n ;=^nd "Necessity and La~guage," p. 250.
^^Ibid., p. 52. Ambrose writes: "Although the fact
that *Lions are felines* expresses a true a priori propo-
sition is equivalent to the fact that * "Feline''' applies to
whatever "lion" applies to* expresses a true verbal propo-
sition, the first sentence does not state what it is, i.e.
,the verbal fact, that we must know in order to know that
what it says (the proposition it expresses) Ts true " Mathema
-
tical Generality," p, 307). Italics mine.
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claiming that understanding it is all that is required in
Further, given (b),
it follows that the proposition we apprehend in understand-
’
Ing the sentence "a camel is an animal,., that is, what we
know in understanding it, is not the proposition that a
camel is an animal. By (a), the proposition we apprehend
in understanding the sentence
..A camel is an animal., is the
proposition that the sentence, "The word ‘animal* applies,
as a matter of usage, to whatever ‘camel* applies to"
expresses a truth. But then (d) is false on the grounds
that the proposition we get to know in understanding the
sentence "A camel is an animal" according to (a), is not
a priori true but only contingently true.
Lazerowitz would seem to blame the inconsistency
between (b) and (c) on the one hand and the inconsistency
between (b) and (a), and (d) on the other, on the alleged
fact that "the sentence ‘A camel is an animal* is a gram-
matical crossbreed with one foot, so to speak, in the cor-
related verbal sentence in the same language and the other
in related non-verbal fact - claiming sentences, "20 That is,
he would blame these inconsistencies on the supposed fact
that the sentence "A camel is an animal "
shares with
, , , Q(l), the sentence *A camel is a
herbivore
,
*3 the feature of mentioning no expression,
in which respect it is different from
. . , C(3), the
sentence ‘The word "animal" applies, as a matter of
20Lazerowitz, "Necessity and Language," p, 253,
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conveys
that
For in one place he says:
A person can hanHi \r ki > ± ^ ,
order to express a necessary proposition. 22
1 suggest, however, that the inconsistencies we have
just brought to Light are not due to the sentence "A camel
is an animal" being a "grammatical crossbreed"; rather,
they are due to ^ holding two false statements, namely,
(a) and (b) above. For in understanding the sentence "A
camel is an animal," either we get to know the proposition
it expresses or we do not. If we get to know the proposition
it expresses, then since it expresses a necessary proposition
and not a contingent verbal one, what we know in understand-
ing it cannot be the same as what we know in knowing to be
true what its correlated verbal sentence says. And if we
do not get to know the proposition expressed by the sen-
tence "A camel is an animal" in understanding it, then a
^liazerowitz, Metaphilosophy
. p. 48,
^^Morris Lazerowitz, "Metaphilosophy." Critica 5
(1971): 17.
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necessary, if not sufficient, condition for fully under-
standing the sentence is not satisfied on his view. For it
is self-contradictory to maintain that a person fully under-
stands a sentence "S" but does not know what it says.
Clearly, m (d) above Lazerowitz intends that the
iropositron we apprehend in understanding the sentence "A
camel is an animal " be identified with the a priori true
2roposition that a came l is an animal
. But by (b) and
(a), what he intends to be the case cannot be the case on
his view. In other words, he wishes to have it, as eviden-
ced in statements (c) and (d), that in understanding the
sentence "A camel is an animal" we ^ get to know the
a_priori true proposition it expresses. He wishes to hold
that in understanding the sentence "A camel is an animal"
the condition of getting to know what it says is satisfied.
But this wish has to be denied in conjuntion with his hold-
ing statements (a) and (b).
It seems to me, then, that if in saying that the
information conveyed by sentences expressing necessarily
true propositions is verbal Lazerowitz means "What we know
and all we know in understanding a sentence for a neces-
sarily true proposition is a verbal fact, "23 then he has
23 In the case of sentences expressing necessarily
false propositions, that a certain verbal proposition is
false.
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attached a self-contradictory meaning to the word
..convey,...
For if the above is what he means by
..conveys verbal infor-
mation... it „iu imply the self-contradictory claim that a
person can understand a sentence ..3.. and never come to know
What it saj^. But the above is what he means by
..conveys
verbal information,.. Hence, I think we have to conclude
that he has attached a self-contradictory meaning to the
word
..conveys., in his claim that the information which a
sentence expressing a necessarily true proposition conveys
is verbal, or about the actual use of terminology.
1 do not believe, then, that Lazerowitz can establish
the crucial premise (AP2) of argument (AP). As a result
it seems that he cannot establish the three claims mentioned
at the beginning of this chapter, two of which are required
to justify acceptance of (REV) in general, one of which is
required to justify (REV) in its application to the philo-
sophical dispute we examined. These three claims were:
(1) chat in believing that his utterance expresses a nec-
essary truth (as language is now employed), Moore's opponent
has a belief only with respect to a certain verbal proposi-
tion; (2) that if Bradley, for example, has the belief that
the sentence
..There are no temporal facts., expresses a nec-
essary truth, then Moore cannot refute what it is Bradley
*^®^^®ves to be true unless he points out Chat ..temporal fact..
has a descriptive use -- Chat is, unless he points out that
the verbal claim ' ..temporal fact., has no use to describe
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what is actual or possible' is false; (3) that the con-
ventionalist is bringing nearer to us, by a stretched use
of "verbal," the similarity between sentences expressing
necessary propositions and those expressing verbal propo-
sitions, and that Moore's reply to the conventionalist
pushes into the background this similarity.
III. (EM) and the
Appearance/Reality Distinction
At more than one place in his paper "Moore's Paradox,"
Lazerowitz maintains that "Moore is entirely right in say-
ing that philosophers who hold these views know facts of the
sort which by their views they seem plainly to deny. "24
Thus, one might suppose that Lazerowitz' s initial reason
for saying that there is no inconsistency between Moore's
opponents' views and facts of the sort he appears to refer
to in disputing them is ill-based. For in accepting the
notion that a philosophical sceptic knows such facts,
Lazerowitz is, like Moore, committed to holding what most
assuredly would be dismissed by the sceptic as question-
begging. Surely Bradley would say that he does not know,
nor does he believe to be true, propositions describing
temporal facts of the sort Moore claims he does know. Why
not pursue the possibility that Bradley does not know such
propositions to be true and see what can be said in his
defense?
24Lazerowitz, "Moore's Paradox," p. 8.
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Now Lazerowltz has, in several of his writings, con-
sidered this possibility as well as noting how an antl-Com-
mon Sense philosopher would respond to Moore. In his latest
published paper on Moore, Lazerowitz observes:
Philosophers whose views collide with common sense can
4
"® ejected to assent to Moore's charge Passtated in his paradox!
. And to be sure, some phUo-sophers have declared that Moore's paradix begs thequestion, that it assumes what is in dispute,^ If con-
like
Pa>^adox, a metaphysical philosopher
knowing his views to be false, he knows them to be
rue and the so-called truisms of common sense to bemere common sense superstitions. 25
In another place he notes:
Instead of accepting the evidence of his senses the
metaphysician calls to his aid the philosophical dis-tinction between appearance and reality, behind whichhe makes his position secure. He will grant that theredo appear to be material things Qor temporal facts
will insist that the appearance is delu-
sive, ‘mere appearance, ' 26
But according to Lazerowitz, this kind of defense by the
metaphysician against the charge that he knows facts of the
sort which render his view false will not work. In refer-
ence to the philosophical view that motion does not exist
because it is logically impossible for it to exist, Lazerowitz
argues
:
For if, as he maintains, motion is impossible because
its existence would imply a self-contradictory state of
affairs, then the illusion of bodies being in motion is
25Lazerowitz, "Moore's Ontological Program," p. 47.
^^Lazerowitz, The Structure of Metaphysics
, p, 34,
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also logically impossible,
Quite in general, his argument
for the same reason. 27
continues
,
a statement which makes a logical claim rhof^> 4 4
not exist, because its
..IslellTlttlTlZiy
^contra:
exlstence°T?L®appLrLcrwou?d'’alsrim^
Thus, Lazerowitz would contend, by invoking the appear
ance/reality distinction to protect himself against Moore's
charge that he knows facts which falsify his view, the meta-
physician merely introduces or presents us with another ver-
sion of Moore's original paradox. This new variant of
Moore's paradox is
that philosophers have been able to believe in earnest
either of ^o things. One, that they have established
contradictions in propositions while knowing they have
not done this, or two, that they, and others as well,perceive appearances which they know cannot exist.
For if the appearances exist, they know what the cor-
responding reality would be like and know consequently thatthey have not established contradictions in the rele-
vant propositions; and if they have established contra-
dictions in the propositions, they know that the sup-
posedly perceived appearances cannot exist. ^9
Has Lazerowitz shown, then, that the introduction
of the appearance/reality distinction is not a possible
defense against the charge made by Moore in the statement of
27ibid., p. 43.
28ibid., p. 209.
2^Lazerowitz
,
Metaphilosophy
. p. 220
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paradox — the charge, namely, that the metaphysician
knows empirical facts of a sort which are inconsistent with
his philosophical View, It seems to me that Lazerowltz has
not shown this. And in order to see why he has not, con-
aider first his words in the quote above to the effect that
"If the appearances exist, they Cthe philosophers in ques-
tion^ know what the corresponding reality would be like
and know consequently that they have not established con-
tradictions in the relevant propositions;
. . . what is
being maintained here? The following statement helps clarify
what is Intended by these words: "In general, anyone who
says, 'x is not really^
; it only appears to be,' implies
that he knows what it would be like for x really to be 0 ."30
The plain implication of this statement is that a philosopher
like, say, Bradley who says that temporal facts do not
really exist; they only appear to exist, implies that he
knows "what it would be like" for temporal facts to really
exist. And, thus, if "knowing what it would be like" for
temporal facts to really exist were to imply, as is sug-
gested by the words extracted from the above quote, the
logical possibility of their existence, Bradley implies that
what is logically impossible is logically possible.
But in conjunction with his claim that it is logi-
cally impossible for temporal facts to exist, why should we
grant that Bradley is committed to holding that he "knows
30Lazerowitz, Philosophy and Illusion
, p, 110,
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What It would be like- for temporal facts to exist - m a
sense of this phrase which implies that it is logically
possible for temporal facts to exist - simply because he
holds that temporal facts only appear to exist and do not
really exist? It would seem that Lazerowltz wishes to main-
tain that, in descriptive expressions of the form "appear-
ance of there being a0
" 0 " „ust be a term which denotes
or expresses a concept that has theoretical Instances, For
in one place he writes:
Put verbally, a word, »w,» which denotes a concept thatopen to exemplifications cannot function to des-cribe exemplifications, and therefore cannot functiondescriptively in such a phrase as 'appearance of therebeing a w. For if it functioned descriptively in the
appearance-phrase it would have a conceivable range of
application. And if it does not function descriptivelyin the appearance-phrase, the phrase cannot describe an
appearance.
from
It seems to me, however, that Lazerowitz's inference
(1) "w*' cannot function to describe actual or theoreti-
cal instances of things because it denotes a con-
cept not open to exemplification
to
(2) The phrase "appearance of there being a w" cannot
describe an actual or theoretical appearance,
is certainly questionable. Why must "w" function descrip-
tively (as Lazerowitz intends this term) in the appearance-
phrase, namely, in "appearance of there being a w," in order
31Lazerowitz, Metaphilosophy
, p, 146.
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for the appearance.phrase itself to function descriptively!
Consider a similar situation taken from mathematics.
It is a fact that in reductio ad absurdum arguments, ue sup-
pose a self.contradictory concept to have exemplifications,
or an exemplification, in order to "reduce to absurdity"
the supposition that such a concept is open to exemplifi-
cation. For example, we suppose the concept of a rational
number 1 = where s and t are relatively prime, to
have an instance or exemplification in order to show that
the existence of such a number is impossible. The reasoning
runs as follows:
Suppose there exists a rational number 1 = ~\T2, where
,
t
s and t are relatively prime. Then s2 = 2t2, which
implies that s is even: s=2n. For if the square of a
number is even, the number itself is even. Now since
s=2n and £ and t are relatively prime, t is odd. But
since s2=4n2, 2t2=4n2. However, then t2=2n2 and so
t=2n; t is even. Thus, £ is both even and odd. But
this is a contradiction. Hence, no such rational num-
ber as
I
=
~\T2 exists.
Now simply because we discover that the concept of
such a number is not open to exemplification and, hence,
that the expression "rational number ® = ~\/~^
"
does not
t
function to describe what could possibly exist, we do not
conclude that the phrase "supposition that there be a
rational number = ~V~2~ " describes no supposition. The
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fact that the concept of supposing there be such a number
has an exemplification does not imply that the concept of
such a number has an exemplification. Thus it would seem
that the fact that we can entertain a self-contradictory
concept in the sense of drawing consequences from the sup-
position that it is open to exemplification, does not entail
the logical possibility of the concept having any instances.
Put somewhat differently, the logical impossibility of some-
thing existing does not imply that its existence cannot be
entertained and that it is not a possible object of thought.
So, if '_S supposes that 0 exists' were to entail 'S knows
what it would be like for 0 to exist* and if this further
entailed that the existence of 0 is logically possible, then
we could never do what we, in fact, often do in mathematics.
If the logical impossibility of 0 existing does not
preclude^ from being a possible object of thought, I can
see no reason why the logical impossibility of 0 existing
should preclude 0 from appearing to exist. In other words,
I see no reason for counting the inference from (1) to (2)
above as valid. And to put the matter in terms of Bradley's
view, he could, I believe, successfully hold the following:
From the fact that it is logically impossible for there to
be temporal facts, it does not follow that there being tem-
poral facts cannot be entertained. And since what we can
entertain as existing could appear to us to exist, temporal
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events existing in reality is beyond the bounds of possibi-
lity but the appearances of there being such facts are not.
Hence, Lazerowitz has not shown, it seems to me, that the
appearance/reality distinction is not a possible defense
against Moore- s charge in his paradox that philosophers know
facts of the sort which he, Moore, calls attention to in his
refutations of those views.
In his argument (EM) we noted that as reasons for the
assertion that Moore's opponents are not announcing empiri-
cal theories, Lazerowitz offers these two premises:
(EMi) No known facts count against these theories. 32
(EM2 ) No "imaginable or describable facts" count against
these theories, 33
(EM 2 ) is not intended to assert that there are no facts which
count against, for example, Bradley's view that time is unreal,
when construed as the claim that there are no temporal facts;
(EMi) asserts that a philosopher such as Bradley knows it to
be a fact that there are temporal facts and that his knowing
this does not count against his view, (EIMj) assumes, then,
that Bradley could not successfully claim to know that there
only appear to be temporal facts and that temporal facts do
not really exist. But if our argument above is sound,
Bradley can successfully claim, as indeed he would claim,
to know only that there are appearances of there being tem-
^^Lazerowitz
,
"Moore's Paradox," p, 11,
33ibid,
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poral facts. 34 Thus, the conjunctive assertion »ade by
(EMi) above is not justified, I believe, since i do think
our argument above is sound.
Furthermore, it will not do to argue that since
Bradley does not "know what it would be like," nor can he
say what it would be like, for there really to be temporal
facts, his view that there are no temporal facts is not
empirical. We have shown, 1 believe, that there is no
inconsistency in his believing himself to have established
a contradiction in the concept of time while allowing that
he and others are being appeared to35 as if there are temporal
facts. However, from the fact that Bradley cannot say what
it would be like for there to be temporal facts, in the sense
of being able to describe a possible world in which temporal
facts really exist, it follows only that he imagines or
believes that the concept of time, or temporal facts, is
seL f-contradictory
,
11^
^^Cyn page 24 of Philosophy and Illusion Lazerowitz saysThe proposition that time only appears to exist, and thatthere only appear to be occurences, implies quite plainly thatthere are certain occurences: it implies that there occurs
a succession of sensible appearances of various happenings
taking place. And the proposition that there are certain
occurences implies, obviously, the existence or reality, of
time," But I think this is wrong. The proposition that time
only appears to exist, and that there only appear to be
occurences, implies at most that there appears to occur a
succession of sensible appearances of various happenings tak-
ing place,
o c
“'Roderick Chisholm* s way of putting it.
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We need to distinguish between an argument that pro -
fesses to establish a contradiction in a concept and an argu-
ment that establishe s a contradiction in a concept. Bradley's
argument professes to establish a contradiction in the con-
cept of time. 36 Thus, he cannot, consistent with the belief
that his argument does establish a contradiction in the con-
cept of time, describe a possible world in which temporal
facts exist. But it will not follow from this that the propo
sition 'There are no temporal facts' is not empirical; that
'There are no temporal facts' is not empirical will follow
only if Bradley's argument establishes a contradiction in
the concept of time.
36 Bradley's argument can
in the following way;
I believe, be paraphrased
The existence of time implies the existence of apresent moment of time — the now. If the existence of the
now implies a contradiction then so does the existence oftime. The basic divisions of time are past, present, andfuture, and these are mutually exclusive parts of time.
The present cannot contain any past or otherwise it wouldimply that something is happening which is no longer hap-
pening. The present cannot contain any future or other-
wise it would imply that something is happening which has
not yet happened. But the present is either a time span
— it has some duration however short — or is "simple and
divisible" and not a time span. If it is a time span, then
(1) part of the present will have elapsed and still be pres-
ent and (2) part of it will not yet have been reached and
yet be present. The now
, in other words, will include some
past as well as some future if it is a time span. This is
a contradiction. But if the present is not a time span, it
cannot be a part of time. To say, however, that the present
is not a part of time is a contradiction. Thus, the propo-
sition that time exists has either of two logically impossible
consequences and is false. Time is unreal and there exists
only the delusive appearances of there being temporal facts.
See F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (London; George
Allen 6c Unwin, 1920)
,
chi IV. For this paraphrase of Bradley's
argument I am indebted to Morris Lazerowitz, "Paradoxes,"
Philosophy and Illusion
, p, 23 .
I
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Lazerowitz seems to hold, however, that whether an
argument establishes a contradiction in a concept or only
professes to establish a contradiction in a concept, it can
not have empirical consequences. He argues;
An argument that establishes or professes to establish
concept or a proposition is a piece
’
i\seneral, a proposition whose truth-value is determined by analysis is a priori
It Will be plain, without arguing the matter, that
and^rL'^s°rL r
cannot have non- a
.
priori consequences,thus that the proposition that matter does not exist(which carries with it a factual, empirical air) is notlogically different from the proposition that the con-cept matter is self-contradictory. A little reflection
makes it clear also that Moore's translations into the
concrete of the philosophical view that matter is self-
contradictory cannot be the empirical propositions they
appear to be.-^'^
According to Lazerowitz, this is because "a translation into
the concrete of an a priori statement will itself be an
a priori statement . "38
As we have seen, Moore claims that a philosopher who
says 'Matter does not exist' — to use Moore's example
in his "A Reply to My Critics," 'There are no external objects,'
-- is making both an empirical and a non-empirical claim.
The non-empirical claim is the proposition that it is logi-
cally impossible for matter to exist, or the proposition that
the concept of matter is self-contradictory, and the empiri-
cal claim is simply that matter does not exist, Moore also
^^Lazerowitz
,
"Moore's Ontological Program," p, 49.
38ibid., p. 51.
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holds that a proposition constituting a translation into the
concrete of 'Matter does not exist' — for example, '1 do
not have a body' — is empirical. But if, as Lazerowitz
asserts, an priori claim cannot have non- a priori con-
sequences, then since Bradley's claim that the concept of
time is self-contradictory is an a priori claim, 39
proposition inferrable from it -- in particular, the propo-
sition that time is unreal — is a priori and, thus, "not
logically different from" the proposition that the concept
of time is self-contradictory. Further, it will follow
that Moore's translations into the concrete of the view that
time is unreal are non-empirical
,
since these constitute
propositions entailed by the view in question. It will
follow that a proposition such as '1 was not born in the
past' is not an empirical proposition.
It is not the case, however, that all a priori claims
need have a priori consequences; ^0 only if an a priori claim is
true does it follow that all of its consequences are a priori
(true).*^! Hence, there is no inconsistency whatever in Moore's
39as we have seen in chapter II, Lazerowitz does not
actually hold that the philosophical proposition 'The con-
cept of time is self-contradictory' is to be construed as
an a priori claim, although he acknowledges that it appears
to be one
.
^Osee my footnote number 43 in chapter 1.
^^Iprom various discussions and things he has written,
I gather that Lazerowitz is objecting to the idea that since
a necessarily false proposition strictly implies any proposi-
tion whatever, any strict implication having a necessarily
false antecedent is such that its antecedent is "not deduct-
ively relevant" to its consequent. See pp. 44-45 in Meta -
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saying that the proposition * The concept of Time is self-
contradictory* is a priori but that the proposition 'There
are no temporal facts' is, as well as its translations into
the concrete, empirical. I suggest, then, that Lazerowitz
has not provided sufficient reasons to warrant his contention,
stated in "Moore's Paradox," that the views which Moore
hopes to refute are not empirical.
philosophy where a similar charge is made in relation to the
claim that a necessarily true proposition is said to be strictly
implied by every proposition and therefore by empirical propo-
sitions. However, an idea coming from a suggestion by
Wittgenstein and which Lazerowitz makes frequent use of in
his writings on other philosophers can, it would seem, be
applied to what he is doing in these pages: objecting to the
use of a word while creating the false impression of denying
a claim about the nature of something -- in this case the
nature of entailment. For it appears that he merely wishes
to restrict the use of "entailment" to cases where—
' ^
(pA^-q)
and where neither~<> p nor—'<)~q. See especially p, 45.
I say he "merely" seems to be urging a restricted use of
"entailment" because he allov/s, for instance, that when we
have {> p and 0 ^
—
’p and-^^^^q, p strictly implies q, although
he says that p does not entail q.
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CHAPTER IV
MOORE'S APPEAL TO COMMON SENSE AS AN APPEAL TO SELF-
JUSTIFIED BELIEFS: THE INTERPRETATIONS OF
KLEMKE AND CHAPPELL
Introduction
I begin this chapter by briefly setting out one of
Moore's typical arguments against scepticism. In this argu-
ment Moore makes an appeal to what he seems to regard as a
Common Sense proposition; to a proposition of a kind which
'•we certainly all do, in ordinary life, constantly believe
• • • I then consider separately two interpretations of
Moore's appeal to such propositions in philosophical argument.
Each interpretation assumes, unlike the interpretations by
Malcolm and Lazerowitz, that Moore is in fact appealing to
certain empirical truths in attempting to refute his opponents.
What both interpretations attempt to establish, how-
ever, is that when understood in the way Moore conceived of
it, his appeal to Common Sense propositions is an appeal to
beliefs which neither have nor require a justification for
their acceptance; supposedly Moore hopes to refute his
opponents by appealing to what he regards as self- justified
beliefs. But whereas the first interpreter, E.D. Klemke,^
claims that Moore does not refute his opponents in appealing
^Moore, Some Main Problems
, p, 182.
^Klemke, Epistemology
, esp. chapter II, pp. 13-30.
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to these beliefs, the second interpreter, V.C. Chappell,
3
claims otherwise. Chappell holds that Moore does succeed in
refuting his opponents by appeal to beliefs which are indeed
self-justified. His own interpretation, he believes, pro-
vides "a good and sufficient justification for Moore's
appeal to common sense, i.e. for the use of simple, common
truths, matters of everyday knowledge, in the refutation of
certain philosophical positions,"^
After attempting to show that both Klemke and Chappell
have misunderstood Moore on various points
— points which
although different in each case lead to their shared under-
standing of what Moore is doing in his refutations -- 1 then
conclude this chapter with a suggestion. The suggestion is
that, once we appreciate the epistemological approach invol-
ved in Moore* s appeal to Common Sense, it is plausible to
say that we can, according to Moore, justify Common Sense
beliefs in terms of more basic propositions. An understand-
ing of this epistemological approach is best achieved, I
believe, if we relate Moore* s appeal to what Roderick Chisholm
calls the “problem of the criterion." Making a distinction
between two different approaches to justification of claims
to knowledge, a distinction which Chisholm has called to our
attention, is necessary for what 1 think is the most reason-
^Chappell, "Malcolm on Moore," pp. 417-425,
"^Ibid., p. 423.
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able interpretation of Moore- s appeal to Co™.on Sense. This
distinction and how it affects what Moore is doing in his
refutations is my concern in the final chapter. If the
interpretation, or at least the outline of an interpretation,
which 1 develop in chapter V is successful, then we have a
plausible interpretation of Moore's defense of Common Sense
according to which the beliefs he defends are empirical but
not self-justified. The interpretation which 1 develop is
not, I believe, to be found in any of the literature on
Moore's philosophical practice, and yet 1 find it to be the
one we should accept.
I. Moore *s Argument Against
Hume*s Principles
Moore claims in Some Main Problems of Philosophy that
certain principles, which he attributes to Hume, have been
thought to support the sceptical view that no one ever knows
existence of any material object. He formulates
Hume’s principles in terms of two epistemic rules;
I will call the first the rule; That nobody can ever know
of the existence of anything which he has not directly
apprehended, unless he knows that something which he has
directly apprehended is a sign of its existence. And I
call the second the rule; That nobody can ever know
that the existence of any one thing A is a sign of the
existence of another thing B, unless he himself (or,
under certain conditions, somebody else) has experienced
a general conjunction between things like A and things
1 ike B, And the important thing to remember about this
second rule is that nobody can be said to have experi -
enced a conjunction between any two things, unless he
has directly apprehended both the things,^
^Moore, Some Main Problems
, pp, 109-110,
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Moore later refers to these rules as "Hume-s prin-
ciples." According to Moore, it will follow that if these
two principles are true, we cannot (and hence, do not) know
that material objects exist. For one thing, we are not
directly acquainted with them; we are directly acquainted only
with sense data. 6 Secondly, if Hume's rules are true, we
cannot say that the sense-data which we directly apprehend
are a^ of material objects unless we have experienced a
general connection between sense-data and material objects.
On Hume's rules, no one can experience a general connection
between sense data and material objects unless he is or has
been directly acquainted with both sense-data and material
objects. But Moore agrees that no one can be directly
acquainted with material objects. Hence, he agrees that if
Hume's rules or principles are true, then we cannot know
that material objects exist.
^
Moore assents, then, to the first premise of his
opponent's argument, namely, to the truth of the conditional:
Hume's principles are true then no one can know that
material objects exist. But he questions whether his oppo-
nents are correct in affirming the antecedent of this con-
ditional,® Since Moore does not think that Hume's prin-
ciples are true, he wants to prove false the second premise
of the following argument:
^Ibid., p. 119. ^Ibid. ®lbid.
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(1) If Hume's principles are true then no one
knows that material objects exist.
(2) Hume's principles are true.
Therefore, No one knows that material objects exist.
How does Moore hope to refute his opponents second
premise? In his familar way, he first provides a translation
into the concrete of the view he is opposing - a more specific
statement of fact entailed by the view in question and a
statement which permits us to see what is being maintained
by his opponent in a particular case. 9 in this instance, the
view happens to be his opponent's conclusion that no one
knows that material objects exist. And so Moore writes;
"If I do not know of the existence of this pencil now and
here, I can hardly ever know of the existence of any material
object at all. I do not suppose I have ever had better
evidence for the existence of any than I have for this. "10
Hence, he wishes to maintain that
if Hume's principles are true, I have admitted, 1 do not
know now that this pencil — the material object — exists.
If, therefore, I am to prove that I ^ know that thispencil exists, I must prove, somehow, that Hume's prin-
ciples, one or both of them, are not true. In what sort
of way, by what sort of argument, can I prove this?
It seems to me that, in fact, there is no stronger
and better argument than the following. I ^ know that
this pencil exists; but I could not know this, if Hume's
principles were true; therefore
.
Hume's principles, one
or both of them, are false, I think this argument really
is as strong and good a one as any that could be used;
and I think it really is conclusive, 1
1
9cf. pp. 9-11 above, lOlbid,, p. 116,
lllbid., p.
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Moore grants, however, that his argument
(1) If Hume's principles are true then I do not
know (here and now) that this pencil exists.
(2») I do know that this pencil exists.
Therefore, Hume's principles are false,
will not convince those who think Hume's principles are
true, nor those who think that he really does not know that
the pencil in question exists. His argument, he claims, has
the appearance of begging the question. 12 Nevertheless, he
insists that his argument "really is a good and conclusive
argument. "13 This he intends to show.
A good and conclusive argument, says Moore, is one
which enables us "to know that its conclusion is true."l^
At least two conditions are necessary, he adds, if an argu-
ment is to enable us to know this. The first is that the
conclusion must actually follow from the premises. 15 in this
respect, both Moore's and his opponent's arguments are equally
good. Both arguments are valid. But the second condition
necessary for an argument to enable us to know that its
conclusion is true "is this: that we should know the premise
to be true. "16 Since Moore agrees that both his and his
opponent's arguments satisfy the first condition, "the only
way, ... of deciding between my opponent's argument and mine,
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^"^Ibid. ^^Ibid. 16ibid.,p. 121.
104
as to Which is the better, is by deciding which premise C (2)
or (2*) above^ is known to be true.-17 gut in attempting
to decide this, Moore goes on to claim that although he does
know his second premise to be true, the premise, namely,
that 1 do know that this pencil exists, he has no argument
to support the contention that he knows this. He knows, he
says, no proposition or set of propositions from which his
second premise follows.^®
We should observe briefly that we encounter a similar
situation in another of Moore's arguments in which he appeals
to a Common Sense proposition as a premise which he says he
is unable to justify by further argument. In his "Proof of
an External World," Moore adduces in support of the propo-
sition that things exist external to us, the premise 'Here's
one hand, and here's another,' He maintains that this proof
is conclusive, that it is a "rigorous proof, Two of the
three conditions he thinks are necessary for this proof to be
conclusive are identical to the ones we have already discus-
sed in connection with his argument against Hume's principles.
These two conditions are that the conclusion logically fol-
lows from the premise and that the premise is a proposition
known to be true, 20 Moore believes that both these condi-
tions were satisfied when he then argued: Here's one hand,
l^Ibid, ISxbid,, pp. 124-125,
l^Moore, "Proof of an External World," Philosophical
Papers
. p, 146,
20 Ibid,, p, 146.
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and here's another, therefore, two h™an hands exist - cons
quently, two external objects exist. 21
About this "proof Moore says that many philosophers
will most likely be dissatisfied with it on either of two
grounds. First, that he has not provided a "proof of an
external world" unless he can prove that his premise ‘Here's
one hand, and here's another' is true. Second, that if he
cannot give a proof of his premise, then he does not know
that his premise is true. 22 But Moore insists that he does
know this premise to be true even though he cannot prove
that it is true. "I can know things, which I cannot prove;
and among things which I certainly did know, even if (as 1
think) I could not prove them, were the premises of my two
proofs, "23
II. A Preliminary Statement
Two interpretations have been offered to explain why
Moore thought he was justified in claiming to know premises
like those involved in both his argument against Hume's prin-
ciples and his "proof" of an external world, even though he
has no argument in favor of such premises. The basis for
each interpretation is the belief that Moore regards such
propositions as 'I know that this pencil exists' and 'Here
21lbid. 22xbid., pp. 149-150.
23ibid,
, p, 150. Moore actually gives two "proofs"
and not just one. The first is a "proof" that two external
objects existed at the time at which he gave the proof. This
is the one referred to above. The second that two external
objects existed prior to that time (pp. 147-148).
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IS one hand, and here la another' as sel f- justified propo-
sitions. That is, both interpretations take Moore's posi-
tion to be that, when we reach propositions like those used
as Common Sense premises in both his argument against Hume's
prinicples and his "proof" of an external world, we have
arrived at propositions which are ultimate - ultimate in
that, although they may constitute reasons for accepting
other propositions as being true, there are no further
propositions which justify our accepting them. Of these two
interpretations the one advanced by Klemke is the more
radical, Klemke identifies the sense in which Moore is
alleged to hold these Common Sense propositions as ultimate
with the notion of sel f-evidence
, We shall examine his view
first and then consider whether Chappell *s less radical
account of Moore's appeal to Common Sense propositions in
philosophical argument is not more successful.
III. Klemke* s Interpretation and
Criticism of Moore's Appeal
In the second chapter of his book The Epistemology of
G.E. Moore
,
Klemke poses the question; "What are Moore's
criteria
, , , for accepting some of these special common sense
statements as being true"? 24 According to Klemke "Moore
implicitly has such criteria, "25 for even though "he never
^^Klemke, Epistemology, p. 20.
25ibid.
107
called them criteria of common sense,
... he did appeal to
one or the other of them on different occasions . "26
However, of the two criteria Moore supposedly appeals
to as criteria for accepting " 30^^ of these special common
sense statements" as being true, Klemke cites only one cri-
terion which he believes Moore uses in both his argument
against Hume*s principles and his "proof" of an external
world. This criterion will be discussed shortly, but we
should note that Klemke never explains why Moore's alleged
two criteria do not cover all the propositions of Common
Sense, nor does he explain, either, what makes "special"
those to which the criteria apply, or why these criteria
apply to only some of these "special" propositions. Appar-
ently the class of propositions to which both criteria apply
does not include all the propositions of Common Sense nor
even the entire class of those propositions which are "special,"
Klemke simply does not specify what class of propositions is
supposedly covered by the criteria in question.
In addition to the criterion Moore supposedly has for
accepting as true those propositions he claims to know with-
out proof, there is, says Klemke, the criterion of inconsis -
tency upon denial
. Allegedly Moore uses this criterion
only in cases where he attempts to show that certain philoso-
26 27Ibid., p. 21. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
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phers either hold as part of their views propositions which
contradict what they otherwise believe, or, hold views which
are self-contradictory. m such cases, Klemke believes, Moore
uses one of three versions of this criterion to justify
accepting the propositions of Common Sense. 28 gut the asses-
ment of this criterion as well as Klemke* s assertion that
Moore uses it, is not important for our purposes. In the
final chapter L hope to show that Klemke has altogether mis-
understood Moore's intentions with respect to the issue of
accepting Common Sense propositions. We shall
confine our present discussion, then, to an assesment of what
Klemke takes to be Moore's criterion at least for accepting
as true the Common Sense premises of both his argument against
Hume's principles and his "proof" of an external world.
Klemke believes that Moore's "ultimate criterion for
holding the statements of Common sense to be true is that
they are self-evidently true
.
"29 /i,nd after briefly stating
Moore's "proof" of an external world, Klemke goes on to
explicitly say that
a statement like 'Here is one hand, and here is another'
may be called self-evident. It is neither proved (derived
as a conclusion from other premisses) nor verified (Moore
holds that the only time where the latter would be appro-
priate -would be the case, say, in which Moore had a wooden
hand).-^'
321'Prf
.
," pp, p. 149.
28ibid. 29j-bj_d., p. 24. 30it)id., p. 25.
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Somewhat later in his book Klemke remarks:
-In Some Main
Problems of Philosophy we constantly encounter statements
which Moore claims to know, assertions like 'This pencil
exists,' and 'I do know that this pencil exists.' How does
Moore know these things?
. . .
About them he often says that
they are known immediately or that they are sel f-evident . " 31
Klemke, however, leaves it unclear here as to whether
he thinks knowing a proposition immediately is, on Moore's
y same or not with that proposition being self-
evident: whether he means to identify these two notions or
intends to say that such propositions are characterizable in
either one of two different ways -- known immediately or
f“Sviden t , I suspect that he is identifying a proposition's
being known immediately with its being self-evident. But
whether or not 1 am right, I hope to show in section Vll
of this chapter, where we examine Moore's notion of immediate
knowledge, that it would be a mistake to make this identifi-
cation. In our present examination of Klemke 's view we will
show that Klemke has provided no evidence whatsoever to sup-
port his contention that Moore said
.
let alone suggested,
that even some Common Sense propositions are self-evident,
including the two propositions which serve, respectively,
in Moore's "proof" of an external world and his argument
against Hume's principles. But before we do this, let us
31lbid., pp, 142-143.
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observe what further points Klemke wishes to make, given
his assertion that Moore regards as self-evident certain
propositions of Common Sense,
Criticism. Once Klemke attributes to Moore
the view that certain Common Sense propositions are self-
evident and that their being self-evident is the criterion
for accepting them, he then goes on to criticize this cri-
terion. Moore's criterion is inadequate as a criterion for
accepting propositions of Common Sense because it implies
that "we do not need a basis
,
i.e., evidence, grounds, etc., for
accepting [^such propositions] ."32 He continues: "Moore
suggests that we somehow just see or intuitively apprehend
that such statements are self-evident"^3 that is all
there is to the matter. In connection with Moore's state-
ment to know, for example, that here is a hand, a statement
which on Klemke' s interpretation Moore justifies by appeal to
the criterion of self -evidence, Klemke writes:
I suppose that, taken on the commonsensical level and
limited to it, nearly all philosophers would agree that
. . .
common sense statements in this sense of 'know' are
known to be true. But there is another sense of 'know'
in which some philosophers have held that statements con-
cerning the existence of physical objects, for example,
are false, or are false in certain respects, or may be
false, or cannot be known to be true, or cannot be known
to be true with absolute certainty. Statements of this
kind involve
. . , epistemological considerations ....
They involve epistemological considerations because these
philosophers, in saying that we do not know that certain
objects, such as material objects, exist, are using 'know'
in a technical sense
, , , , Moore, when making the
plain, ordinary ploy and attempting to refute various
^^Ibid., p, 25, ^^Ibid.
philosophers, completely ignores
And on the basis of these remarks he
these points. 34
concludes that
wi^rrlspecrio pecuUarly^phtiof anything
his defensl does no?'’establish‘'i^^all know commonsensically to be tru#» maxr what wetrue in an epistemolo^icL ^
verification etc., enter in. 35^ * grounds, evidence.
• Klemke*s Position Assessed
Klerake does not identify what philosophers he has in
mind who allegedly use ••kno„„ ^ technical sense. Nor does
he attempt to support his crucial assertion that there is
SO^ sense of ''know*' according to v^ich Moore's sceptical
opponents would agree that propositions like 'Here is a hand*
are known to be true - not to mention Klemke's contention
that "nearly all philosophers" would agree that commonsensi-
cally we are justified in claiming to know such propositions
because they are self-evident ! Klemke merely says that if
Moore's claim to know, for instance, that here is a hand
were confined to "plain, ordinary knowledge which the plain,
ordinary man has
. .
."36 ^hen "one could hardly quarrel with
him. "37 simply does not offer reasons for the points
intended to support his conclusion that "Moore's defense
does not establish that what we all know commonsensically to
be true may be known to be true in an epistemological sense.
3^Ibid., p. 27. ^^Ibid., p. 29. p. 26.
^^Ibid.
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where grounds, evidence, verification etc., enter in. "38
The basis for Klemke’s interpretation
. But now to
the most important question. Is Klemke justified in attri-
buting to Moore the view that there are some Common Sense
propositions which are self-evident, whether we are talking
about the acceptance of such propositions in ordinary life
or their acceptance as premises in philosophical argument?
The answer to this question is that he is not. For
the only passage to which Klemke refers in which Moore him-
self actually uses the expression "self-evident" is one
which, when only partially quoted as inKl mk * * s presenta-
tion, is removed from context. 39 Klemke cites is this
partial passage from Some Main Problems of Philosophy :
"\Vhat are we to say of these two principles? They do seem to
me to be sel f-evident . "40 But when Moore's words are seen
in their surrounding context, it becomes apparent that it is
not propositions of Common Sense which are self-evident but
3^Italics mine.
*30
^^Klemke does refer to a passage in Principia Ethica
.
but here Moore only defines ''self-evident" as it relates to
his belief "that the fundamental principles of Ethics must
be sel f-^evident
"
(George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1962;
3d paperback ed.), p. 143). Moore defines "self-evident"
here as follows: "The expression 'self-evident* means pro-
perly that the proposition so called is evident or true, by
itsel
f
alone; that it is not an inference from some propo-
sition other than itself " (Ibid.), But Klemke certainly
has not shown that Moore intended the beliefs of Common Sense
to fall under this definition.
^^See Klemke, Epistemology
, p. 25,
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only two principles with respect to Time which he regards as
necessarily true, Moore writes;
:
* * equally well assumed that time is infintt<»in extent both ways - both towards the past and towards
ciDlerthat htT assumption merely involves the prin-ples tha before any or every length of time there musthave elapsed one other equal to it, and that after any or
equal trit elapsed"i^othLo i . \^at are we to say of these two JHnciples?They do seem to me to be self-evident; but I confess^I donot know exactly how to set about arguing that they areself-evident. The chief thing to be done is, 1 think toconsider them as carefully and distinctly as possible*
be^true^
^^ether it does not seem as if they must
Now would Moore wish to hold that the proposition
* Here's a hand* is such that to determine its truth-value
you consider the proposition "as carefully and distinctly
as possible and then
. . , see whether it does not seem as
. [ZitZI t be true;
. , Moore makes it clear in
more than one place that the beliefs of Common Sense are not
propositions which muaJL be true but are rather contingent
propositions , ^2 and there is no evidence whatever to support
the idea that Moore thought a contingent proposition is one
whose truth-value could be decided by merely reflecting, in
some sense, on the proposition itself.
I think we must say that Klemke has placed on Moore a
^^Moore, Some Main Problems
, p. 191.
49See, for instance, these papers; "A Defense of
Common Sense," p, 42; "Certainty," also in Philosophical
Papers
. p. 230; "A Reply to My Critics," p.~T71
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v.e„ concerning the beliefs of Contnon Sense which Moore him-
self never held. There is, I believe, no evidence that
Moore regarded any Common Sense propositions as self-evident.
And I hope to show in chapter V that it is Just as much a
fundamental error on Klemke's part to suppose Moore even
thought it appropriate to have criteria for knowing proposi-
tions of Common Sense in order to be justified in accepting
them. Once we focus our attention in chapter V on the
issues surrounding the notion of criteria for knowledge, I
think we will see how Klemke*s interpretation results from
a fundamental misunderstanding of ^foore*s epistemological
approach.
But first, let us see if there is not, after all, some
basis upon which to construct a less radical account of the
idea that Moore's Common Sense premises are those which have
no justification beyond themselves for being accepted. Let
us turn to Chappell's interpretation of Moore's appeal to Com-
mon Sense in the refutation of certain philosophical views.
Although not subscribing to the idea that Moore takes some
beliefs of Common Sense to be self-evident beliefs, Chappell
does think that Moore regards them as self- justified. In
other words, Chappell, unlike Klemke, does not attribute
to Moore the view that we "intuitively apprehend"'^^ that Com-
mon Sense propositions are true, but he nevertheless takes
Moore to be saying that such propositions neither have nor
require justification in terms of other propositions.
^^Klemke, Epistemolog y
.
p. 25,
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V, Chappell's Interpretation
Chappell holds that Moore is justified in claiming
to know, even though he cannot prove, a proposition like
*Here is a hand' since
Moore's statement is not the sort of truth for which rea-sons need or even can be given. It is logically tmpo”i-ble to have reasons for thinking that everything we ?aketo be true is true cf. "Not every premise can^rproved”)Hence some propositions among those we claim to know must ’’
for^'i^^nklL^ot^ they may be reasonsthinking her propositions to be true they themselvesdo not have reasons. Moore's statement is a clear case ofa proposition which is ultimate in this sense. Even to
ask for reasons for thinking it true is out of place; we
would not know how to comply with such a request. And intact we do not ask for reasons for statements of its sort.We take them to be true on their 'intrinsic evidence.'
Furthermore we are justified in doing so; just because
they are so obvious and held with such certainty (even
though they may be false) they stand, so to speak, inno-
cent until proven guilty. Such statements constitute our
ultimate appeal in all matters of truth and falsehood;
hence they have a kind of natural authority. Being justi-
fied in taking them to be true does not consist, as it
does with other statements, in being able to give reasons
for them. They are themselves the reasons finally, which
we give for other statements, but we do not require any-
thing to justify our accepting them beyond that they
be obvious and certain (cf. Principia Ethica
, pp. 143
Chappell claims that his account of Moore's 'defense,' only
part of which is presented here, shows Moore's appeal to Com-
mon Sense to be "'an interesting and tenable philosophical
position' when it is interpreted in the way that Moore him-
^^Chappell, "Malcolm on Moore," pp. 422-423. Through-
out his article Chappell uses as an example of one of Moore's
Common Sense propositions the proposition 'My mail arrived
this morning after breakfast was served.' Thus, when he refers
to "Moore's statement" in the above passage, it is this propo-
sition and not 'Here is a hand' about which he is speaking.
Nevertheless, it is clear from his article that he intends
his interpretation to be such as to cover Moore's refutations
in general
.
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self conceived it, "^5
Initial Problem in
Chappell's Interpretation
Now I think there are at least two different points
referred to in what Chappell is maintaining and these need to
be distinguished from one another in order to determine what
IS really at issue. With respect to Moore's Common Sense
propositions, one point Chappell wishes to make is that "in
fact we do not ask for reasons for statements of
. .
.
QtheiF]
sort. We take them to be true on their 'intrinsic evidence.
A second point he wants to establish is that Moore's Common
Sense propositions are "not the sort of truth for which
reasons
. . , can be given. "^7 These propositions, Chappell
claims, "constitute our ultimate appeal in all matters of
truth and falsehood;
, , , ,
Chappell is not clear as to how he imagines the first
point to bear on the second point he wishes to establish.
It is certainly true that in ordinary circumstances we do
accept propositions which Moore would regard as Common Sense
propositions without asking that reasons be given for them.
If a man says that he perceives a pencil directly before him,
we ordinarily accept what he says and do not go on to ask
him what justifies his thinking that he knows that what he
perceives before him is a pencil. Furthermore, Chappell may
"^^Ibid., p. 423. '^^Ibid., p. 422. ^^Ibid.
^®Ibid.
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even be right in saying that his statement is among those
which "stand, so to speak, innocent until proven guilty. "^9
Nevertheless, neither from the fact that in everyday situa-
tions we do not go on to ask a person to justify his claim
to perceive a pencil before him, nor from the fact that we
take such propositions to be "innocent until proven guilty"
can we arrive, I think, at the view that such propositions
are evidentially ultimate in that there is no justification
for their acceptance. The fact that in everyday situations
we accept a person's claim to perceive a pencil before him
without further questioning does not entail that such claims
are actually self-justified
, Nor does the fact that we
take such claims to be "innocent until proven guilty" entail
this. Let us see, in their turn, why neither of these two
entailment claims would hold.
First, there seems to be a pragmatic element to con-
sider in connection with questions of justification. Ordi-
narily whether a justification is necessary depends in part
on how much others — those to whom the justification would
be given -- are willing to grant without further question-
ing, 50 If one believes that a person is willing to grant
in various situations that when a thing looks to have a cer-
tain property F it has that property F, one may have only to
^9 Ibid.
^®Cf, Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Claredon Press,
1974), pp. 156-157.
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point out that the object looks to have F in order to justify
(for that person) the claim that the object has the property
F. But what a person is willing to grant in certain cir-
cumstances Will not always, even in ordinary life, coincide
with what he is willing to grant in other circumstances. As
Lehrer points out:
hiAg;s”orthe"m:?Lr^:f —Ple)
bear-print or something e^sefth4n ' w4 b^SoSfL°:t:ntly
rb:ar!“‘^°rwre^ hr:“s*;ne'^^
thinfof°“'' t'"® of'^'belLruntu"some““^
resti ^n ^hr^i^siion!?^'^"" consequence
l^alen something of practical importance or epistemic
consequence rests on the question, we are not willing to
grant what we would otherwise grant. As the case of a person
who claims to see a bear-print indicates, we may not be will-
ing to grant such a person in certain circumstances that if
something looks like a bear-print then it is a bear-print.
We may grant to him the fact that it looks like a bear-print
but require further evidence from him to justify his claiming
to see a thing of the sort he says he sees.
Once we consider this pragmatic element involved in
the notion of justification, it seems to me that it becomes
less plausible to infer from the fact that we ordinarily
accept certain Common Sense propositions without further ques-
tioning, that such propositions neither require (under any
51 Ibid,
,
p, 105.
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circumstances) nor have a justification beyond themselves
Beliefs Which for the most part we all share in our every-
day lives are those we are willing in numerous circumstances
to accept on their '.intrinsic evidence." Nevertheless, this
does not show that such beliefs constitute their own justifi-
cation; it does not show that such beliefs are self- justified.
Furthermore, even if we do accept the assumption that
Common Sense propositions are those we regard as "innocent
until proven guilty," in other words, justified until shown
to be unjustified, it will not follow that such propositions
are self-justif led. To suggest that a person's claim to
perceive a pencil before him can be justified by appeal to
further propositions is not, so far as 1 can see, to suggest
that what he says should be regarded as unjustified until
shown to be justified. That Common Sense propositions are
open to further justification does not commit one to any
attitude of scepticism or suspicion with respect to their
truth.
In asking a logician, for instance, to justify a deduc-
tive inference, one need not be expressing any doubt as to
whether the inference is in fact justified. The person ask-
for a justification may be wanting to learn merely what
rules the logician has for counting as valid an inference the
person in question accepts as valid. His request for justifi-
cation does not, in other words, presuppose that there is a
reason to regard the inference as suspect. Likewise, there
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is no reason to suppose that questions about the justifica-
tion of Conution Sense propositions need be challenges or expres-
sions of doubt with respect to their truth. 52 * person can
hold, it seems to me, that Common Sense propositions are
those which (for the most part) we should regard as Justi-
fied until shown to be unjustified and set about to deter-
mine what reasons or principles he thinks he has for count-
ing these justified beliefs
.as. justified; he can set about
to determine this, I suggest, without implying that he does
not, after all, regard these beliefs as justified. In short.
that Common Sense propositions may be open to justification
by other propositions does not commit one to the view that
Common Sense propositions are "guilty" by presumption.
Thus, I do not see how Chappell hopes to establish the
stronger of the two points we have distinguished, the point,
namely, that Moore's Common Sense propositions are not open
to justification by further propositions -- that they are
evidentially ultimate propositions. And the question as to
whether Moore himself wishes to make this stronger point
to him by Chappell is, I think, what is really at
issue in discussing Chappell's interpretation of Moore's appeal
to Common Sense beliefs in the refutation of certain philoso-
phical positions. Upon what basis does Chappell attribute
this position to Moore? This is what we will now consider.
^^Cf. Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Engle-
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
,
Inc,
,
l^^o)
,
p, 25,
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VII. Whether Chappell- s Interpretation is Sound
Chappell's interpretation of Moore, according to
which Common Sense propositions are "not the sort of truth fs:]
for which reasons
... can be given, "53 seems to be based
primarily on certain passages surrounding Moore's argument
against Hume's principles. Here Moore says that although
one way in which a proposition can be known to be true (and
hence count as a justified belief) is if it follows from
some premise already known to be true, this cannot be the
only way in which a proposition can be known to be true.
If it were, it would imply that
no man ever has known any proposition whatever to be truein the slightest degree probable. For if I cannot know
any proposition whatever to be either true or probably
true, unless I have first known some other propositionfrom which it follows, to be soj then, of course, I can-
not have known this other proposition, unless I have firstknown some third proposition, before it; nor this third
proposition, unless I have first known a fourth before
it; and so on ad infinitum
.
In other words, Moore claims,
. . .
it would follow that no man has ever known any
proposition whatever to be even probably true, unless
he has previously known as absolutely infinite series
of other propositions. And it is quite certain that
no man ever has thus known a really infinite series of
propositions
.
And so if any argument, including Moore's argument against
Hume's principles and his opponent's argument in defense of
^^Chappell, "Malcolm on Moore," p. 422.
^'^Moore, Some Main Problems
, p. 122.
55 Ibid., p. 123.
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Hume's principles, is a good one it must be the case, says
Moore, "that we are capable of knowing at least one proposi-
tion to be true, without knowing any other proposition what-
ever from which if follows. And I propose to call this way
of knowing a proposition to be true, immediate knowledge. "56
What Moore wishes to hold is this, since the condi-
tion necessary to make an argument conclusive — the condi-
tion, namely, that its premise be known to be true can be
satisfied when the premise is known immediately as well as
when there are further arguments in its favor, his argument
against Hume's principles "may be Just as good an argument
as any other, even though its premise — the premise that 1
do know that this pencil exists — is only known immediately . "57
However, Chappell's interpretation of what Moore intends here
seems to commit Moore to the view that a proposition known
immediately is one which is not open to justification by
further propositions. For Chappell argues that since "to
prove anything at all requires premises which themselves do
not need proving in order to be accepted, "58 follows that
"some propositions among those we claim to know must be
ultimate in the sense that although they may be reasons for
thinking other propositions to be true they themselves do
do not have reasons. "59 And according to Chappell, "Moore's
56ibid. ^^Ibid., pp. 124-125.
^^Chappell, "Malcolm on Moore," p. 422.
59 Ibid
.
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statemtent Qin this context, Moore-
s premise that he knows that
pencil existsj is a clear case of a proposition which is
ultimate in this sense.
But given Moore's notion of immediate knowledge, I do
not believe that from the fact that there are premises which
do not need proving in order to be accepted, we can infer that
some propositions are ultimate in Chappell
-s sense. Nor, 1
suggest, do we have a reason for saying that Moore's premise
is an instance of a proposition which is ultimate in this
sense. In terms of what Moore wishes to maintain I think
that Chappell's point, namely, that to prove anything at all
requires premises which themselves do not need proving in
order to be accepted, can be put this way. If any of our
beliefs are justified because we know propositions which
entail them, then at least one of our beliefs must be justi-
fied when no proposition is known which entails it. Moore
himself expresses this point as follows, in terms of his dis-
tinction between immediate and mediate knowledge:
. . , if any proposition whatever is ever known by us
mediately, or because some other proposition is known
from which it follows, some one proposition at least,
must also be known by us immed iately
.
or not merely because
some other proposition is known from which it follows.
Let us put Moore's point here somewhat differently.
The fact that a premise is known immediately -- not because
60 ibid.
^^Moore, Some Main Problems
, p. 124.
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some other proposition is known which entails it - cannot
be a sufficient reason for rejecting as inconclusive the
argument in which that premise figures. If it were, it
would imply that no argument is conclusive. If an Irgument
could be rejected merely on the grounds that its premise is
not known to follow from some other proposition, then the
implication is that an argument is conclusive only if its
premise is known to follow from some other proposition. And
this, as Moore points out, leads to the absurd consequence
that an argument is conclusive only if an infinite series
of propositions is knovm to be true.
Moore's argument against Hume's principles (or any
other argument) cannot, then, be rejected merely on the
grounds that he does not know some further proposition from
which his premise -- the premise that he knows that this pen-
cil exists -- follows. But we cannot conclude from this
that an argument against Hume's principles cannot be construc-
ted in which Moore's premise is known mediately
, and so we
cannot conclude that his premise is ultimate in Chappell's
sense; that is, ultimate in the sense that although it may
be a reason for thinking other propositions to be true, it
does not have a reason. For Moore writes:
. . .
it is important to insist that even when you do know
a proposition immediately, you may also at the same time
know some proposition from which it follows; you may
know it both immediately and also because you know some
other proposition from which It follows. If, therefore,
we give the name mediate knowledge to all cases in which
you know a proposition, because you know some other from
125
follows! th© iresul t i c t-H^'i-
the same time know the same nronoaf °‘’® ®''‘*
and also immediately .62 P-^°P° = ition both mediately
Hence, it would be incorrect to infer from the fact that
Moore- s premise, or for that matter, from the fact that any
proposition of Common Sense is known immediately, that it
cannot also be known mediately - known also because some
other proposition is known from which it follows. And if
this is so, I believe it would also be incorrect to con-
clude, as Chappell does, that a Common Sense proposition
is not one for which a reason can be given.
Again, to rephrase Moore's central contention as it
relates to his argument against Hume's principles; Since
some premise must be known immediately if there are any con
elusive arguments at all, his argument against Hume's prin-
ciples can count as conclusive even when he knows no fur-
ther proposition from which his Common Sense premise can be
deduced. And given his distinction between immediate and
mediate knowledge, we can see that this is a far more restric-
ted point to make with respect to Common Sense propositions
(which serve as premises in Moore's arguments) than is the
one Chappell takes Moore to be making. Moore's distinction
between immediate and mediate knowledge does not permit one
to infer from the fact that some propositions are justified
62 Ibid,
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Without the need of proof that there are propositions which
cannot be proved. And so, this distinction does not permit
one to infer from the fact that a Common Sense proposition
may be justified when there is no argument in its favor that
such a proposition is self
-justified
.
I believe a case can be made for saying the following.
Moore would not regard an argument against Hume's principles
in which his premise, »1 know that this pencil exists,' is
deduced from some further proposition as being a better argu-
ment than his own. Moore claims that his premise is more
—
Pr-emise from which it might be deduced. He
say s
;
. . whether the exact proposition which formed mypremiss, namely: I do know that this pencil exists*
or only the proposition: This pencil exists; or onlythe proposition: the sense-data which I directly appre-hend are a sign that it exists; is known by me immediately
one or other of them, 1 think, certainly is so. And all
*
three of them are much more certain than any premise which
could be used to prove that they are false; and also much
more certain than any other premise which could be u sed
to prove that they are true.^
Nevertheless, from the fact that his premise is more
certain than any other proposition which might be used to
prove it true, we still cannot infer that Moore regards his
premise as evidentially ultimate. The above passage plainly
allows for the possibility that there are propositions
which justify Common Sense propositions and which are still
more certain or more ultimate than they. What is ruled out
63 Ibid., p. 125, Italics mine.
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a ca«.u.
,,,,
^proposition ftos. which we can Hoote-s Colson Sense
and which is more certain than it. In being faithful
to Moore.s position, then, we wiu have to say that if there
are propositions which he would regard as being both (a)
more certain than Common Sense propositions (or at least
certain in a sense in which they are not) and (b) capabll ofjustifying these, the relation of justification must be
construed as a non-deductive one. 64 suggestion that
there may be such propositions becomes quite plausible, it
seems to me. once we identify and explain Moore's position
with respect to a fundamental, epistemological issue invol-
ved in his rejection of certain anti-Common Sense views such
as Hume's. This we will do in chapter V.
^
Moore claims that the beliefs of Common Sense aresolutely certain
. See, for example, "Certainty," p. 236^us, we will have to say that for Moore, there are no propo-
external world which are more certain^thLthe beliefs of Common Sense, For an interesting discussion
aLnt^ih^^
definitions of "certainty" in which no proposition
Firth
^orld seems to be certain, see Roderick
7^(1967)^^ Certainty," The Philosophical Review
CHAPTER V
MOORE'S APPEAL TO COMMON SENSE
AND CRITERIA OF KNOWLEDGE
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Introduction
In chapter IV we tried to establish two main points.
The first had to do with Klemke's view. We attempted to
show that Klemke has no basis for his contention that Moore
appealed to a criterion of self-evidence in an effort to
justify the acceptance of Common Sense propositions. Fur-
thermore, his critical comments on Moore's appeal to Com-
mon Sense mistakenly assume that Moore did, in fact, regard
some of the beliefs of Common Sense as self-evident beliefs.
The second main point we tried to establish was that Chappell's
JT>retation is not likely the one which best expresses
Moore's intentions; at least as this relates to certain
claims which Moore makes about immediate knowledge in Some
Maim Problems of Philosophy
,
claims which Chappell seems to
think support his interpretation. Now our purpose will be
to offer an interpretation of Moore's appeal to Common Sense
which is, in my opinion, more in accord with his more inclu-
sive epistemological approach both as a Common Sense philo-
sopher and as a sense-datum philosopher. To reach this
interpretation, I am suggesting, we need to obtain a much
broader perspective of the epistemological position involved
in Moore's appeal to Common Sense. This broader perspec-
tive is achieved by viewing Moore's appeal to Common Sense
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in terms of an answer he gives with respect to a fundamental
problem in epistemology: a problem which Roderick Chisholm
calls the "problem of the criterion."
I. The Problem of the Criterion
Chisholm distinguishes two pairs of questions:
(A) What do we know? l?hat is the extent of our knowledge?
(B) How are we to decide whether we know? k?,at are the
criteria of knowledge?!
And what he terms "the problem of the criterion" presents
itself in the following way: It would seem that if you do
not have an answer to the second pair of questions, then you
will not obtain an answer to the first pair of questions.
On the other hand, it would also seem that if you do not
already have an answer to the first pair of questions, you
will not arrive at an answer to the second.
Put differently, if you have no criterion or criteria
for sorting out what things you know from those you do not
know -- if you have no way of deciding whether you do, in
fact, know the things you think you know -- then you cannot
hope to arrive at an answer to question (A); you will not
know what it is you do know or how far your knowledge extends.
Yet, it would seem equally true that if you do not already
know what things you do know or how far your knowledge extends.
Roderick M, Chisholm, The Problem of The Criterion
.
The Aquinas Lecture 1973 (Milwaukee; Marquette University
Press, 1973), p. 12.
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you will not obtain an answer to question (B); you will not
know how to go about deciding whether you know, you will not
know what the criteria for knowing are. For to know whether
your criteria actually succeed in sorting out cases of knowl-
edge from cases that are not, you already have to know what
it is you do know and what it is you do not know. 2 And so,
one position to take with respect to this problem is to con-
tend that, since you cannot answer either question without
answering the other, neither question can be answered. You
do not know what are the criteria of knowing and you do not
know what it is you know.
Chisholm gives the name "sceptic" to a philosopher
who takes this position.^ It is to be understood, however,
that a sceptic with respect to the problem of the criterion
is not the same as a sceptic with respect to our knowledge
concerning the external world. A sceptic with respect to
our knowledge concerning the external world will say that
we do have an answer to question (A). He will say that we
know little if anything to be true and that our knowledge
does not extend beyond, say, what we know to be true about
our own subjective mental states. Following Chisholm's
practice, we will use quotation marks to indicate when we
are talking about the sceptic ("sceptic") with respect to
the problem of the criterion.
^Ibid., pp. 12-14. ^Ibid., p. 14.
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There are at least two other positions to take, as
Chisholm observes, with respect to the problem in question.
Each of the two positions he mentions implies that we can
answer one of the two pairs of questions (A) and (B) with-
out presupposing an answer to the other. The "methodist"
will be a philosopher who says that he does have an answer
to question (B) and that in terms of this answer he can
figure out an answer to question (A). The "methodist" thus
begins with a criterion (criteria) of knowing and then on
the basis of it, decides what it is he and others know and
what the extent of our knowledge is.^
We observed that Hume's first principle says, in
effect, that the way you decide whether your belief in the
existence of anything you have not directly apprehended is a
genuine case of knowledge and, hence, completely justified
is to see whether you know that something which you have
directly apprehended is a sign of its existence. And if
you follow the second principle telling you whether what
you directly apprehend is a sign of the existence of some-
thing in which you believe, you will find that you do not
know that material objects exist — this principle tells
you that your belief in the existence of material objects
is not a justified belief. Thus, Hume takes the "methodist"
approach to the problem of the criterion. He assumes that
‘^Ibid., pp. 15-18.
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in order to really know and, thus, be completely justified
in our belief that material things exist, we need a prin-
ciple or set of principles to which we appeal to decide whe-
ther we know such things. His principles, if accepted, have
the consequence that the Common Sense belief that we do in
fact know that material things exist is never a justified
belief.
A third alternative to either the "sceptic's" position
or the "methodist* s" is what Chisholm labels "particularism."
The "particularist" is a philosopher who begins with the
assumption that "in order to find out whether you know such
a thing as that this is a hand, you do not have to apply
any test or criterion. in other words, the "particularist"
will maintain that there are certain beliefs which we are
completely justified in accepting — and assuming the other
conditions of knowledge are met, know to be true -- without
our having to appeal to principles to decide this, and that
on the basis of these beliefs we then go on to formulate
our principles or criteria of knowledge. The "particularist"
believes that he has an answer to question (A) above and then,
if he carries out his program, will attempt to arrive at an
answer to question (B).
Thus, a "particularist" does not wish to hold that
our knowledge is, so to speak, "unprincipled" in the sense
that there is no distinction which can be drawn between
justified and unjustified beliefs. He simply denies that we
^Ibid.
,
p. 22.
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must be aware of what these principles are before we can
decide in specific cases whether we know certain propositions
to be true. Unlike the "methodisf in his approach to the
problem of the criterion, the
"particularistn begins with the
assumption that these principles will countenance specific
cases in which we think that we already have knowledge and,
SO, completely justified beliefs.
rhoi L;- A * we know to be good and to theCbelietsZ]we know to be bad. Knowing what we do about* *ourselves and the world, we have at our disposal certaininstances which our rules or principles should countenanceinstances which our rules or principles ’
bv And, . . .we assume thaty investigating these instances we can formulate cri-teria which any instance must satisfy if it is to becountenanced and we can formulate other criteria whichany instance must satisfy if it is to be ruled out orforbidden.®
II. Moore as a "Particularist"
I am suggesting, along with Chisholm, that Moore was
a "particularist" in his approach to the problem in question.
^
And although Chisholm only mentions Moore in passing, I
think we can elaborate on Moore's "particularist" approach
and its consequences for his appeal to Common Sense.
In his refutation of Hume's principles Moore claims
that
"the strongest argument to prove that Hume's principles
are false is the argument from a particular case, like
this in whicl^we do know of the existence of some mate-
tial object [_that is, like the case in which Moore
^Ibid., pp. 35-36. ^Ibid., pp. 20-21.
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(believes he) knows that this pencil existi].-8
Some pages later he adds to this by saying:
it xs obvxouQ 4_ — ,
the existence of a materi^ ^ °instance, no princiole which particular
of the existeLe of invtMnc
® = ’=hat 1 cannot know
which are not fulfilled in the^c^^*" conditions
can be regarded af^est^b^Lhed^'^^?^e°Lrf «•
rL?:r^^ari^^ec^?r?rsp^tl^f‘^r o1
drtions named were not fulfilled, \ould L^Lfficient
true!?
Principle and to pr^ve that L wfs not
Moore goes on to make it clear, however, that this should
not be taken to imply that
fi'ii
general principles as to the
Tr inf knowledge must be hopeless and uselessIt o ly follows that in our survey of the particular’
which our principle is to be based, we
^ery careful not to reckon as instances of thecases where we obviously do not know something, instances
the'^rhf^
obvious that we do not knowt ing m question.
It is my contention that, when viewed at a more funda-
mental level, Moore's rejection of Hume's principles is
really the rejection of a methodological assumption which
is implied by one's acceptance of these principles over
Moore's simple claim to know that this pencil exists. The
assumption in question is that we need criteria or principles
to decide whether we are completely justified in claiming to
know such a proposition as that this pencil exists. And it
is important to keep in mind that it is this "methodist"
QMoore, Some Main Problems
, pp. 125-126.
^Ibid., p. 143. l°lbid.
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assumption which Moore is here denying and that he is not
expressing the view that singular propositions, for example,
•This pencil exists,' are more certain than general philoso-
phical principles such as Hume's. Although Moore would
agree that his specific claim to know that this pencil exists
xs more certain than Hume's general principles, this is not
the crucial point he is making as a "particularisf in his
approach to the problem of the criterion. The "particularist'*
IS not opposed to general principles, as Moore's words above
make evident, but rather to the idea that a knowledge of these
principles is required to decide in specific cases whether we
know, for example, that material objects like this pencil
exist. If we do have such knowledge in specific instances,
then so much the worse for a principle which, like Hume's,
says that these cases are not cases of knowledge.
In challenging Hume's principles with a specific
instance in which a material object is known to exist, Moore
is defending the "particularist" approach to the problem of
the criterion. On my view, what Moore would offer as a
justification for accepting his simple claim to knowledge over
Hume's principles is his belief that here is a case one can
recognize as an instance of knowledge without appeal to a
principle to decide this. More fundamentally, it is Hume's
"methodist" position that Moore is challenging when he rejects
Hume's two principles. For these two principles are formu-
lated on the assumption that we do not already have an answer
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to the question, "What do we know?"
of this fundamental assumption that
of simple Common Sense propositions
Hume.
And it is the rejection
underlies Moore's defense
against sceptics such as
If I am correct, then, it is Moore's
"particularist"
approach to the problem of the criterion which actually calls
for the rejection of Hume's principles and not his alleged
view that his Common Sense belief in the existence of this
pencil is a self- justified belief. Klemke, it seems to me,
makes Moore out to be a "methodist" in saying that Moore
appealed to the criterion of self-evidence to justify his
acceptance of Common Sense propositions. ^ But it is Moore's
belief that we do not need to appeal to criteria in accep-
ting a proposition such as 'This pencil exists' which actually
defines his disagreement with a philosopher like Hume. Not
only is Klemke mistaken in representing Moore as a "methodist,"
Moore simply does not hold the view that Common Sense propo-
sitions are self-evident, as we have seen.
Nor does Moore hold the view that Common Sense propo-
sitions, though not self-evident, are evidentially ultimate
in that there are no further propositions which justify our
acceptance of them. As we have also seen, Moore, in all
liklihood, does not subscribe to Chappell's view that Com-
mon Sense proposition cannot be justified by more basic propo-
sitions. Moore holds only that a Common Sense belief, such
11 See page 108 above.
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as the one used in his refutation of Hume's principles, is
going to be more certain than any other proposition from
Which it may follow or be deduced. At least this is what
S°gg.Main Problems of Phim...rw„ ^nd this view
of Moore's is compatible with saying: (1) that there are
propositions which are certain in a sense in which no Com-
mon Sense proposition about the external world is certain; 12
(2) that these propositions serve to justify our acceptance
of Common Sense propositions; (3) that the relation between
Common Sense propositions (about the external world) and the
more basic propositions which justify them is not deductive.
In short, Moore's position is quite compatible with the idea
that criteria can be formulated which countenance the beliefs
of Coiranon Sense and which provide a non-deductive means of
justifying such beliefs in terms of still more basic propo-
sitions. What is involved in this idea will be briefly dis-
cussed under the heading "Completing the 'Particularist'
Program" — the last part of this chapter.
III. Selecting Common Sense Propositions
Moore suggests that it is indeed possible to formulate
certain principles which state the conditions under which our
beliefs are justified and the conditions under which they are
1 o
^^The qualification "about the external world" seems
necessary in view of the fact that 'I have had feelings of
many different kinds' is among Moore's list of Common Sense
beliefs. See "A Defense of Common Sense," p. 34.
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not. 13 But, consistent with his "particularist" approach,
he suggests that the adequacy of such principles is Co be
tested in accordance with whether they countenance or forbid
those cases we antecedently recognize as cases of knowledge.
AS he puts it:
..The mere fact that in any particular instance
I did know of the existence of a material object, in spite of
the fact that the conditions named were not fulfilled, would
be sufficient to upset the principle and to prove that it
was not true. ..14 one might contend, therefore, that there is
a sense in which Common Sense beliefs are basic, ultimate
beliefs for Moore or any "particularist." For a "particu-
larist" simply says that any adequate set of criteria or
principles will countenance propositions like 'This is a hand'
and for this contention he provides no defense. If Common
Sense propositions are simply those which Moore or any "parti-
cularist" selects as being propositions which any adequate set
of criteria for knowing should countenance, then are they not,
after all, being held as basic, self-justified beliefs? Let
us consider this point.
Chisholm has remarked that "we can deal with the pro-
blem [^that is, the problem of the criterion!) only by begging
the question. It seems to me that, if we do recognize this
fact,
. . .
then it is unseemly for us to try to pretend that
1 3
^-•See last passage quoted above.
14,Moore, Some Main Problems
, p. 143.
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it isn’t so,”^^ His point, which 1 think is coriroct, is that
it is not a matter of demonstration as to which approach to
the problem in question is the right one. We will not be
able to "prove” that the "sceptic" is mistaken in his belief
that to deal with the problem of the criterion involves a
circularity, nor that the "methodist" or the "particularist"
is right or wrong, as the case may be, in beginning with
their respective answers to the pair of questions (A) and
(B). To deal with the problem at all involves assuming that
the other approaches are mistaken. Thus, in selecting
"particularism" over, say, "methodism," there is a sense in
which the acceptance of Common Sense propositions is an
arbitrary matter. But from this it will not follow that the
"particularist" must hold the beliefs of Common Sense to be
basic or sel f- justif ied beliefs within his epistemology.
I think we must distinguish two different tasks: (1)
the task of freely choosing the "particularist ' s" position
and, hence, of selecting Common Sense propositions as those
which our criteria of knowing will countenance, and (2) the
^^Chisholm, The Criterion , p. 37.
l^Beginning with their own assumptions about the nature
of philosophical problems in general, some philosophers will
hold that the problem of the criterion is not a problem at
all but only the appearance of one, and that it has no solu-
tion but only a "dissolution." See, for example, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1953)
,
p. It is beyond the scope of our
purpose, however, to answer this particular charge.
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task Of reconstructing the justification of our knowledge
concerning the external world. m beginning this second
task, the decision to accept particularism" as a solution
to the problem of the criterion has already been made and the
lob for the epistemologist now becomes one of setting forth
explicit principles for the justification of propositions
about the external world. Once these principles are formu-
lated, the question "..Ihat counts as your justification for
accepting this (or that) proposition"? does not call for an
arbitrary decision, llhat counts as a correct answer is now
determined by the principles set forth.
V/hat IS involved in this distinction can, I think, be
likened to what is involved in Rudolf Carnap's distinction
between "external questions," questions which call for a
decision to be made concerning the adoption of some concep-
tual framework, and "internal questions," that is, questions
which are answered within some antecedently accepted frame-
work according to its rules. 17 once the decision is made to
accept the "particularis t" position and, hence, to accept
Common Sense propositions as those which any adequate set of
criteria of knowing will countenance, such propositions need
not count as basic, sel f- jus tified beliefs in an effort to
carry out the second of the two tasks mentioned. The criteria
See Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and
Ontology," Meaning and Necessity; A Study in Semantics and
Modal Logic (Chicago ; The University of Chicago Press.
Phoenix Books, 1958), pp. 205-221.
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of knowing which are formulated in an attempt to carry out
this second task, although they will countenance the beliefs
of Common Sense, are principles which state the conditions
under which such beliefs will be justified in terms of what
the "particularist" may hold are still more basic proposi-
tions within his epistemology. If we make the distinction
between (1) and (2) above, there is no reason to suppose that,
because Common Sense beliefs are those freely chosen to be
countenanced by his principles, they will serve as evidentially
ultimate propositions for the "particularist" when he embarks
on the task of reconstructing our justification for knowledge
concerning the external world.
Although one of the two tasks we have distinguished
makes the acceptance of Moore's Common Sense propositions a
matter of choice, it seems to me that his "particularist"
approach to the problem of the criterion parallels a more
promising approach to the problem of justifying inductive
inference. Nelson Goodman observes that "the problem of
induction is not a problem of demonstration but a problem of
defining the difference between valid and invalid predictions ."
\^Jhen Goodman says that the problem of justifying induction is
not one of demonstration, he means that it is not a problem
of showing that there is "some way of distinguishing antece-
dently between true and false predictions
. , .
."19 Accord-
^°Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction. & Forecast (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1955) p. 66.
Ibid
. , p . 65
.
142
mg to Goodman,
"predictions are justified if they conform to
valid canons of induction; and the canons are valid if they
accurately codify accepted inductive practice. "20 Hence,
"the basic task in Justifying an inductive inference is to
show that it conforms to the general rules of induction. "21
And what he calls the "new riddle of induction" we face is,
quite in general
,
the task of formulating these rules in
such a way that they will countenance the inferences we already
accept and recognize as good inductive practice and forbid
those inferences we already accept as bad inductive practice.
To justify an inductive inference, then, will be to
show that it conforms to rules we have formulated on the
basis of having already recognized certain inferences as the
ones we wanted our rules to countenance as valid and certain
others as those we wanted our rules to forbid. Like the
"particularism in his approach to the problem of the cri-
terion, a philosopher sympathetic to Goodman's approach to
induction will assume that he needs no antecedent criteria
to decide whether certain inferences are good and, hence,
should be countenanced by the rules in question, or whether
certain others are not good and should be forbidden by his
rules of valid induction. On the basis of these good and
bad instances, he will then attempt to formulate his rules
stating what conditions any inference must satisfy if it is
to be accepted or rejected.
20 21Ibid.
,
p. 67. Ibid
. ,
p . 66
.
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IV, Sense-data and Justification
It must be conceded that Moore never set for him-
self the task of formulating criteria for knowledge. In
particular, he never set for himself the task of construc-
ting, by means of certain epistemic principles, a theory of
justification for our knowledge concerning the external world
After having affirmed that he had an answer to the question
"W^ do we know?," Moore never went on to provide an answer
to the question "\>/hat are the criteria of knowing?" This is
simply to say that he never completed the "particularist"
program. But it seems to me that had Moore considered such
principles, he would have claimed that propositions about
sense-data should figure in the justification we have for
claims to know propositions about the external world.
In Some Main Problems of Philosophy Moore says that
"the sense-data which we directly apprehend are signs of the
existence of a material object
. . ,
."22 ^e believed, in
other words, that the direct apprehension of certain sense-
data provided some sort of evidence for the belief in the
existence of material objects. But here Moore seemed to
think that he might, nevertheless, know immediately the propo
sition * This pencil exists.'
It might be said: I certainly do not know immediately
that the pencil exists; for I should not know it at all,
unless I were directly apprehending certain sense-data,
and knew that they were signs of its existence. And of
^^Moore, Some Main Problems
, p. 116.
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course I admit, that I should not know it, unless I weredirectly apprehending certain sense-data. But this is
again a different thing from admitting that 1 do not
know it immediately. For the mere fact that I should
not know it, unless certain other things were happen-
ing, is quite a different thing from knowing it only
because I know some other proposition
.
The mere direct
apprehension of certain sense-data is quite a different
thing from the knowledge of any proposition; and yet I
am not sure that it is not by itself quite sufficient
to enable me to know that the pencil exists, 23
Although the direct apprehension of certain sense-
data may be a different thing from the knowledge of any
proposition, I do not see why Moore could not say that the
proposition that he is directly apprehending certain sense-
data is one which confers some sort of evidence on the propo-
sition that this pencil exists — given his view that the
direct apprehension of certain sense-data constitutes a
sign of the existence of a material object, Moore could
allow that 'This is a pencil' is known immediately and yet
claim that the proposition 'I am directly apprehending cer-
tain sense-data' provides some sort of evidence, though
not deductive evidence, for the proposition 'This is a pen-
cil.' Recall that in Some Main Problems of Philosophy ,
a proposition known immediately is one known to be true but
not because some other proposition is known from which it
follows , 2^
23 24Ibid,
,
p, 125, Ibid, , p , 124,
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As Casimir Lewy points out, 25 there are certain pas-
sages in Moore* s writings which indicate that at times he
was not absolutely certain whether or not propositions about
the external world could be deduced from propositions about
sense-data. Moore never says that they can be, but after
maintaining that he "cannot help agreeing with Russell" that
only propositions such as those about one's memory or other
subjective states are known immediately, Moore claims in
Four Forms of Scepticism" that he is more certain that this
is a pencil than he is of the assumption that this proposition
does not follow logically from any proposition known immediat-
ely
.
26
Furthermore, during a course of lectures given in 1928-
29, Moore says that, whether a proposition such as 'This is
a physical thing' is known immediately or is deducible from
what is, depends partly on the analysis of this proposition.
After considering a number of arguments to prove that he does
25 In a letter received from him in response to a writ-
ten request of mine, I asked Dr, Lewy if he could direct me
to passages in Moore's writings which would indicate that
Moore did take propositions about sense-data to be more ulti-
mate than Common Sense propositions. In this letter he expressed
his agreement with the idea that Moore does not regard Com-
mon Sense propositions as those which are "ultimate" in
Chappell's sense of this expression. See page 115 for the
sense in which Common Sense propositions are "ultimate" on
Chappell's interpretation of Moore's "defense,"
9 f\
^Moore, "Four Forms of Scepticism," Philosophical
Papers
, pp . 225-226. As a proposition about one's memory,
Moore cites 'There was a sound like "Russell" a little while
ago.' p. 225, And he holds that sounds are sense-data. See
Some Main Problems
, p. 32.
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not know that this is a physical thing ( where in the context
of his remarks he is pointing to a blackboard), Moore states
one final argument having among its premises these two state-
ments, and I here quote them:
(1) No human being has ever known immediately: This is
a physical thing.
(2) No human being has ever known this by formal deduc-
tion exclusively from premises that were known imme-
diately
.
^
'
Moore's comment on these two premises is: "Now I don't feel
perfectly certain of (1) and (2): . . . whether they are
true partly depends on what I am believing or knowing when I
believe or know 'This is a physical thing,' i.e,, on the
analysis of this proposition or fact. "28
It is not clear why Moore in his lectures of 1928-29
seemed to think that the analysis of, for example, 'This is
a pencil' partly determines whether this proposition is
deducible from what is known immediately . 29 But there may be
an explanation for his saying then that, whether this propo-
sition is known immediately, in the sense in which sense-
^^Moore, Lectures on Philosophy « p. 50.
28 Ibid.
,
p. 50.
^^Moore may have been toying with the idea that ' This
is a pencil' is analyzable strictly in terms of sense-data.
Professor Bruce Aune has pointed out to me that if this is
the case, then Moore might have had something like this in
mind. Suppose 'This is a pencil' is analyzed as 'This is a
set of certain sense-data.' 'This set exists' might then be
deducible from 'These sense-data exist,' where the latter
proposition is known immediately.
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datum propositions are, depends in part on its analysis.
Tliree years before these lectures were given, Moore's
"A Defense of Common Sense" first appeared. ^0 In this paper
Moore says:
It seems to me quite evident that my knowledge that 1 am
now perceiving a human hand is a deduction from a pair
of propositions simpler still — propositions which I
can only express in the form 'I am perceiving this ' and
' This is a human hand. '31
With respect to propositions like ' This is a human hand,'
Moore claims that "two things only seem to me to be quite
certain about the analysis of such propositions
. . .
."32
These two things are
that whenever I know, or judge, such a proposition to be
true, (1) there is always some sense-datum about which
the proposition in question is a proposition -- some
sense-datum which is £ subject (and, in a certain sense,
the principle or ultimate subject) of the proposition in
question, and (2) that, nevertheless, what 1 am knowing
or judging to be true about this sense-dat\M is not (in
general) that it is itsel
f
a hand, , , ,
As these passages seem to indicate, Moore not only
believed that sense-data play a definite role in the justifi-
cation we have for knowledge about physical things, they
figure in the very analysis of propositions about physical
things. If Moore still thought that this was the case in
his lectures of 1928-29, we can understand his saying that
30lt first appeared in Contemporary British Philosophy ,
2d series, vol. 2, ed. J.H. Muirhead (London: George Allen
6c Unwin, 1925), pp, 193-223.
^^Moore, "A defense of Common Sense," p. 53.
^^Ibid., p. 54. 33xbid.
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whether the proposition
-This is a physical thing- is known
immediately depends partly on its analysis. For 1 should
think that, if Moore still believed to be true about the
analysis of propositions like
-This is a hand- what he did in
his "A Defense of Common Sense," he would hold that at least
these propositions assert is something known
immediately; sense-data are "in a certain sense," as made
explicit by analysis, the ultimate subjects of such proposi-
tions
.
Moore does seem to have been inclined toward some ver-
sion of a foundation theory of justification in which propo-
sitions strictly about the external world are not basic. But
sense—data to be involved in the anal y sis of propo—
sitions like *This is a hand* (that is, propositions which,
on Moore* s view, constitute one of a pair of simpler propo-
sitions from which one*s knowledge that he is perceiving a
physical thing is deduced), Moore is holding what clearly
seems to be a more radical notion that is necessary for a
foundationalist view. It is my belief that Moore was wrong
in suggesting that the subject matter or content of those
beliefs which one regards as basic on a foundationalist view,
whether this content be sense-data or some other subjective
item of experience, should figure in the analysis of propo-
sitions about the external world. However, we can appreciate
how this more radical notion of his might bring about an
uncertainty as to what principles are required to justify
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propositions about the external world in terms of subjective
propositions about sense-experience. On Moore's view, what
would otherwise count as being only the content of a subjec-
tive proposition is already (implicitly) involved as an ulti-
mate subject in propositions about the external world.
Moore appears to have considered a number of ways in
which subjective propositions — on his view, propositions
about sense-data — might be said to be involved in the justi-
fication of our knowledge concerning the external world. At
times he expressed some uncertainty as to whether from these
propositions we could deduce propositions about the external
world; at other times he thought that whether propositions
about the external world are known immediately or are dedu-
cible from purely subjective propositions depended in part on
the analysis of propositions like »This is a pencil' or 'This
is a hand.' He even considered the possibility that his knowl-
edge or belief that this is a pencil might be based on an
analogical or inductive argument. In the course of examining
one of Russell's sceptical arguments, Moore writes:
. . .
he [iRusselFj assumes: (1) My belief or knowledge
that this is a pencil is, I do not know it immediately,
and if also the proposition does not follow logically
from anything that I know immediately, in some sense
'based on' an analogical or inductive argument; and (2)
what is 'based on' an analogical or inductive argument
is never certain knowledge, but only more or less pro-
bable belief. And with regard to these assumptions, it
seems to me that the first must be true in some sense or
other, though it seems to me terribly difficult to say
exactly what the sense is. What I am inclined to dispute,
therefore, is the second: I am inclined to think that
what is 'based on' an analogical or inductive argument.
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in the sense in which my knowledge or belief that this isa pencil IS so, may nevertheless be certain knowledge andno^ merely more or less probable belief,
He closes these remarks, however, with his familar sort of
claim that he is more certain that he does know that this is
a pencil than he is of either one of Russell's assumptions . 35
Moore was never certain as to how propositions about
sense-data might provide evidence for one's belief in the
existence of an external world. But once his sense-datum
philosophy is brought in line with his "particularist" approach
to the problem of the criterion, I think we are justified in
saying this: Whatever criteria or epistemic principles Moore
might have agreed were the ones required to countenance the
beliefs of Common Sense, they will be principles telling us
how we can justify our Common Sense beliefs in terms of still
more basic propositions
,
36 xf we are right in saying this,
then I think we have at least the outline of an interpreta-
tion of Moore's defense of Common Sense which, unlike
Chappell's interpretation, reflects both Moore's methodologi-
cal approach as a "particularist" and his epistemological
concerns as a sense-datum philosopher.
3^Moore, "Four Forms of Scepticism," pp, 225-226,
^^Ibid,
,
p, 226,
3^However, given Moore's "particularist" approach, he
would say that one does not need to be aware of these princi-
ples in order to be justified in claiming to know a Common
Sense proposition.
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V. Completing the "ParticuLarist" Program
Chisholm has developed further the "particularist"
position which, I have suggested, may be found in Moore's
defense of Common Sense. He has gone on to offer a set of
epistemic principles which tell us under what conditions
various subjective propositions " tend to confer reasonable-
tend to confer acceptability
.
. .
.n37 proposi-
tions about the external world. These principles, if correct,
provide a non-deductive (as well as a non-inductive) means of
justifying propositions about the external world in terms of
more ultimate propositions. Chisholm believes that what
will count as the more ultimate, subjective propositions to
which these principles apply are those describing "self-pre-
senting" states. He writes;
A man's being in a certain state is self-presenting to
him at a given time provided only that (i) he is in that
state at that time and (ii) it is necessarily true that
if he is in that state at that time then it is evident
to him that he is in that state at that time, 38
Examples of what Chisholm calls "self-presenting" states
are the state of thinking that one perceives (or seeming to
perceive) and the state of thinking that one remembers (or
seeming to remember). 39
Chisholm's idea here is that if, for example, a per-
^^Chisholra, Theory of Knowledge , forthcoming revised
edition, p, 133.
38Chisholm, The Criterion
, p, 29.
39 Ibid,
,
p. 30,
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son thinks that he perceives something to be a hand then it
follows from his so thinking, that he is lustified in think-
ing that he perceives something to be a hand. 40 other
words, thinking that one perceives something to be a hand is
a "mark of its own evidence"41 and, furthermore, under cer-
tain conditions confers reasonableness upon the proposition
that one perceives something to be a hand as well as the
proposition that something is a hand. So on Chisholm's view,
to say that a person's being in the state called "thinking
that he perceives that something is F" is a criterion for the
proposition 'something is F' being one that is reasonable for
that person, can be explicated by the following epistemic
principle:
^ believes (jthink^ that he perceives somethingto have a certain property F, then the proposition thathe does perceive something to be F, as well as the propo-sition Jhat there IS something that is F, is one that is
reasonable for S.42
This principle is one of four such principles which,
Chisholm would hold, provide the ‘'particularist" with cri-
Chisholm is not suggesting that propositions des-
cribing “self-presenting" states are incorrigible. He does
not hold the view that if a person believes that he is think-ing that he perceives something to be a hand, then it follows
that his belief is true. For a criticism applicable to
Chisholm*s definition of “self-presenting states," especially
condition (ii) in his definition, see Lehrer. Knowledge,
pp. 119-121.
'^^Chisholm, The Criterion
, p, 30.
^^Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge
, p. 45.
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teria for justifying our beliefs about the external world in
terms of other, still more basic beliefs. 43 And the more
general idea motivating the formulation of such principles
is the contention that
in addition to the 'rules of deduction' and the 'rules ofinduction,' there are also certain basic 'rules of evi-dence,* The deductive logician tries to formulate thefirst type of rule; the inductive logician tries to for-
mulate the second* and the epistemologist tries to for-
mulate the third. 44
In accordance with this contention we might alter a suggestion
of Moore's. Moore says in "A Defense of Common Sense" that
he is not at all sceptical about the truth of Common Sense
propositions but only uncertain about their correct analysis . 45
In light of Chisholm's conception of the task facing the epis-
temologist we might say, and I think this sums up the "parti—
cularist" point of view: There is no doubt as to the truth
of Common Sense propositions but only an uncertainty as to
exactly what "rules of evidence," epistemic principles, will
be required to countenance these propositions as completely
43xn all there are nine epistemic rules stated in his
Theory of Knowledge
,
but only four of these tell us how to
justify propositions about the external world on the basis of
certain subjective propositions. See pp. 44-54,
Objections by way of counterexamples to Chisholm's
rules as formulated in his Theory of Knowledge can be found
in^Herbert Heidelberger
,
"Chisholm's Epistemic Principles,"
Nous 3 (1969): 73-82. Chisholm's revisions and corrections
are to be found in his paper "On the Nature of Empirical
Evidence" in Roderick M. Chisholm and Robert J. Swartz, eds..
Empirical Knowledge: Readings from Contemporary Sources
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
:
Prentice-Hall
,
1973)
,
pp. 224-249
.
44chisholm, Theory of Knowledge
, p, 2.
45ivioore, "A Defense of Common Sense," p. 53.
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justified.
Conclusion
Chisholm's specific version of the criteria or epis-
temic principles which a "particularisf seeks may not have
met with Moore's exact approval, that is, had Moore himself
carried out the "particularist" program in full. Further-
more, it is certainly controversial whether the evidentially
ultimate propositions to which the principles should apply
will be of the sort Chisholm defends. ^6 Nevertheless, 1
think it is plausible to view Chisholm's principles, or some
modification of them, as being in the spirit of the epistemo-
logical position involved in Moore's defense of Common Sense.
Once Moore's defense of Common Sense is freed of the notion
when understood in the way Moore conceived it, it is a
defense of certain self- justified beliefs, there is no reason
to suppose that at least some version of Chisholm's prin-
ciples do not genuinely supplement Moore's position.
Moore's "particularist" approach to the problem of the
criterion, when conjoined with his sense-datum epistemology,
lends itself less naturally to Chappell's interpretation
than to the following interpretation. Although the beliefs
^^See, for example, Roderick Firth's paper "Ultimate
Evidence" in Perceiving
.
Sensing and Knowing
,
ed. R.J. Swartz
(Garden City," N.Y. : Doubleday, 1965), pp. 486-496. Firth
claims that since a person may have adequate sensory evidence
that an object is F even though he does not believe that he
perceives it to be F, propositions describing sense-experience,
and not propositions describing Chisholm's "self-presenting
states," are the ones to which these principles should apply.
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of Common Sense are going to be those we want our theory of
knowledge to countenance as completely worthy of our accep-
tance, they are not going to be the evidentially ultimate
propositions we start with in attempting to provide criteria
for the justification of our knowledge concerning the exter-
nal world. On this interpretation, Moore’s appeal to cer-
tain Common Sense propositions as premises in philosophical
argument is not an appeal to what he thought were self-justi-
fl-sh beliefs but rather an appeal to the ’’particularist”
approach to the problem of the criterion.
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